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“There is a kind of pseudo-science. Social science is an example that’s not a science. They 
follow the forms, they gather data, they do so and so. (But) they’re not (scientists), they sit at 
the typewriter and make up (all sorts of stuff like), “Food grown with organic fertilizer is 
better than food grown with non-organic fertilizer.” May be true, may not be true. And it 
hasn’t been demonstrated one way or the other…(As a physicist), I’ve found out how hard it 
is to get to really know something, and therefore when I see how they (social scientists) get 
their information,…I have a great suspicion.” 
 




                                                          






“Positivism” is an approach to social inquiry that dominates the discipline of International 
Relations (IR). For positivists, this dominance is justified because positivism yields us 
scientific knowledge of world politics. In response, my thesis reconstructs positivism’s 
argument and argues that positivism fails to yield evidence at least, and scientific knowledge 
at most. Most fundamentally, positivism fails because our present-day concepts – such as 
“democracy” and the “GDP” – are too ambiguous. To remedy this, I draw a lesson from two 
theories in Physics and Mathematics: Primitive Recursive Arithmetic and Newtonian 
Kinematics. I outline their method of “Lego-languages” that we in IR can use to construct 
unambiguous concepts. I argue that the first step to using this method, is for IR scholars to 







In the body of my thesis, I had to power through my argument. Thus, I couldn’t conduct a 
frank discussion of the philosophical debt my thesis has accrued. I discuss this here as 
intellectual honesty demands that I reveal every idea that inspired this thesis.  
 
In parts one and two, I critique positivism. My main inspiration is Kant’s “Transcendental 
Dialectic” section in his Critique of Pure Reason. In this section, Kant showed how the then-
contemporary metaphysical arguments pertaining to God, the Soul and the Universe are 
fundamentally irresolvable. This is because these concepts of “God” etc. are more generally, 
ambiguous, and more specifically, ‘unconditioned’ by our sensory experiences. More 
specifically, given such ambiguity, metaphysicians can generate equally compelling 
arguments for and against any claims they make about God, the Soul and the Universe.  
 
I then thought that perhaps, our extra-sensorial, ambiguous and abstract concepts such as 
“democracy” and “ideology” are of the same type as those three metaphysical ones Kant 
attacked. The only difference is that we have the critical, historical distance to see problems 
with the former, but lack that distance for the latter.  
  
Unfortunately, while Kant taught me what to say, he could not tell me how I could say it – 
that is, to say it in a way that’s both relevant for IR, and which banks solely on good, 
accessible argument, rather than the intellectual prestige of Kant. Thus, I had to scour for 
intellectual resources from various places – such as mathematical logic, the philosophy of 
language and so on. These intellectual resources are evident in the body of this thesis.  
 
Parallel with this suspicion of mine is an acquaintance with Physics. Having some (mostly 
popular, qualitative) understanding of Physics, I could not help but notice a gap between how 
this (actual, prototypical) science proceeded, with the purported “scientific method” that 
KKV propounded. I noticed at the very least that, 1. Physical theories are fundamentally 
descriptive and not causal, and (as you will see) 2. Physicists spend a lot of effort 
conceptualizing and defining their concepts (such as “space”, “time” and “energy”), so much 
so that you might mistake them for (mathematically-adept) philosophers. Now, contemporary 
physicists might dismiss number 2., but that is because their ancestors like Einstein and 
Newton have already done that hard work for them.  
 
More generally, I saw a gap between the depth and rigour of physical theories (like Quantum 
Mechanics and Relativity) and the depth and rigour of those ‘mainstream’ theories peppering 
IR. In fact, at least with regards to sophistication and rigour, I found that physical theories 
had more in common with those of Continental philosophers like Lacan and Heidegger. 
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The positive, third part of my thesis is inspired by Heidegger, who argues that all theoretical 
inquiry is (as an activity, existentially) grounded in our concrete, everyday experience. I have 
elaborated on this in my undergraduate thesis. 
 
Parallel with my reading of Heidegger however, is my attempt at learning logic and 
mathematics (for the latter, primarily, Real Analysis, although I haven’t gotten far yet). I 
realized that their basic concepts (“and”, “not”, “sets”, “relations” etc.) are those that are not 
only mind-bogglingly simple, but ones that we can use to describe our concrete, everyday 
experiences. In fact, in the course of studying logic and mathematics, I frequently found 
myself having (and being able) to come up with simple, everyday examples to 
unambiguously concretize and internalize these new ideas I were encountering.  
 
Thus, I began to suspect that the (conceptual) foundations of mathematics (and physics) is 
founded on concrete, everyday experience. More importantly, I thought that concrete (or 
sensory) experience can provide a foundation for IR, if not the social sciences as a whole. It 
is this that inspires the third part of my thesis. 
 
In addition, my focus on language/propositions is influenced by logical-positivist and formal-
logical philosophies of science (for the latter, especially the subfield of “Structural Realism”). 
Also, my overall philosophical disposition towards science is also largely anti-Realist and 
influenced by Kant. That is, scientific theories are a humanly constructed scaffold to 
organize/help us wrap our heads around surface phenomena (or, things as they appear to us), 
they need not and sometimes do not aim to describe things as they are in-themselves. This 
philosophy falls under Patrick Jackson’s category of “Analyticism.” 
 
Finally, I must also mention that I am, at this point of my education, ignorant of statistics – 
although I hope to remedy this during my upcoming stint as a PhD student. Thus, I apologize 
should my critique of positivism be in part or as a whole, flat-footedly unaware of the 
statistical foundations of positivist social science. This is a weakness of mine that I have been 
acutely aware of in the course of writing this thesis, and I will be very glad if there are 
interlocutors willing to have a frank, open-minded and rigorous2 discussion of this issue (on 





                                                          
2I mean this in the mathematical sense of the term. A rigorous discussion begins from scratch, starting from 
definitions and a bunch of simple assumptions, then slowly proceeding step by justified step to more advanced 
propositions (or theorems). Most importantly, a rigorous discussion cannot appeal to convention or authority. 
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The discipline of International Relations (or, IR) has engaged in regular bouts of 
methodological/philosophical introspection. This has led Brown (2014)3 to remark that we in 
IR do too much introspecting to the neglect of substantive research. Others like Monteiro and 
Ruby (2009)4, as well as, Katzenstein and Sil (2010)5 also concur.  
Nonetheless, methodological introspection – pertaining especially to issues 
surrounding the use of ‘the scientific method’ – is lively in pockets of IR. Patrick Jackson’s 
2011 The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations is an exemplar of such 
methodological introspection.6 Likewise, the European Journal of International Relations 
and Millennium have recently launched special issues tackling such topics.7  
One striking commonality in such introspective works is an engagement with 
“positivism” – a particular methodological approach to social science most famously 
propounded by King Keohane and Verba (1994).8 Positivists believe that (social) science 
makes, and finds evidence for, causal propositions. The way to find evidence for it, they 
                                                          
3Chris Brown, "Ir as a Social Science: A Response," Millennium - Journal of International Studies 43, no. 1 
(2014).  
4Nuno P. Monteiro and Keven G. Ruby, "Ir and the False Promise of Philosophical Foundations," International 
Theory 1, no. 01 (2009).  
5Rudra Sil and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics: Reconfiguring 
Problems and Mechanisms across Research Traditions," Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 02 (2010).  
6Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its 
Implications for the Study of World Politics(NY: Routledge, 2011).  
7Cora Lacatus, Daniel Schade, and Yuan (Joanne) Yao eds., "Special Issue- Quo Vadis Ir: Method, 
Methodology and Innovation," Millennium - Journal of International Studies 43, no. 3 (2015). Colin Wight and 
Tim Dunne eds., "Special Issue-the End of International Relations Theory? ," European Journal of International 
Relations 19, no. 3 (2013). 
8See Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for 
the Study of World Politics, Chapter 3. For examples of works spanning the continuum of pro to anti-positivist, 
Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative 
Research(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). Henry Brady and David Collier, eds., Rethinking 
Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards(Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010); Steve Smith, Ken 




believe, is to posit an independent and dependent variable, and see if they co-vary ceteris 
paribus. Among such introspective works are those critical of positivism. Chief among those 
are interpretivists who chastise positivism for its naïve faith in the ‘scientific method’.9  
However, there are anti-positivists sympathetic to positivism’s quest for science. 
Scientific Realists – learning from the philosophy and practice of science – have expressed 
doubts regarding the positivist view of causal evidence.10 Likewise, Patrick Jackson has 
dislodged the definitional monopoly positivists have over the word “science”, arguing that 
there are other non-positivist ways to study world politics scientifically.11 
My thesis is a continuation of these methodologically-introspective works that are 
firstly, sceptical of positivism, but secondly, keen on establishing IR as a scientific discipline. 
In my thesis, I argue negatively, that positivism fails to yield evidence at least, and is 
unscientific (even pseudo-scientific) at most. The crux of this problem is that our concepts in 
IR are too ambiguous. In response and more positively, I argue that the first step to 
(re)establishing IR as a scientific discipline is for us to describe our sensory experiences of 
world politics using autoethnography and possibly, filmmaking.  
My entire thesis is divided into three parts. The first part reconstructs what positivism 
is. The second part says why it fails, and the third part posits a solution to address this failure. 
Each part is constituted by three chapters, which are in turn constituted by sections, which are 
in turn constituted by sub-sections. My chapters are numbered “1.1”, “1.2” and so on. 
Chapter 1.1 for example, refers to the first chapter of the first part, while chapter 3.2 refers to 
the second chapter of the third part.  
                                                          
9For example, Steve Smith, "Positivism and Beyond," in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, ed. Steve 
Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski(NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996).  
10The best exponent of this genre of Scientific Realist IR is Milja Kurki, Causation in International Relations: 
Reclaiming Causal Analysis(NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008).  
11Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the 
Study of World Politics, Last Chapter.  
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In chapter 1.1, I reconstruct the tenets of positivism from scratch. I argue that a 
positivist is one who aims to maximize good evidence for or against general, causal 
propositions. They believe that such good evidence is found if there is ceteris paribus 
covariation between an independent and dependent variable. In chapter 1.2, I survey the 
articles in the top three IR journals from 2010-2014, and furnish evidence that positivism is 
dominant in IR. In chapter 1.3, I translate positivist jargon on research design into my own 
framework of “evidential chains.” This concludes the first part of my thesis.  
In chapter 2.1, I define the basic notions of intension and extension used in examining 
concepts. In chapter 2.2, I look at the use of indicators in IR and argue that they fail to yield 
evidence for or against causal propositions. In chapter 2.3, I look at the use of indices in IR – 
that is, measures that aim to measure a concept ‘holistically’ – and argue that they too fail 
because our concepts are too ambiguous. Insofar as all positivist works rely on either 
indicators or indices, all positivist works in IR fail because they either rely on indices or 
indicators. This concludes the second part of my thesis.  
In chapter 3.1, I look at the implications of my anti-positivist argument. The 
implications are two-fold. More broadly, with positivism rendered unscientific, IR is at a loss 
on how to establish itself as a science. More narrowly, as our concepts in social science are 
(as I will call it, multiply) ambiguous, how can we construct unambiguous concepts? In 
chapter 3.2, I tackle these two questions by drawing lessons from two theories in mathematics 
and physics – Primitive Recursive Arithmetic and Newtonian Kinematics – and show how 
they painstakingly define their concepts from the ground-up. More importantly, physicists 
and mathematicians define their concepts first before doing more advanced steps like 
theorizing or describing.   
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From these two examples, I distill a methodological lesson pertaining to 1. how we 
can hope to place IR on a scientific footing, and 2. how we can construct unambiguous 
concepts. This involves the construction of what I call, a Lego-language, where – like how a 
handful of elementary Lego-bricks can be assembled into complex Lego-structures – we 
concatenate unambiguously simple (or, primitive) concepts to gradually form compound (or 
‘jargoned’) concepts. More importantly, the first two parts of my thesis is a demonstration of 
this Lego-linguistic method in practice.  
In chapter 3.3, I apply this lesson to IR. Specifically, I examine Iver Neumann’s At 
home with the Diplomats12 – a work I take to be the closest IR has come to taking the sensory 
seriously. I show firstly how Neumann is able to excise ambiguity from his language by 
restricting himself to a description of his sensory experience. I then show how we can draw 
out three unambiguous primitive concepts – “persons”, “positions” and “information-









                                                          
12Iver Neumann, At Home with the Diplomats: Inside a European Foreign Ministry(Ithaca, NY: Cornell 













Part 1: What is Positivism?    
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This first part aims to do three things. Firstly, reconstruct what positivism in social 
science/IR is, secondly, furnish evidence for why the contemporary IR is dominated by 
positivists, and thirdly, translate all talk about positivism into my framework of “evidential 
chains.”  
 
Chapter 1.1: Positivism’s Tenets 
 
 In this section, I argue that the following conditions are sufficient for a scholar to 
qualify as positivist. Informally, these conditions are also the doctrinal tenets of positivism. In 
arguing for this moreover, I lay out and build from scratch, the jargoned grammar and 
vocabulary via which my thesis, and social science more generally, proceeds. The conditions 
are:  
 
1. [With respect to epistemic aims] Positivists aim to maximize our evidence for or 
against our propositions about the social world. 
 
2. [With respect to propositional scope] Positivists are interested in maximizing 
evidence for only a subset of propositions, they are: general causal propositions. 
 
3. [With respect to its technique of pursuing evidence] Positivists think the only way to 






In contrast, positivism’s two primary opponents – scientific realists and (both radical and 
moderate) interpretivists – disagree with some or all of these positivist tenets.  
 
Prelude: A Picture of Social Science as Wholly Constituted by Propositions about Social 
Reality 
 
 Let’s start from the basics. What is my chapter concerned with? Positivism. But what 
is positivism concerned with? Social science. Specifically, it prescribes a particular way of 
doing social science. But what is social science? I hope in this sub-section to lay out a general 
reconstruction of social science all positivists, and even some of its opponents, will agree 
with.  
My reconstruction, as you will see, verges on banality, but that’s good news: 
banalities are uninformatively correct and uncontroversial, but correct and uncontroversial 
nonetheless. Specifically, I see social science as wholly constituted by propositions about 
social reality,13 where there are two relations propositions stand relative to. The first is a 
proposition-utterer/hearer relation, marked by issues of (subjective) belief about the 
truthfulness of a proposition, and the second, a proposition-object relation, marked by issues 
of the (objective) truthfulness of a proposition itself.14  
                                                          
13John Gerring, Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework(NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
Chapter 6.  The layout of Gerring's overall book seem to hint at such a belief. Robert Keohane, "Beyond 
Dichotomy: Conversations between International Theory and Feminist Theory," International Studies Quarterly 
42, no. 1 (1998): 196, para.1.  
14Richard Kirkham, Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 26. This 
two-fold distinction I'm making maps on to what Kirkham calls the "justificatory project" in various theories of 
truth. In this project, truth is not construed qua truth (as relation with some object), but rather construed as being 




It is via such a distinction that I rescue positivism from critiques against its alleged 
hubris, this alleged hubris being positivism’s supposed faith that the ‘scientific method’ will 
yield us ‘objective truth’ about the world.15 Positivism as I will show, seeks to maximize, not 
objective truth, but good reasons (or, pieces of evidence) for why we should subjectively 
believe in the truth (or falsity) of a proposition.16 My purpose however, is not positivist 
apologia; my later sections critique positivism by showing how its equivocations provide it 
no safe refuge.  
We can now start by defining social science as the (scholarly) examination of social 
reality. Note how two distinct but related human activities are contained within this 
definition. The first human activity (or set of human activities) is “social reality”, composed 
of activities like elections, war, trade etc. The second human activity is “scholarly 
examination”, composed of activities like theorizing, publishing, attending conferences etc.   
 These two activities are distinct insofar as for example, a scholarly examination of 
war is not the same as war itself. The former would involve trawling through military 
archives, while the latter involves the brutal business of fighting and dying. There are 
nonetheless related insofar as one [scholarly examination] is about – or takes as its object – 
the other [social reality].17 Positivism – as a view about social science – can then be seen as 
                                                          
15Jim George and David Campbell, "Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Difference: Critical Social 
Theory and International Relations," International Studies Quarterly 34, no. 3 (1990): 272-77. Dvora Yannow, 
"Thinking Interpretively: Philosophical Presuppositions and the Human Sciences," in Interpretation and 
Method: Empirical Research and the Interpretive Turn, ed. Dvora Yannow and Peregrine Schwartz-
Schea(London: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), 8-11.   
 
16King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, 8-9.  This 
as we will see, is a more precise restatement of KKV's equivocation that "the conclusions of (positivist social 
science) are uncertain."  
 
17Alfred Tarski, "The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics," Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 4, no. 3 (1944): 343-45.  
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functioning at a meta-level, that is: it is a scholarly examination, about our scholarly 
examinations, about social reality.18  
 Just as war produces death, and trade produces wealth, I propose that sentences are 
the primary (and I daresay, only) entities that scholarly examinations (or scholarship) 
produce.19 This might sound strange to you, the reader, but there are two ways to justify this. 
Firstly, scholars express their ideas only either via writing or speaking, both of which involve 
the production of literal sentences. Secondly, more common but fanciful construals of 
scholarship as the production of “knowledge”, “ideas” or “interpretations”20 likewise have 
these knowledge claims or interpretations spoken or written down in actual sentences. Hence, 
the strangeness of my construal lies not in its wrongness, but in the generality and literalness 
of construing “sentences” as the products of scholarship. In addition, one can (and usually 
does) concatenate sentences to form theories or descriptions of some state of affairs.  
 Sentences however, come in many types, but scholarship (primarily) produces just 
one type: propositions. Propositions are sentences, spoken by a speaker, that aim to tell us 
what the speaker believes is true about some state of affairs.21 Hence, “pigs don’t fly” is a 
proposition (and a true one at that), but so is “all oranges are purple”; false ones count too 
because propositions are merely expressions of belief (true or otherwise) about states of 
affairs. In contrast, other types of sentences such as exclamations (like “huh?” or “you’ve got 
                                                          
18Ibid., 349-51.  
19Alan Richardson, Carnap's Construction of the World: The Aufbau and the Emergence of Logical 
Empiricism(NY: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 6-9.This is a view of inquiry articulated by arch-Logical 
Positivist, Carnap. Whether positivists in social science buy into such a view Positivists (in philosophy) hold is 
unclear. But at the very least, the former positivists can be made to be agreeable with this view.   
20King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, 6. Terence 
Ball, "Deadly Hermeneutics, or, Sinn and the Social Scientist " in Idioms of Inquiry: Critique and Renewal in 
Political Science ed. Terence Ball(NY: SUNY Press, 1987). 
21Kirkham, Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction, 57.  One must note that the debate over what a 
proposition is is highly contentious among philosophers. For a philosopher working in this topic, my definition 
is even in a most charitable reading, a terrible one.  
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to be kidding me.”), and imperative ones (like “go there, quick!”) cannot be reasonably 
construed as products of scholarship.22 
 Propositions can be either true or false (or lying somewhere in between).23 For 
example, “all bachelors are unmarried” is obviously true, and “no apple is red” is patently 
false, while “this restaurant is unsanitary” – uttered by a fussy patron – probably has its 
truthfulness lying somewhere between (absolute) truth and falsity.  
I can now distinguish two relations propositions stand relative to. The first is the 
relation between speaker and proposition, insofar as propositions express its speaker’s belief 
(about some state of affairs).24 The second is the relation between proposition and reality 
insofar as a proposition is about some thing in reality.25 I call these relations a proposition’s 
subjective and objective relations respectively, insofar as the former relates the proposition to 
its uttering subject, while the latter relates the proposition with the object of concern (in the 
world). These two relations are marked by the distinct, but related issues of belief and truth 
respectively.26  
In the following sections, I examine both the subjective and objective relations, 
showing that positivists maintain a healthy dose of scepticism regarding the difficulty of 
                                                          
22Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 22-23. These numbers 
refer to Wittgenstein's numbering, not the pages. 
23Kirkham, Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction, 47-48; Tarski, "The Semantic Conception of Truth and 
the Foundations of Semantics," 342. Propositions are in this case "truth-bearers", which is: they are entities that 
bear the property of being either true or false. For example, it is absurd to say that this entity, this chair, is true 
or false, but it makes sense to say that this entity, this proposition "this chair is in this room", is either true or 
false. Friedrich Kratochwil, "Evidence, Inference and Truth as Problems of Theory Building in the Social 
Sciences," in Theory and Evidence in Comparative Politics and International Relations, ed. Richard Ned Lebow 
and Mark Lichbach(NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 45-46. 
24Linda Zagzebski, "What Is Knowledge? ," in The Blackwell Guide to Episteology, ed. John Greco(Malden, 
MA: Blackwell, 1999), 94; Hilary Putnam, Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Volume 3(NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983), 83-85.  
25Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Volume 3, 83-85.   
26Kirkham, Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction, 120-22. Duncan Pritchard, What Is This Thing Called 
Knowledge? (NY: Routledge, 2006), 5. 
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truthful correspondence between proposition and object. In this respect alone, positivism and 
most of its opponents share common ground.27    
 In sum, social science can be stylized as involving the production and examination of 
propositions – such as “democracies are more peaceful.” and “the hypothesis that 
democracies are more peaceful is wrong.” Where propositions have the property of standing 
simultaneously in two distinct but related subjective and objective relations, marked by issues 
of belief and truth respectively.  
 
Positivism’s Epistemic Aims: Pursuing Evidence and not necessarily Truth. 
 
 While I have spelt out what social science ‘is’, what then do positivists think we 
social scientists should do? It is here that I introduce the notion of “evidence.” Before I do 
that however, the notions of “belief” and “truth” must be more precisely defined. Belief is a 
subjective attitude one has towards the truth of a proposition, while truth pertains to the extent 
of objective correspondence between a proposition and its object. It is entirely possible that 
we possess belief in relation to some false proposition, or disbelief in relation to a true one. In 
other words, truth and belief while related, do not entail each other.28  
 This non-entailment opens a gulf between belief and truth: we can never say that such 
and such a proposition is (objectively) true.29 To say that a proposition is true is nothing more 
                                                          
27King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, 8-9. 
Friedrich Kratochwil, "Constructing a New Orthodoxy? Wendt's "Social Theory of International Politics" and 
the Constructivist Challenge," Millenium 29, no. 1 (2000): 92. Colin Wight, "A Manifesto for Scientific Realism 
in Ir: Assuming the Can Opener Won't Work," Millenium 35, no. 2 (2007): 383-86. 
28Edmund Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?," Analysis 23, no. 6 (1963). The disjoint between truth, 
belief and (evidential) justification is best illustrated in this paper.   
29Putnam, Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Volume 3, 277-81; Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in 
International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics, 44-52. This 
statement reflects a deflationist (or as Putnam puts it, "disquotational") account of truth. Deflationism thinks that 
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than to profess a belief that it is true, but given that belief doesn’t entail truth, this belief of 
ours might be wrong.30 In other words, if our hands write it, our mouths speak it, or our 
brains think it, that uttered proposition simply expresses belief, and not necessarily truth, 
even though it might. Put more starkly, belief is nothing more than our subjective guesses at 
the truth of a proposition.  
 We can certainly posit a range of possible guesses about the truth of any proposition. 
We can guess that it is either utterly false, absolutely true, or more true than false and so on. 
Thankfully, such guesswork isn’t like the one we make at roulette. This is because attached to 
these possible guesses are better or worse (normative) reasons why we should and should not 
make such a possible guess.31 For example, I have more good reasons to guess that the 
proposition “no orange is purple” is true, than to guess that it’s false. As belief is equivalent 
to subjective guesses, there are then in this example, more good reasons for me to believe in 
the proposition’s truth, than its falsity.  
 Evidence then, refers to these reasons for and against our various possible guesses at 
the truth and falsity of propositions.32 In this respect, evidence – once gathered – is related 
only subjectively to our belief about a proposition’s truth.33  
                                                          
to assert that a statement is true is nothing more than to assert that statement itself, and vice versa. My 
invocation of a deflationist definition of truth here stands in prima facie tension with my definition of truth as 
correspondence in the previous paragraph. As a reconcilation, I view deflationism as applying to a proposition's 
subjective relation (of course a subject would think his assertion is true) while correspondence applies to a 
proposition's objective relation. 
30Putnam, Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Volume 3, 278. Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, 
Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology(NY: Clarendon, 2004), 3. 
31Trent Dougherty, "Introduction," in Evidentialism and Its Discontents, ed. Trent Dougherty(NY: Oxford, 
2011), 1-5.  
32Conee and Feldman, Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology, 1. Dougherty, "Introduction," 22-23. My 
construal of beliefs as "subjective guesses" is informed by a notion of epistemic fallibilism, which is really a 
view every informed student of the issue of "knowledge" can and should hold, or at least take seriously.  
33Patrick Rysiew, "Making It Evident: Evidence, Evidentness, Justification and Belief," ibid., 209-10. Richard 
Fumerton, "Evidentialism and Truth " ibid.  This statement reflects more an internalist-evidentialist position, in 
constrast to an external-evidentialist one. Internalists think that evidence is solely about attempts at the 
justifications of belief (hence, internal to a subject's belief states), while externalists think that evidence involves 




 More concretely, evidence can come in many forms: sensory experience, statistical 
inference, textual exegesis, experimentation etc.34 What counts as good and appropriate 
evidence depends solely on the subject matter of the proposition. Experimental evidence 
would be strange if it functions as evidence for historical propositions, and the products of 
textual exegesis are inadequate as evidence for physical laws.  
Evidence is nonetheless, related some way, somehow, objectively, with the object of 
the proposition but this relation is pertinent only in the process of gathering evidence, and not 
evidence’s status once we’ve got it.35 For example, gathering evidence for a particle physics 
theory might involve interaction with its object (say, electrons), but such evidence once 
gotten, pertains solely to our subjective guess at the truth of that theory. Moreover, it is 
entirely possible that good evidence can be egregiously suppressed or ignored by (even) an 
entire scholarly community. This is however, an issue of evidence’s reception, not of 
evidence qua evidence.36  
 I/we can next assert one more property of evidence: that for any one proposition, there 
exists multiple pieces of evidence for, or against it (whether already found or yet-to-be-
found). In this respect, it makes sense to talk about a piece, or multiple pieces of evidence. 
 Positivists then simply seek to maximize the pieces of evidence we (social scientists) 
have regarding the propositions we make about the social world.37 Of course, a prerequisite 
for such evidence is that they must be good – where what counts as good evidence is 
                                                          
34Ted Hopf, "The Limits of Interpreting Evidence," in Theory and Evidence in Comparative Politics and 
International Relations, ed. Richard Ned Lebow and Mark Lichbach(NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 60-61; 
Pritchard, What Is This Thing Called Knowledge? , Part II.  
35There is nothing in the literature on evidentialism that suggests this. Its relative youth means that it hasn't yet 
considered the process of gathering evidence.   
36Kratochwil, "Evidence, Inference and Truth as Problems of Theory Building in the Social Sciences," 29-32.  
37King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, 16-17, 48.  
In p.48, KKV writes: "In general, we wish to bring as much information (read: evidence) to bear on our 
hypothesis as possible." 
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contentious and will be explicated two sub-sections down. In short, the goal of positivist 
social science is nothing more than a pursuit of (more and more pieces of good) evidence.  
The purpose of evidence (in-itself, and for positivists) is then not to hubristically 
proclaim some attainment of ‘objective truth’, on the contrary, evidence is merely something 
that help positivists make better subjective guesses at the truth of a proposition.38 
Consequently, uncertainty is an integral part of positivism’s epistemic aim: assuming that we 
can never finish collecting all possible pieces of evidence for any proposition, we cannot 
consequently be certain about any proposition’s truth.39 We can of course, be more certain 
than before, if we possess more evidence than before.  
    
Positivism’s Propositional Scope: Just General, Causal ones 
 
 I now examine a subset of propositions positivists are interested in.  
More generally, if X is a subset of Y, whatever that can be said of all members of Y 
can also be said of all members of X, but not vice versa.40 For example, all animals can move 
and so do all cats, but not all animals meow even if all cats do. Hence, while I have provided 
an account of all ‘animals’/propositions above, I now proceed to give an account of 
‘cats’/general causal propositions, a subset of propositions all positivists are interested in. As 
we will see in this sub-section, there are (‘cat’-like) issues unique to this subset of 
                                                          
38Ibid., 29.  KKV writes here that "Theory and data collection are both essential aspects of the (positivist 
research) process by which we seek to decide whether a theory should be provisionally viewed as true or false." 
Note the provisional nature of truth or falsity.  
39Ibid., 8-9.  
40Patrick Hurley, A Concise Introduction to Logic, 11th ed.(Boston, MA: Wadsworth, 2012), 218-19.  
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propositions, even while, as will be evident in the next sub-section, (‘animal’-like) issues of 
truth and evidence range over it. 
  Positivists are interested in a subset of propositions, namely, general, causal 
propositions. I now spell out how positivists can see what general causal propositions qua 
propositions, are. In this respect, I merely examine the propositional, and hence, linguistic 
content of general causal propositions.41  
Tentatively ignoring the issue of propositional generality, we see that causal 
propositions describe a particular kind of relation between two things.42 What this particular 
relation is however, involves asking the notoriously difficult question about the nature of 
causation.43 So let’s leave it vague for now. In any case, causal propositions can be 
symbolically expressed in the form “aCb”, which reads “a is related to b (in a causal 
manner).”44  
For example, “democracy (a) has a positive causal impact (C) on peace (b)”, or “A 
Republican president (a) leads to the existence of (C) a bellicose US foreign policy (b).” 
What’s important is its three pertinent components: the two things (a and b) and its causal 
relation (C). Note how propositions like “All countries in 2014 are democratic” don’t count, 
as only one thing (the set of all countries), and its attendant property, is posited.  
 Let’s now assume that there exists some causal propositions that can be parsed out 
into more than one particular instances (themselves also expressed propositionally) where it 
                                                          
41Eric Grynaviski, "Contrasts, Counterfactuals and Causes," European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 
4 (2013). Grynaviski is the only IR scholar, as far as I know, who took a linguistic view by examining what we 
(do and should) mean in our causal propositions.  
42Gerring, Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework, 128-29.  
43Kurki, Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis, Introduction.  
44This symbolism is conventional in mathematics and logic.  The aCb vs. aRb distinction will figure in my later 
distinction between hypotheses and causal propositions.   
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is meaningful to speak of the “a”, “b”, and “C” in question.45 I (imperfectly) define 
“meaningfulness” as a property of a proposition, describing how the proposition is not being 
gibberish.  
One such causal proposition is “Letting an apple go from one’s hand (a) causes (C) 
the apple to fall (b).” Here, this causal proposition can be meaningfully parsed out into one of 
many instances of say, “Julius Caesar in 50 BC let an apple go from his hand (an instance of 
“a”), causing (C) his freshly picked Gaulish apple to fall (an instance of “b”)”; other 
pertinent instances also include, “Neil Armstrong let an apple go in outer space, but this 
didn’t cause it to fall (due to an absence of gravity).”  
In social science, US foreign policy during the Nixon administration is an instance of 
the general causal proposition about presidencies and US bellicosity. In contrast, the 
aforementioned propositions about Julius Caesar isn’t a legitimate/meaningful instance of the 
proposition about Republican-presidential bellicosity. Their “a-s”, “b-s” and “C” do not 
match up, so to speak: it will be gibberish to talk about falling apples as being instances of 
American bellicosity.  
 Causal propositions which can be parsed out in such a manner, I call, general causal 
propositions. In social scientific parlance, such particular instances of general causal 
propositions are called “cases”,46 where a case for some general, causal propositions has to be 
                                                          
45Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery(NY Routledge, 2002), Chapter 3, and Section 28. My treatment 
of this issue corresponds more closely with Popper's more cursory and less rigorous treatment of this issue. The 
relation between particular causal statements and general causal statements are however, a thorny issue in the 
philosphical literature on probabilistic causation. For a sample, Christopher Hitchcock, "The Mishap at 
Riechenbach Fall: Singular Vs. General Causation," Philosophical Studies 78, no. 3 (1995). Also, David Lewis, 
"Causation," The Journal of Philosophy 70, no. 17 (1973): 558, no.2. 
46John Gerring, "What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For? ," The American Political Science Review 98, 
no. 2 (2004): 341-42.  
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such that it is meaningful to speak about the “a”, “b” and “C” in question. Hence, a case is 
defined only relative to the general causal proposition it is an instance of.47  
More precisely however, I have only dealt with the linguistic properties of our 
propositions about cases – i.e. that they meaningfully purport to describe instances of, and 
are hence related to, general causal propositions. Conversely and more formally, a 
proposition is a general causal proposition if and only if it firstly, has the form “aCb”, where 
C expresses a causal relation, and secondly, there exists a reasonably large handful of 
meaningful propositions describing particular instances/cases of it.  
 Interpretivists part company with positivists in this respect: all general causal 
propositions are for them, meaningless, and thus, non-existent.48 This is because ‘cases’ 
possess their own incommensurably idiosyncratic definitions of the “a-s” and “b-s” in 
question (most famously, idiosyncratic definitions of “democracy” across countries).49 
Hence, talking about say, Peruvian “democracy” as a case of “Democracy” in general 
(defined in largely ‘Western’ terms), is for all intents and purposes, gibberish. It is akin to 
speaking of Caesar’s falling apple as an instance of Republican presidencies.  
 
The Ceteris-Paribus Picture of Positivist Causal evidence. 
  
Given then that positivists aim to maximize our evidence for propositions, how do 
they maximize evidence for not just any propositions, but general causal propositions? To 
                                                          
47Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework, 103-04.  
48Robert Adcock, "Generalization in Comparative and Historical Social Science: The Difference That 
Interpretivism Makes," in Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research and the Interpretive Turn, ed. Dvora 
Yannow and Peregrine Schwartz-Schea(London: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), 57-65.  
49Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," The American Political Science Review 
64, no. 4 (1970): especially 1050-52.  
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jump the gun, the one-line answer is this. Positivists think that the only kind of good evidence 
for some (general) causal proposition, is ceteris paribus covariation between the independent 
and dependent variables expressed in a hypothesis derived from it [that (general) causal 
proposition].50  
But this answer is currently undefined as we don’t have the vocabulary to understand 
it. More specifically, what do we mean by “independent” and “dependent variable”, “ceteris 
paribus” and “hypothesis”? More importantly, why do positivists think that this counts as 
good causal evidence?  
 Let’s now backtrack. We only currently have an understanding of what “evidence”, 
“general causal propositions”, and the subjective and objective relations of “propositions” 
are/mean.   
 To begin, I examine the assumptions positivists hold when talking about causal 
relations?51 The first assumption is that there exists a(n ‘external’) world. The second is that 
the world is populated by entities – states and institutions, for example. 52 The third 
assumption is that entities have the capacity to affect other entities in the world. In this 
respect then, as the former entity is responsible for some change in the latter entity, we say 
that the former entity caused some change in the latter, and both of them are causally 
related.53  
                                                          
50King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, 77-79. Paul 
Kellstedt and Guy Whitten, The Fundamentals of Political Science Research(NY: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 197-98. 
51Harold Kincaid, "Causation in the Social Sciences," in The Oxford Handbook of Causation, ed. Helen Beebee, 
Christopher Hitchcock, and Peter Menzies(NY: Oxford, 2009), Section 3.  
52Paul Holland, "Statistics and Causal Inference," Journal of the American Statistical Association 81, no. 396 
(1986): 945, RHS, para.2. RHS stands for "right hand side" and LHS will stand for "left hand side." 
53Gerring, Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework, 128-29.  
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The fourth assumption – and one anti-positivists wrongly caricature positivists for not 
holding54 – is that the world is constituted by a complex multiplicity of causal relations 
between entities.55 Given this fourth assumption, positivists think that the world is such that it 
isn’t just one causing entity (or, a causal factor) that’s responsible for some change in the 
caused entity.56 They believe that for some causal effect (that is, change in the caused entity), 
a multiplicity of causal factors are/were responsible for that said effect.57 This fourth 
assumption paints a picture of the world that looks like a giant tug of war between causal 
factors.58 The causal effect (the outcome of the tug of war game) depends on a multiplicity of 
players (causal factors) pulling in opposing directions, at varying (causal) magnitudes.  
Therefore, what positivist (general) causal propositions express, is not a belief that 
just one causal factor is responsible for some outcome, rather, it merely expresses a causal 
power (or contribution, or force) one entity exerts on a causal outcome.59 Such propositions 
about this force (say, Republican presidencies causing US bellicosity) can still be true even if 
it’s actually negated in the hurly-burly of the tug of war game (by say, a pacific Congress and 
a war-averse American public). Analogously then, asserting a general causal proposition of 
the form “aCb”, is much like saying “Joey (a player in the tug of war) exerted five units of 
force in the left hand direction.” This is a possibly true statement one can find evidence for, 
                                                          
54Kurki, Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis, 259.  
55James Mahoney and Gary Goertz, A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the 
Social Sciences(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 56-60. Kincaid, "Causation in the Social 
Sciences," Section 3, First Presupposition. 
56Mahoney and Goertz, A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences, 
52. This can be inferred from the structure of both quantitative and 'qualitative' equations.  
57Ibid.  
58Stephen Mumford and Rani Lil Anjum, Getting Causes from Powers (NY: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
19-45. I deliberately chose such a Scientific Realist metaphor for causes. It is one also already reflected in a 
stylized linear regression equation. If linear regressions are typically positivist, then Scientific Realists (in social 
science, not philosophy) have nothing to critique positivists about in this respect.  
59Kellstedt and Whitten, The Fundamentals of Political Science Research, 199. I credit also, Prof. Soo Yeon 
Kim for making this point in her research design class. 
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even if Joey’s contribution is (actually, and/or known to be) insignificant in the grand scheme 
of things.60  
How then do positivists find evidence for general, causal propositions? To do so, 
positivists think we must derive a related but separate set of propositions. These propositions 
are called, “hypotheses”, and they describe not causes, but co-variation. More generally, 
hypotheses take on the form “xRy”, which reads “x co-varies with y.”  
But what do we mean by “co-variation”? More importantly, why are hypotheses 
necessary, why the additional step? This is due to positivists’ fourth assumption of causal 
complexity. Given a multiplicity of causal relations in the world, how then can we be (more) 
certain when an entity really does exert a causal force on some causal outcome? It could have 
been any other causing entity, or set of entities.61 For example, in pushing a stalled vehicle, 
how do I know I really contributed anything to its moving, in the midst of a gale (blowing in 
the direction of the car’s motion), while standing on a downhill, greasy road? Analogously, is 
Joey really participating in that tug of war?   
In any case, the derivation of hypotheses from general causal propositions is itself 
underpinned by more assumptions. Beyond the four already mentioned, the fifth assumption 
is that entities have properties.62 The sixth assumption is that some of these properties can 
change: states can become democratic or lapse into despotism, state-systems can turn from 
pacific to war-prone and back again. Since some of these properties can change, we say that 
                                                          
60King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, 87-89.  
KKV here show how their (or rather, the Neyman-Rubin) model of causation they employ is compatible with 
notions of multiple causality. I think they're absolutely right in all respects.  
61Ibid., 82-84.  




these properties allow for variation63, and since that is the case, these properties are, in social 
scientific parlance, called “variables.”  
A hypothesis describes conditions under which we have good evidence for a (general) 
causal proposition. It demands evidence for two things: firstly, evidence that the caused entity 
did change in some way, and secondly, evidence that the causing entity had some 
contribution in that change. Evidence for the first is easy to specify. Positivists think that we 
just need to specify the property of the caused entity that we believe, changed (say, European 
inter-state relations changing its property from being belligerently unstable to pacifically 
stable).64 This constitutes the ‘y’ in the “xRy” form of a hypothesis. This ‘y’ is called the 
“dependent variable” (abbreviated as the “DV”) insofar as it specifies a property of some 
entity whose variation depends on some other entity (that putatively caused it).65 
Consequently, if we observe variation in the dependent variable, this constitutes evidence that 
a caused entity did change in some way.66 
How then can we furnish evidence that a causing entity has some responsibility for 
that said change? Positivists think the first step is to specify some property of the causing 
entity that should change as a result of it [that causing entity] actually acting on the caused 
entity.67 For example, should I have put effort into pushing, rather than merely pretend to 
push the stalled vehicle, I (the causing entity), will perspire profusely (have a change in some 
                                                          
63Kellstedt and Whitten, The Fundamentals of Political Science Research, 105, 5.8.4. Strictly speaking however, 
this variation need not be on a continuum (i.e. something that's continuous), it can vary discretely, where one 
example is varying dichotomously (for example, war/no war for some states of affairs).  
 
64Gerring, Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework, 92-93.  
65Kellstedt and Whitten, The Fundamentals of Political Science Research, 8.  
 
66Holland, "Statistics and Causal Inference," 947. Strictly speaking, my logic in this paragraph is muddled 
because I neglected to mention that causation is the case only if when the change in the DV occurs under ceteris 
paribus conditions. But I defer talk of the ceteris paribus situation for now for reasons of style. 
 
67As far as I know however, no positivist has framed the IV in these terms as I do. My framing of it is 
idiosyncratic to my particular lingusitic architectonic of "entities", "properties" "evidence" and the like. It's not a 




property of mine). This vari-able property, or variable in short, constitutes the ‘x’ in a 
hypothesis of the form “xRy”. To distinguish it from the dependent variable, it is called the 
independent variable (abbreviated as the “IV”) – named rather misleadingly as such only 
insofar as it is the variable that is not the dependent variable.  
Taken in conjunction then, should we observe the IV and DV changing (or varying) 
together, we then say that there is co-variation between the two.68 Hence, at this point of my 
presentation, we can say we possess some degree of evidence for some causal proposition if 
we observe covariation between the two variables expressed in a hypothesis derived from it.  
Note that strictly speaking (for more reasons that will be clear soon), it is meaningless 
(and not just false) to say that the independent variable causes the dependent variable: me 
perspiring doesn’t contribute in causing the stalled vehicle to move.69 This is because 
hypotheses do not describe causal relations in the world, they merely describe the conditions 
under which we can say we possess a piece of evidence for a general causal proposition. 
  Nonetheless, merely seeing covariation is insufficiently good evidence for a causal 
proposition. This is because social scientists have stumbled across instances where despite 
observing covariation, their inference that a causal relation exists turn out to be spurious. 
Most generally, the root of these spurious inferences is believed by positivists to be due to a 
third entity (a “confounder”) that causally affects the two expressed in a causal proposition.70 
This confounding causal relation is such that it simultaneously changes the (independent and 
dependent) variable properties, resulting in covariation between the ‘x’ and ‘y’ of a 
hypothesis.  
                                                          
68Kellstedt and Whitten, The Fundamentals of Political Science Research, 56.  
69Piergiorgio Corbetta, Social Research: Theory, Methods and Techniques(London: Sage, 2003), 60-64.  
70Kellstedt and Whitten, The Fundamentals of Political Science Research, 59.  
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However, causal responsibility for such covariation lies in this third entity and not in 
any putative causal relation between the two entities in question. All this leads to the famous 
injunction to young students that “co(variation) is not causation.”71 In this respect, mere 
covariation is susceptible to what I call, evidential inflation: it can get passed off as evidence 
in support of a causal proposition that isn’t actually true.  
But mere covariation is also susceptible to evidential deflation, where not observing 
covariation leads us to believe that no causal relation exists, when it actually does.72 This, as 
mentioned, is due to the hurly-burly of positivism’s tug-of-war picture, where other causal 
factors can and do thwart the contribution of one factor on a causal outcome. For example, I 
might actually push the stalled vehicle and perspire profusely (leading us to observe variation 
in the IV) but the vehicle fails to budge due to an engaged handbrake (leading us to observe 
no variation in the DV). This lack of covariation leads to evidential deflation insofar as it 
makes one think that I, the vehicle pusher, am making no causal contribution, when in fact, 
I’m making some. 
Solving this problem, in the ideal, is nonetheless, very simple: create a ‘world’ (or 
rather, situation) where we forcibly remove every entity other than the two of interest! This 
solves evidential inflation insofar as confounders are now annihilated. And this solves 
evidential deflation insofar as other players in the tug of war (especially those in the 
‘opposing’ team) are now expelled from the game.  
This situation is called a ceteris paribus73 situation, and it is one we can in varying 
degrees, approximate in practice. A perfect approximation is those seen in high school 
                                                          
71Corbetta, Social Research: Theory, Methods and Techniques, 91.  
72While positivists strictly speaking, don't talk about such evidential deflation, I include this as a partial pre-
emption of Scientific Realist talk about dormant causal powers. See note 75 in this thesis for more details.  
  
73David Collier, Jason Seawright, and Gerardo L. Munck, "The Quest for Standards: King, Keohane and Verba's 
Designing Social Inquiry " in Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, ed. David Collier, 
Jason Seawright, and Gerardo L. Munck(NY: Rowman and Littlefield 2010), 70-76; Henry Brady, "Doing Good 
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laboratory experiments. If for example, we want to see whether mixing two chemicals will 
cause an explosion, we simply mix just those two chemicals!74 This mixture might be rare 
outside the laboratory because these two chemicals co-exist with a myriad others in a myriad 
of local contexts.75 Here, a cetris paribus situation is actually created: the situation features 
                                                          
and Doing Better: How Far Does the Quantitative Template Gets Us? ," ibid. Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in 
International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics, 66. Gerring, 
Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework, 133. 
 
King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, 77-78. 
 
Why this term "ceteris paribus" hasn't been used right off the bat by KKV and in discussions about positivist, 
quantitative social science is beyond me. Doing this would have cleared up the otherwise muddled 
misunderstandings anti-positivists have of (the especially quantitative) positivist method (for example, Kurki in 
note 54 of my thesis). My guess is that KKV borrowed Holland’s (partial) borrowing of Lewis' term of 
"counterfactual" causation - Lewis being the philosophical parent of the positivist understanding of causation – 
incognizant of the philosophical context (of possible worlds and modal logic) informing Lewis' use of that term.  
 
See also Paul W. Holland, "Statistics and Causal Inference: Rejoinder," Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 81, no. 396 (1986): 970 ; Clark Glymour, "Statistics and Causal Inference: Comment: Statistics and 
Metaphysics," ibid. 
 
What Lewis is really talking about is the ceteris paribus conditional. This diffidence to paraphrase the words of 
these philosophical and statistical 'masters' gets transplanted to our discipline, to the detriment of clear 
discussion. This ceteris paribus notion of causation, for the purpose of social science, has almost absolutely 
nothing to do with "counterfactuals" as social scientists understand the term. Plus, positivists are not flat-footed 
finders of mere correlational regularities.   
 
Lewis, "Causation," 560, paras. 2-3; Counterfactuals(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1973), 3, 16.  In place of "ceteris 
paribus (relative to situation X)", Lewis uses the phrase "most similar to (situation X)." Kincaid, "Causation in 
the Social Sciences," Section 1. Kincaid here explicitly calls it "ceteris paribus." Also, Gerhard Schurz, "Ceteris 
Paribus Laws: Classification and Deconstruction " Erkenntnis 57, no. 3 (2007). 
 
For a piece that correctly uses the term “counterfactual”, see Grynaviski, "Contrasts, Counterfactuals and 
Causes." The foreigness of his counterfactual formulation (where "that X caused Y, explains why Y actually 
happened, rather than Y'. which didn't happen) is instructive of the misunderstanding of the term among 
positivists.  
 
74Schurz, "Ceteris Paribus Laws: Classification and Deconstruction " 357-58. Rebecca Morton and Kenneth 
Williams, Experimental Political Science and the Study of Causality(NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
43. 
 
75Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the 
Study of World Politics, 91-92.  Strictly speaking however, Jackson is here speaking about dormant causal 
powers, not those already active causal powers of entities drowned out in the hurly-burly of other active causal 
powers that I've been talking about. Metaphorically, such dormant causal powers are Joey (a player in the tug of 
war) temporarily taking a break from the game. To see how much force in which direction that Joey contributes 
to the game, the researcher has to intervene and pull Joey up to force him to 'get back in the game'. It is also this 
dormant-active distinction that I think, Jackson correctly identifies as the real defining contribution of Scientific 
Realism (by calling attention to the former kind of causal powers positivists overlook). In my later, very brief 
'critique' of Scientific Realism, I however, egregiously overlook this contribution by Scientific Realists (for 
reasons of stylistic economy/simplicity).  
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only those two chemicals (and a possible attendant explosion) of interest in some causal 
proposition.  
The second best approximation (and a recent fad among positivists)76 is control-group 
experiments. A ceteris paribus situation is here not created, but approximated. Its logic can 
be illustrated by the following example, where the aim is to test the proposition that exposing 
people to angry images causes anger in them. There are however, many competing causal 
factors causing anger besides these images, such as missing the bus, among others.77 To solve 
this, participants are randomly assigned to two groups. As random assignment is the case, 
both groups have equal proportions of people missing the bus, waking up on the wrong side 
of the bed etc.78 Hence, the net/average causal impact of competing causal factors are equal 
for each group, reflected in each group’s ideally equal measures of anger, quantified at say, 
+67. You can intuit how this extends to the universe of all competing factors, even to those 
the researcher cannot even begin to imagine, let alone measure.79   
All the researcher has to do then is expose just one group to the angry images (that is, 
do something that varies the independent variable). If the exposed group now has its overall 
anger measured at +70, while the other has an anger-measure of +67, the net causal impact of 
angry images on anger is then inferred to be +3, ‘ceteris paribus’.80 Here, a ceteris paribus 
situation is not created because competing causal factors are not forcibly removed. It is 
approximated insofar as random assignment is such that the causal impact of all these 
competing factors are believed to cancel each other out.81  
                                                          
76Morton and Williams, Experimental Political Science and the Study of Causality, Chapter 1.  
77Ibid., 45.  
78Ibid., 47.  
79Ibid., 44-45.  
80Holland, "Statistics and Causal Inference," 947.  
81Schurz, "Ceteris Paribus Laws: Classification and Deconstruction " 351-54.  This draws on Schurz's 
distinction between an exclusive sense of ceteris paribus (where competing causal factors are forcibly removed), 




The third best approximation is the bread and butter of quantitative-positivist social 
science. This is seen in multivariate regression analyses, where the researcher accounts for all 
competing causal factors she can imagine and measure.82 She then – using statistical 
techniques I don’t understand – look at how the independent and dependent variables of 
interest will covary sans all these competing factors.83 Analogous methods can also be seen 
in qualitative research, made most obvious in Mill’s methods of similarity and difference.84 
You can see how these methods are hampered by our limited imaginations and relative 
scarcity of measures vis-à-vis a complex world; this method can’t account for and measure all 
competing factors like control-group experiments can.85 It is for this reason that it’s a third 
best approximation. 
One might of course, point out ellipses in the logic of these aforementioned 
approximations to the ceteris paribus situation. I shall however, give positivism the benefit of 
the doubt, and take these approximations to be equivalent, and just as good as the actual 
ceteris paribus situation seen in laboratories.  
 We see here that ceteris paribus covariation solves the problems of evidential 
deflation and inflation seen in mere covariation; the causal impact from confounders and 
other competing factors are either removed or cancel each other out. Analagously, a ceteris 
                                                          
82For a quantitative-positivist critic of the entire notion of "control variables", see Philip A. Schrodt, "Seven 
Deadly Sins of Contemporary Quantitative Political Analysis," Journal of Peace Research 51, no. 2 (2013): 
294-95. "Seven Deadly Sins of Contemporary Quantitative Political Analysis (Paper Presented at the Apsa 2010 
Annual Meeting) "  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1661045. The author unpacks this a 
little differently and more extensively in p.16-17 of this earlier draft.  
 
Jason Seawright, "Regression-Based Inference: A Case Study in Failed Causal Assessment," in Rethinking 
Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, ed. David Collier, Jason Seawright, and Gerardo L. 
Munck(NY: Rowman and Littlefield 2010). See Seawright also for some methodological and practical 
difficulties in using control variables.   
 
83Kellstedt and Whitten, The Fundamentals of Political Science Research, Section 9.4.  
 
84Jason Seawright and John Gerring, "Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of 
Qualitative and Quantitative Options," Political Research Quarterly 61, no. 2 (2008): 304-06.  
 
85Morton and Williams, Experimental Political Science and the Study of Causality, Section 4.8.  
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paribus situation is us removing every other player, and seeing whether Joey did exert some 
force in some direction, in that otherwise messy tug-of-war. Given such a solution, positivists 
say that the observation of ceteris paribus covariation is a sufficient condition for good causal 
evidence.86 Plus, given that positivists think that it’s difficult to find comparably good 
evidential alternatives besides ceteris paribus covariation, they think that this is the only way 
to find, and hence a necessary condition for good causal evidence.87  
 Good positivist evidence for general causal propositions are then, a very 
straightforward extension to evidence for causal propositions. If, for some general causal 
proposition, the ceteris paribus covariation expressed in some hypothesis derived from it, is 
observed for all cases, evidence is found for a true, deterministic causal relation; if it is 
observed for some/most cases, evidence is found for a true, probabilistic causal relation.88 
 
 
                                                          
86Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, "The Importance of Research Design," in Rethinking Social 
Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, ed. David Collier, Jason Seawright, and Gerardo L. Munck(NY: 
Rowman and Littlefield 2010), 114, para.1.  
 
87Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, 6-8. This can be logically argued as 
follows. KKV asserts that the rules of scientific inference (p,7-8) (should) apply to all evidential facets of 
empirical research (p.6). Given that they equate (in chapter 3) scientific causal inference with a ceteris paribus 
covariational picture, this equivalently means that ceteris paribus covariation should apply to all evidential 
facets of empirical research. That is, according to KKV, all good causal evidence is of a ceteris paribus-
covarational nature. This then logically entails that if a piece of causal evidence is good, then it is of a ceteris 
paribus nature. Which entails (by negating the consequent), that if it is not of a ceteris paribus nature, then it is 
not good (or, bad) evidence. Analogous to how if air is absent, then fire is absent; this therefore means that 
ceteris paribus covariation is a necessary condition for good causal evidence.  
 
88This is actually a wrong characterization of how both qualitative, quantitative and any social scientists view 
causation. I've elided these 'proper' characterizations as they are stylistically incongruent with the way I've laid 
out the issue. And what I think justifies my elision is how my thesis isn't about evidence for the generality of 
causal propositions.  I could talk a lot more about this but the nub of how quantitative scholars gather general 
causal evidence is by taking the average of causal effects across cases, ceteris paribus - where the predicate "is 
in a ceteris paribus situation" applies to groups of entities/cases, not individual entities/cases.   
 
Mahoney and Goertz, A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences, 76-





Positivism in relation to its Scientific Realist Critic, and why those Three Conditions are 
Sufficient for it 
 
 Getting back to the big picture, positivists are interested in causal propositions of the 
form “aCb.” The object of this proposition is some two entities in the world thought to be 
related causally. Finding evidence for causal propositions is however, difficult due to 
positivism’s assumption of causal complexity. Hence, positivists derive hypotheses which 
describe the properties of these entities that should covary ceteris paribus, should a causal 
proposition be true. In social scientific parlance, a causal proposition is said to be (rendered) 
falsifiable (by the scholar) should (the scholar) derive such hypothetical propositions from the 
causal proposition.89   
Thus, while the object of causal propositions are, like all propositions, about some 
object in the world, the object of hypotheses are however, about the subjective relation of 
belief and evidence some causal proposition stand to us.90 In this respect, hypotheses stand at 
a meta-level from causal propositions, looking down at its [the causal proposition’s] 
subjective relation, and having as its object, the grounds of our good evidence for it [that 
causal proposition]. As such, the topic of hypotheses are of a “If I observe P, then I have 
good evidence for Q” nature. It’s about my (or our) observations and my (or our) grounds for 
good evidence.  
  Of course, we often conflate our propositions about an object, with the object itself; 
we, in making the proposition “this table is red”, often think that this table is really red. And 
                                                          
89Gary King, "Restructuring the Social Sciences: Reflections from Harvard's Institute for Quantitative Social 
Science," PS: Political Science & Politics 47, no. 01 (2014): 100-05. That KKV do not adhere fully to Popper’s 
version of falsification is seen in p.101 para.1. 
90Nancy Cartwright, Hunting Causes and Using Them: Approaches in Philosophy and Economics(NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 25-37. I borrow Cartwright's distinction between a causal proposition and 
the warrant/evidence for that said proposition.  
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we also mistakenly think that finding evidence for a proposition means that it is true. This is 
fine for propositions we are pretty certain of (like the redness of that table in front of me), but 
it’s more suspect for the less certain ones we make in social science. Hence, social scientists 
often slip up and say that the independent variable causes the dependent variable.91 But this 
wrong. Worldly objects cause changes in each other, while observations of ceteris paribus 
covariation expressed in a derived hypothesis, are about our grounds of good evidence for 
that putative causal change.92  
Hence, saying that the IV and DV cause each other is meaningless insofar as it 
attributes a property (a causal relation) to objects (grounds of subjective evidential belief 
rather than two worldly objects) it isn’t ‘made’ for. It is akin to saying that “The French 
Revolution was very articulate” when we mean to say “Sue’s presentation on the French 
Revolution was very articulate.” The former is strictly speaking, gibberish.  
Now, a Scientific (or strictly speaking, Critical) Realist might realize that I attribute 
many of their ‘doctrinal’ beliefs to positivists (such as causal complexity and a prioritizing of 
evidence rather than truth).93 But ask any social scientist everyone agrees to be ‘positivist’ 
and I’ll wager that he’ll likely agree with those. Should I win that wager, then it means that 
Scientific Realists have made a (sceptical) positivist caricature94 in order to couch these 
‘doctrinal’ beliefs as novel, when positivists, agree with them anyway. Hence, to Scientific 
                                                          
91Kellstedt and Whitten, The Fundamentals of Political Science Research, 1.3. This is one example of such a 
slip-up. 
92Corbetta, Social Research: Theory, Methods and Techniques, 61.  
93Wight, "A Manifesto for Scientific Realism in Ir: Assuming the Can Opener Won't Work," 384.  
94Heikki Patomäki and Colin Wight, "After Postpositivism? The Promises of Critical Realism " International 
Studies Quarterly 44, no. 2 (2000): 217, paras.1-2. Kurki, Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming 
Causal Analysis, 66-68. 
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Realist talk about “ontological realism” and “epistemic relativism”, a positivist would say: 
well, tell me something new.95 
What Scientific Realists are really saying (or should say) vis-à-vis positivists is that 
yes, causal complexity is the case. But such causal complexity is such that not all (true) 
causal propositions can have their evidential conditions expressed as ceteris paribus-
covariational hypotheses.96 They take issue with the positivist assertion that the only kind of 
general, causal propositions that should slip out of our (scholarly) mouths are those where 
‘testable’ hypotheses can be derived from it; ‘no evidence, no talk’ is the positivist motto.97 
But Scientific Realists think that no, we should at least talk about these causal relations, and 
give professors who do, recognition and tenure. Hence the Scientific Realist counter-motto 
“ontology before epistemology.”98  
In any case, recall the three conditions – first, (positivist) social science pursues 
evidence, and not necessarily truth; second, general, causal propositions are the/(positivists’) 
main propositions of interest; and third, (positivists) think ceteris paribus covariation is the 
only way of gathering good evidence for the aforementioned subset of propositions. How 
then can I show that these conditions are sufficient for a scholar to qualify as positivist?  
To show this, we can first stylize the entire landscape of methodological –isms 
scholars hold, to be such that all scholars are either positivists, Scientific Realists or (radical 
or moderate) interpretivists. It is also fair to say that there exists some scholars (that we can 
denote as “X”) who hold all three beliefs expressed in those conditions stated above. All 
                                                          
95Wight, "A Manifesto for Scientific Realism in Ir: Assuming the Can Opener Won't Work," 224. Jackson, The 
Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World 
Politics, 88-92. Jackson expresses the same sentiment as I have. 
96Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics(NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Chapter 2, 
Section 4.  
97Keohane, "Beyond Dichotomy: Conversations between International Theory and Feminist Theory," 196-97.  
98Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 47.  While this is not exactly what Wendt means by the phrase, 
I think this [i.e. what I wrote in my paragraph] is the general motivation behind the second chapter of his book.  
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Scientific Realists reject the third belief that ceteris paribus covariation is necessary for good 
evidence; hence, no one in X is a Scientific Realist. Moreover, radical and moderate 
interpretivists as mentioned, reject the second (and very likely, third) conditions; hence, no 
one in X is an interpretivist. Given that everyone in X are neither Scientific Realists nor 
interpretivists, everyone in X are positivists (given that it’s the only alternative left). 














                                                          
99Charles Ragin, "Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond," (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 2008), 16, 19-20.  This is due to the equivalence between a sufficient condition and its set-theoretic 
formulation, that is, if all As are Bs then A is a sufficient condition for B. 
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Chapter 1.2: The Dominance of Positivism in Contemporary IR 
 
 In this chapter, I now show how the present-day practice of IR fulfils these three 
sufficient conditions and is thus, positivist. More specifically, I intend here to give evidence 
for the following proposition: the present-day practice of IR is marked by a hierarchy which 
has positivism on top. To do so, I examine the top-3 ranked IR journals (from 2010-2014) 
showing how scholarship overwhelmingly fulfil the three sufficient conditions I’ve 
mentioned.  
 The excel spreadsheet which I record my coding of these articles can be downloaded 
via the URL: http://bit.ly/1KelP8a.100 
In this chapter, I examine the top-3 ranked IR journals. This is based on the 2011 
TRIP survey101. I exclude Foreign Affairs as it isn’t peer reviewed. I however, include the 
American Political Science Review (abbreviated as, APSR) given its prestige, despite it not 
being strictly IR. The top 3 journals are then, APSR, International Organization, and 
International Studies Quarterly (abbreviated as ISQ),.102 I then examine only articles 
published from 2010-2014 as I’m finding evidence for (my proposition about) our 
contemporary practice of IR.  
                                                          
100The cells in blue represent works following a ceteris paribus approach; cells in green are works which don’t, 
and cells in orange are excluded from the count (as they are mostly meta-commentaries on the state of the 
discipline).   
101Daniel Maliniak, Susan Peterson, and Michael Tierney, "Trip around the World: Teching, Research and 
Policy Views of International Relations Faculty in 20 Countries," The Institute for the Theory and Practice of 





 Before I begin however, I give myself a headstart, by assuming that the first condition 
– of IR/social science being a discipline pursuing evidence for propositions – is one held by 
everyone to be unproblematic, and is thus, a condition that is met. 
 For the other two conditions, I found that out of IO’s 104 articles, 83% of them make 
general, causal propositions, and 67% of the 104 articles use ceteris-paribus methods to 
furnish evidence for them. For ISQ’s 243 articles, 77.8% of them make general causal 
propositions, and 71.2% of them use ceteris-paribus methods. For APSR’s 48 IR-focused 
articles, 85.4% of them make general, causal propositions and 77.1% of them use ceteris-
paribus methods.  
 Note firstly, that I have been very strict in coding these articles. Only articles that 
make both general and causal propositions count. Articles that talk about only say, the EU, 
China or the US don’t count. Secondly, I also found that all but one of the ceteris-paribus 
methods used are quantitative (primarily regression, but some experimental). The only 
exception is Johnson and Urpelainen’s 2012 IO article which tried to approximate the ceteris 
paribus ideal using a qualitative case study.103 
 Thus, at least 2/3rds of the articles in these journals have been positivistic in nature, 
and nearly all those positivist works have been quantitative in nature. I’m not sure if 2/3rds 
constitutes a hefty proportion, but if we can agree that it does (especially as a lower bound), 




                                                          
103Tana Johnson and Johannes Urpelainen, "A Strategic Theory of Regime Integration and Separation," 
International Organization 66, no. 04 (2012): see p.656.  
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Chapter 1.3: Translating and Summing up Positivism using 
Evidential Chains 
 
Measurement and Evidential Chains: An Introduction 
 
 I’ve mentioned that for positivists, evidence for ceteris paribus covariation is 
equivalent to good causal evidence. However, as I will show in later chapters, problems 
surface in the process of gathering such evidence, and such problems have its root in the 
“concepts” that we use.  
 A “concept” however, is a meaningless, undefined term at this point. But before I can 
even define the notion of a “concept”, I have to first define the notion of “measurement” and 
“data”, and I shall do it using our existing grammar and vocabulary of “evidence”, 
“propositions” and the like. I do this by translating all talk about positivism into my own 
framework centred around the notion of what I call, “evidential chains.” As an easy 
introduction, I shall give two everyday illustrations of evidential chains at work. Here’s the 
first.  
My cat is suffering from severe itchiness, so I send him to a vet. The vet determines 
that the cause of itchiness is either from a food allergy or from fleas, but is unsure which one. 
Quickly drawing on her professional experience, the vet determines that if there is a severe 
loss of fur, then it’s from fleas, but if there is diarrhoea, then it’s from a food allergy. She 
sees that my cat’s stool isn’t watery (no diarrhoea) but that there is significant fur loss. Given 
this, the vet prescribes anti-flea medication, and after taking it, my cat steadily recovers. 
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 Looking at the above illustration, we see our usual story. To test (or more 
cumbersomely, to gather evidence for whether she should believe in the truth of) the causal 
proposition “fleas are causing this cat to itch”, the vet devises a hypothesis “there is 
covariation between levels of fur loss and levels of itchiness in this cat” which, if good 
evidence is found for it, constitutes good evidence for the causal proposition. There’s nothing 
new in this story, it seems.  
 Let’s look at a second illustration. A novice gardener’s garden has been destroyed by 
pests recently. He suspected that aphids are the cause of its destruction. To ascertain this, he 
walked about his garden and see if there were more aphids than usual. It turns out (it seems to 
him) that this was indeed the case, and he proceeded to apply anti-aphid pesticide on his 
garden. However, the problem persisted. Puzzled, he asked a more experienced gardener to 
come take a look. The experienced gardener soon realized that those insects on the garden 
weren’t aphids but similar-looking, but still destructive grasshopper larvae. She then told the 
novice gardener that the way to differentiate them was that grasshopper larvae have their hind 
legs protruding upwards, while aphids don’t. Armed now with this new knowledge, the 
novice gardener applied anti-grasshopper pesticide, which then solved the problem.  
 Like the vet, the gardener wants to test the causal proposition “aphids are causing 
destruction in my garden.” He then derives a hypothesis: “there is covariation between the 
number of aphids observed and the extent of destruction.” But good evidence for these 
hypothesis turn out to be more difficult to find.  
Analyzing these hypothesis, we see that evidence for them is dependent on evidence 
for even more basic propositions.104 For example, evidence for the gardener’s co-variational 
hypothesis is dependent on evidence for the variational propositions “there is variation in the 
                                                          
104Andrew D. Cling, "The Epistemic Regress Problem," Philosophical Studies 140, no. 3 (2007). 
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levels of aphids” and “there is variation in the extent of destruction.” In addition, we see that 
these variational propositions are meaningful only given a change from some state of affairs 
to some other state of affairs (or ‘from-to states of affairs’ for short).105 Hence, evidence for 
the proposition “there is variation in levels of aphids” is dependent on the evidence for even 
more basic propositions like “there were low levels of aphids last week”, and “there are high 
levels of aphids today.”106  
These propositions above thus stand in what I call an evidential chain, constituted by 
relations of evidential dependence among propositions.107 A proposition (or set of 
propositions) is evidentially dependent on another insofar as good evidence for the latter 
constitutes good evidence for the former. More generally, causal propositions are evidentially 
dependent on hypotheses, which are in turn, evidentially dependent on propositions asserting 
that there is variation, which are in turn, evidentially dependent on propositions describing 
the relevant from-to states of affairs. The totality of these evidential-dependence relations 
constitutes an evidential chain, and the last set of propositions (about from-to states of affairs) 
I call, datum-propositions (datum being the singular of data), and measurement108 is the 
process of gathering evidence for these datum-propositions.  
                                                          
105Jay Weinstein, Applying Social Statistics: An Introduction to Quantitative Reasoning in Sociology(NY: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), 26-27.  
106In quantitative social science, one gleans such variation from variation in the data (in this case, the different 
numerical values the variables take). Such data usually come in the form of a table. ibid., Chapter 4.  
107Cling, "The Epistemic Regress Problem," 402. My language of evidential chains and evidential dependence 
draws on that of the "epistemic regress problem." A problem expressed as: if proposition P is evidentially 
dependent on some proposition P1, which is evidentially dependent on P2 ad infinitum, how can we ever be sure 
about anything? This is somewhat similar to Michael G. Titelbaum, "Not Enough There There: Evidence, 
Reasons and Language Independence," Philosophical Perspectives 24, no. 1 (2010): 480-81. 
 
108Robert Adcock and David Collier, "Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and 







 Why then is measurement important? Let’s take a look now at the vet. How can she 
justifiably believe that there is covariation between levels of fur loss and itchiness? This is 
because she has evidence for at least two datum-propositions, which are respectively “there 
were low levels of fur loss last week” and “there is high levels of fur loss this week.” Such 
evidence is visual: she saw the loss of fur with her own eyes and such visual evidence is so 
unproblematic in her case that she and us, take these two propositions to be ‘true.’  
 For the gardener however, finding good evidence for his two propositions is more 
difficult. For the gardener, these propositions are respectively: “there were few aphids in my 
garden last week”, and, “there are a lot of aphids in my garden this week.” The novice 
gardener however, only has good evidence for the proposition “I see tiny insects in my 
garden.” It unfortunately, turns out that no, one cannot have just seen tiny insects, one must 
see tiny insects without upward-protruding hind legs for one to possess good evidence for the 
proposition “there are more aphids than usual.”  
The moral of the story thus, is that measuring (or establishing standards of evidence 
for) certain kinds of datum propositions can take a lot of work.109 
 IR scholars face similar situations like the vet and gardener: both gardener and vet are 
finding evidence for (causal) propositions, and so is the IR scholar. Let’s now look at such a 
situation by zooming in on a particular work that I think is typical yet exemplary of a work in 
positivist IR. That work is Fearon and Laitin’s (2003).110 
 
 
                                                          
109For an example, see the debate regarding the measures of democracy. Gerardo Munck and Jay Verkuilen, 
"Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices," Comparative Political Studies 
35, no. 1 (2002).   
110James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War," American Political Science Review 
97, no. 1 (2003).  
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Fearon and Laitin: An Example of Evidential Chains in IR Scholarship 
 
  Fearon and Laitin’s causal proposition is, to paraphrase bluntly: weak states cause 
civil wars.111 This is because they think that weak states/governments do not have the 
capacity to police their territory.112 Such weakness then makes armed competitors against that 
state more likely to flourish, where such armed competition is simply, civil war.113 The 
previous two sentences describe what social-scientific jargon calls a “causal mechanism.”114 
Where propositions about causal mechanisms purport to describe how (or the process via 
which) one entity causally affects another.  
Positivists however don’t test (propositions about) causal mechanisms, and in my 
opinion, they have good reasons to do so.115, 116 This is because all they have to do (according 
to the dictates of their –ism) is to test the causal proposition via ceteris paribus covariation. If 
such covariation is present, there’s evidence that an entity, does (in some way, but we don’t 
                                                          
111Ibid., 75, last para.  
112Ibid., 79-82.  
113Ibid., 76, Right hand Side, first paragraph (continued from previous page). Nicholas Sambanis, "What Is Civil 
War? ," Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 6 (2004). According to Sambanis however, defining what a "civil 
war" is, is however, not "simple" (as my sentence suggests).  
114John Gerring, "Review Article: The Mechanismic Worldview: Thinking inside the Box," British Journal of 
Political Science 37, no. 1 (2007): 3-5.   
115Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for 
the Study of World Politics, 63-71. Mahoney and Goertz, A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Research in the Social Sciences, 102, para.2. King, Keohane, and Verba, "The Importance of Research Design," 
85-89. Kurki, Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis, 101-06. 
116Scientific Realists in IR strongly disagree with such an ignoring of causal mechanisms, often attributing it to 
positivism’s alleged Humeanism. See, Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy 
of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics, 109-11. Kurki, Causation in International 
Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis, Parts II and III.  Kurki provides the most extensive disagreement and 
alternative to this positivist ignoring of mechanims. Although her discussion extends far beyond mechanisms to 
other facets of causation. Personally, I have no opinion on this debate, and this debate has no bearing on my 
thesis I hope, and as far as I can see.  
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know how), cause a change in another entity.117 For positivists, such propositions about 
causal mechanisms, if untested, function as speculation, not evidence.118  
With all propositions about causal mechanism/s rendered superfluous, we can now 
focus on Fearon and Laitin’s causal proposition “weak states cause civil wars.” What then is 
their hypothesis? It seems that they’ve got many,119 where the evidence for each, serve as 
pieces of evidence for the causal proposition. Let’s look at a (paraphrased) handful of these 
hypotheses. 
 
“Ceteris Paribus, the more mountainous the state/country (pardon the conflation), the higher 
the likelihood that that state will experience civil war.”120  
 
“Ceteris Paribus, the more unstable a state, the higher the civil war likelihood.”121 
 
“Ceteris Paribus, lower a state’s GDP per capita, the higher the civil war likelihood.”122 
    
As mentioned, these propositions are evidentially dependent on propositions asserting 
variation between the variables, which are in turn dependent on propositions about the from-
to states of affairs necessary for variation. These from-to propositions are propositions about 
what social scientists call, the “data”, or datum-propositions as I call them. For Fearon and 
                                                          
117Holland, "Statistics and Causal Inference," 947. King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: 
Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, 87, first few lines. . 
118This is what postiivists think , not what I think. But I think that positivists have good reasons (in that they 
have extensively reasoned out the reasons for) why they believe this.   
119Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War," 79-82.  The hypotheses in the previous sections are 
those of their opponents.  
120Ibid., 80, left hand side, hypothesis H8a; 81, right hand side, first full paragraph after H11.  
121Ibid., 81, Hypothesis H10b.  
122Ibid., 80, H9.  
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Laitin, they have many datum-propositions – 6611 of them to be exact!123 And the set of all 
these datum-propositions is called a dataset.124  
Let’s now examine one proposition (datum-proposition #4335 to be exact)125 in this 
dataset. Fearon and Laitin write it as:  
.126 This is gibberish, but fortunately, only tentative gibberish, because Fearon and Laitin 
have provided us a Rosetta stone to translate their datum-propositions (written in the 
language of numbers) to plain English.127  
 Translating datum-proposition #4335 into English, it reads:  
Madagascar, in 1975, experienced no civil war, had a population of 7.6 million, had a polity2 
score of -0.6 (which one can further translate as “is somewhat undemocratic”), had a GDP per 
capita of $995, had 32.8% of its landmass classified as mountainous,…(and so on). [My 
translation]. 
This can be further parsed into propositions such as “Madagascar in 1975, experienced no 
civil war”, “Madagascar in 1975 is somewhat undemocratic” and so on. And we can see that 
datum-proposition #4335 is evidentially dependent on these parsed propositions. Given all 
these, the process of measurement is the gathering of evidence for propositions like, “32.8% 
of Madagascar’s land is mountainous.” Or more difficult, that “Madagascar is somewhat 
undemocratic.” 
                                                          
123I got their replication data from http://web.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/publicdata/publicdata.html, accessed 
January 14, 2015. I opened it using Gretl, and exported their data from Gretl to an excel spreadsheet. This 
picture here is a screenshot of that excel spreadsheet.   
124Kellstedt and Whitten, The Fundamentals of Political Science Research, 84-85.  
125See the attached excel spreadsheet of Fearon and Laitin’s dataset. I have cut out many extraneous columns 
that feature information we don’t need in order to get at what they’re doing.  
126This is a screenshot of the row number 4335 in the attached excel spreadsheet of Fearon and Laitin’s dataset. 
127See footnote 121 of how I obtained their replication data.  
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Fearon and Laitin measured the proposition about Madagascar’s mountainous terrain 
by trusting in the truth of all cartographical propositions made by a certain World Bank 
geographer.128 Hence, the aforementioned parsed proposition is evidentially dependent on the 
word of this geographer. Of course, if one is fussy, one can posit further, sophisticated chains 
of cartographical evidence that Fearon and Laitin’s measurement is evidentially dependent 
on.129 Should the quality of evidence for such propositions low-down the evidential chain be 
poor (or crudely, untrue), “measurement error” is said to have taken place.130 I shall however, 
bracket any doubt about the possible errors of such propositions so far down the evidential 
chain, and take evidence for them to be good enough evidence for the (datum) propositions 
that are evidentially dependent on them.  
In any case, you see how the evidential chains for Fearon and Laitin, the vet, and the 
gardener are alike in their general form: some proposition is evidentially dependent on some 
other proposition and so on. It’s just that Fearon and Laitin’s evidential chain is more 
complicated.  
Is Fearon and Laitin however, like the vet or the gardener? They would love to be like 
the vet of course, but there are others who think they’re in the gardener’s company. Gleditsch 
and Ruggeri is one of them, and they claim that “GDP per capita…is at best, a very indirect 
measure (of state strength). [emphasis added]”131 Here, we have a situation similar to that of 
the gardener: just because he saw small insects, it doesn’t mean that he saw aphids. Likewise, 
just because Fearon and Laitin has good evidence that “there is ceteris paribus covariation 
                                                          
128Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War," 81, note 16.  
129For an example, US Army Corps of Engineers, Control and Topographic Surveying(Washington, D.C.: 
Department of the Army, 2007).  
130Corbetta, Social Research: Theory, Methods and Techniques, 78-79.  
131Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Andrea Ruggeri, "Political Opportunity Structures, Democracy and Civil 
Wars," Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 3 (2010): 301; Sambanis, "What Is Civil War? ," 827, para.1. See 
also, Cullen S Hendrix, "Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Implications for the Study of 
Civil Conflict," Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 3 (2010). 
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between GDP per capita and civil war likelihood”, (Gleditsch and Ruggeri think) it doesn’t 
mean that they have good evidence that “there is ceteris paribus covariation between state 
strength and civil war likelihood.” Put simply, Gleditsch and Ruggeri think there’s something 
wrong with Fearon and Laitin’s evidential chain.  
More generally, in positing an evidential chain, Fearon and Laitin is stating a series of 
propositions they think are evidentially dependent on others. More precisely, an evidential 
chain is itself a meta-proposition which takes as its object (causal, datum and hypothetical) 
propositions, and make claims about their evidential relations.132 This meta-proposition is 
subject to the same issues of truth and evidence that any proposition is subject to. Hence, both 
Gleditsch and Ruggeri, and the experienced gardener doubt the truth/good evidence for these 
meta-propositions.  
If Gleditsch and Ruggeri are right, I term Fearon and Laitin’s evidential chain as “not 
sturdy”, and should Fearon and Laitin be right (and in the company of the vet), I term their 
evidential chain as, “sturdy.” More precisely again, propositions about evidential-chain 
sturdiness are meta-meta propositions, as these pertain to the truth/good evidence of the 
aforementioned meta-propositions of evidential dependence/chains. An evidential link is not 
sturdy then, if and only if no good evidence is found for the meta-proposition that an 
evidential link (or set of evidential links) is the case. If not, it is sturdy. 
 
 
                                                          
132This notion of a language and meta-language is one taken from meta-mathematics and logic. Francesco Berto, 
There's Something About Godel: The Complete Guide to the Incompleteness Theorem(Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2009), 10-13.  
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Research Design as Evidential Chains: Translating and Summing up the Positivist 
Approach 
  
In positivist social science, the spelling out of one’s evidential chain is also known as 
research design.133 This is by far the easiest term in social scientific parlance to explain. 
Think of research design as a battle plan: a plan where a general states her objective and 
spells out how she aims to accomplish it. “Research design” is thus about designing a plan 
about how one aims to conduct research. We can make the term even clearer if we take the 
positivist view that “research” is about finding evidence for causal propositions. Research 
design is thus a plan about how one aims to ‘gather data’, and use it to furnish good evidence 
for the causal proposition in question.134 When is a (positivist) research design good? Simple: 
it’s good if it achieves positivism’s aim. That is, if it enables the scholar to gather good 
evidence for her causal proposition.135   
I aim in this section to show firstly, that the various steps in research design can be 
talked about as various rungs in an evidential chain. And secondly, that it sums up the 
positivist approach to social science. Illustrated in the following fig.1.3b, a causal proposition 
is evidentially dependent on hypotheses, which are evidentially dependent on a proposition 
that “there is ceteris paribus covariation between the variables”, which are evidentially 
dependent on a proposition that “there is variation between the variables.” Lastly, at the 
‘bottom’, are the datum-propositions, stating the from-to states of affairs that variational 
propositions are evidentially dependent on.  
                                                          
133King, Keohane, and Verba, "The Importance of Research Design."  
134Ibid., 113, para.2.  
135Kellstedt and Whitten, The Fundamentals of Political Science Research, 4.  
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As a sidenote, fig.1.3b features only two hypotheses but it can be generalized to any 
number of hypotheses. Also, fig.1.3b and my reconstruction of the positivist research 
design/evidential chain is ideal-typical: that is, the specific research designs/evidential chains 
of each study might differ from my reconstruction, but I hope that such idiosyncratic 








My language of evidential chains is of course foreign to the jargon involved in 
“research design”. I thus aim in this sub-section to more specifically, A. translate existing 
research design jargon into mine of evidential chains,136 and B. show why my language is 
better: it is better insofar as it lets us talk about the same thing more clearly and 
economically.  
I shall start with the first task A. The arch-positivists King Keohane and Verba 
summed up the act and purpose of (positivist) research design as such:  
“(Positivist) social science,…, seeks to develop and evaluate theories. Our concern is less with 
the development of theory than theory evaluation—(that is,) how to use the hard facts of 
empirical reality to form scientific opinions about the theories and generalizations that are the 
hoped for outcome of our efforts. Our social scientist uses theory to generate observable 
implications, then systematically applies publicly known procedures to infer from evidence, 
whether what the theory implied is correct.”137 
Some of the underlined phrases in the quotes are those that I think are either unclear 
or controversial. Looking at some controversial phrases, we could always ask: are there such 
things as “hard facts of empirical reality”?138 Does the term “hard” mean they’re above 
‘social construction’?139 And what is “science” and “scientific opinion”?140 For the former 
question, social constructivists find it problematic.141 For the latter, Jackson’s (2011) book142 
                                                          
136King, Keohane, and Verba, "The Importance of Research Design," 113, para.0.  
137Ibid., 113. para.2.  
138Ibid., 113, para.2.  
139Ball, "Deadly Hermeneutics, or, Sinn and the Social Scientist ".  
140King, Keohane, and Verba, "The Importance of Research Design," 113, para.2.  
141Smith, "Positivism and Beyond," 20-21. Mary Hawkesworth, "Contending Conceptions of Science and 
Politics: Methodology and the Constitution of the Political," in Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research 
and the Interpretive Turn, ed. Dvora Yannow and Peregrine Schwartz-Schea(London: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), 29-
32. 
 
142Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for 
the Study of World Politics.  
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has I think, convincingly shown that the word “science” is either definitionally multi-faceted 
at best, or undefinable at worst.143   
 I shall now rephrase KKV’s definition of positivist research design in a clearer and 
more un-controversial way. I shall do this by substituting these unclear and controversial 
underlined phrases with my language of evidence and propositions. More importantly, I hope 
that such substitutions leave the substance of KKV’s message intact.  
I shall now justify my more potentially controversial/non-synonymous substitutions. 
My first potentially controversial substitution is the word “theory” with the phrase “general, 
causal propositions.” I hope however, that the differences (among positivists) are, if not 
minute, at least irrelevant for my reconstruction of their worldview.144 My second substitution 
is the phrase “hard facts of empirical reality.” with the phrase “datum-propositions whose 
good evidence is (believed by positivists/scholars to be supposedly) easy145 to gather.” This 
substitution is justified if you can agree that: firstly, evidence for all (datum) propositions like 
“this apple is green” is easier to find than general, causal propositions like “economic 
interdependence between states causes peace” and secondly, the philosophically careless will 
mistake the former for the “hard facts of empirical reality.” Lastly, KKV’s/the positivist view 
of research design assumes that evidence for general, causal propositions is hard to gather 
                                                          
143Ibid., 189.  
144Kellstedt and Whitten, The Fundamentals of Political Science Research, 3, last para. Kellstedt and Whitten 
provides a definition that I think is most representative of the positivist view of the term “theory.” And is one 
very close to my substitution of “general, causal propositions.” The term “theory” is multifaceted however. 
Another possible definition (not straightforwardly positivist, and not belonging, or having to belong in any –
ism), is by Patrick Jackson and Dan Nexon, "International Theory in a Post-Paradigmatic Era: From Substantive 
Wagers to Scientific Ontologies," European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 3 (2013). Jackson and 
Nexon see theories as “scientific ontologies.” (a term too complex to unpack here).  
 
145My substitution of “observable” with “easy to gather evidence for” is influenced by two philosophical 
interpretations of what is called the Ramsey sentence of a scientific theory. My interpretation follows Lewis’ 
one where the Ramsey sentence is informally, the link between hard to understand concepts with easy to 
understand concepts; the traditional Logical positivist interpretation is that Ramsey sentences link the 
unobservable with the observable. This will be introduced and elaborated on in the following chapter on 
concepts. David Lewis, "How to Define Theoretical Terms," The Journal of Philosophy 67, no. 13 (1970): 428. 
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because they contain these things called ‘unobservables’ (whatever the language of 
observable/unobservable means).146  
 Here’s how I will rephrase KKV’s summing up of research design, and my 
substitutions are seen most clearly in Table 1. In prose form first, 
“(Positivist) social science,…, seeks to make and find good evidence for, general, causal 
propositions. [However, evidence for all general causal propositions in social science is 
difficult to find] Our concern is (thus) less with the making/saying of these propositions than 
with finding good evidence for them—that is, how to use datum-propositions whose good 
evidence is easier to find, to form evidentially informed beliefs about general, causal 
propositions (whose evidence is hard to find). That is the hoped for outcome of (positivist) 
research design. Our social scientist uses her general causal proposition to generate 
evidentially, and sturdily related datum-propositions, then systematically applies publicly 
known procedures to infer from her evidence for her datum-propositions which she has 
gathered, to whether this constitutes good evidence for her general, causal proposition.”147 
Now in table form; the bolded portions indicate my substitutions.  
KKV My Translation 
(Positivist) social science,…, seeks to (Positivist) social science,…, seeks to 
Develop make 
And And 
Evaluate find good evidence for or against, 
Theories general, causal propositions 
*I’ve added a clause stating what I think is KKV’s 
assumption, on the right hand side of this table. 
[However, evidence for all general causal propositions in 
social science is difficult to find.] 
Our concern is less with the Our concern is (thus) less with the 
development of theory making/saying of these propositions 
Than than (with) 
                                                          
146Collier, Seawright, and Munck, "Critiques, Responses and Trade-Offs: Drawing Together the Debate," 132, 
last para. King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, 8, 
25, 41, and especially, 109-12  
147"The Importance of Research Design," 113. para.2.  
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theory evaluation finding pieces of good evidence for or against them 
—(that is,) how to use —(that is,) how to use 
the hard facts of empirical reality datum-propositions whose good evidence is easier to find, 
to to 
form scientific opinions form evidentially informed beliefs 
about the about the 
theories and generalizations truth of general, causal propositions (whose evidence is 
hard to find). 
that are the hoped for outcome of That is the hoped for outcome of 
our efforts. (positivist) research design. 
Our social scientist uses Our social scientist uses 
theory her general causal proposition 
to generate to generate 
observable implications, evidentially, and sturdily related datum-propositions, 
then systematically applies publicly known procedures to then systematically applies publicly known procedures to 
infer from evidence whether what the theory implied is 
correct 
infer from her evidence for her datum-propositions 
which she has gathered, to whether this constitutes good 
evidence for her general, causal proposition. 
 
To give more examples of how common positivist jargon can be translated into my 
language of evidential chains, the jargon of “case selection” is nothing more than (choosing 
and) justifying how the dataset (that is, collection of datum-propositions), is good evidence 
for the variational, hypothetical and causal propositions in question.148 This is especially 
pertinent if the scholar has a dataset containing propositions pertaining to only a subset of all 
possible cases. Case selection thus ensures the sturdiness of the evidential links149 between 
                                                          
148Douglas Dion, "Evidence and Inference in the Comparative Case Study," Comparative Politics 30, no. 2 
(1998).  
149Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," The American Political Science Review 
65, no. 3 (1971): 683, Left hand Side, Para.1. That the “comparative method” is about the sturdiness of the 
evidential link between the dataset and variational proposition and, not about good evidence for the dataset is 
seen most clearly when Lijphart writes that the comparative method is not about measurement. Only about 
“discovering empirical relationships (or covariations) among variables.” 
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these datum-propositions about the few, with hypothetical/causal propositions about the 
many.150 In quantitative social science, such issues are also called issues of “sampling”.151 
The jargon of “method” as well (imprecisely called methodology)152 pertains to two 
things. The first is how a scholar achieves/approximates the ceteris paribus ideal, or more 
precisely: how to find evidence for the ceteris paribus clause expressed in ceteris paribus 
variational propositions. This is seen in regression and experimental methods.153 “Method” 
also pertains secondly, to how one ’gathers data’ – expressed more precisely as the finding of 
good evidence for datum propositions – seen in (positivist-styled) discourse analysis and 
ethnography, among other methods.154   
 The gist of research design, translated to my language of evidential chains is this. If 
you have a general, causal proposition whose evidence (you think) is hard to find, you could 
construct a sturdy evidential chain that, in effect, terminates in datum-propositions whose 
evidence (you think) is easier to find. The positivist then employs various methods that are of 
                                                          
150Lee Peter Ruddin, "You Can Generalize Stupid! Social Scientists, Bent Flyvbjerg, and Case Study 
Methodology," Qualitative Inquiry 12, no. 4 (2006).  
151Corbetta, Social Research: Theory, Methods and Techniques, Chapter 8.  
 
152This distinction is horribly muddled in social science. To clarify, I define methodology as pertaining to the 
justification/logic (hence the suffix –ology) behind why a particular method (or some particular facet of it) helps 
us get good evidence. This is usually seen if students, or a scholarly community is sceptical of that method. The 
method itself pertains to (issues of the finessed execution of) its [that method’s] technique of gathering evidence. 
To use a culinary example: the method of chopping onions finely is about how to wield the knife in a finessed 
way, while the methodology/justification behind it is that it makes the onions cook more evenly. If Cook A says 
“that’s nonsense! Coarsely chopped onions cook just as evenly”, that’s a disagreement about methodology. And 
if Cook B says: “chef C teaches his students that steak knives are the best knives to use if you want to chop 
onions finely. That’s nonsense! Cleavers are obviously the best.”, that’s a disagreement about method. My 
definitions are closest to: Liz Stanley and Sue Wise, "Method, Methodology and Epistemology in Feminist 
Research Processes," in Feminist Praxis: Research, Theory and Epistemology in Feminist Sociology, ed. Liz 
Stanley(NY: Routledge, 2013 ), 26, para.1. 
 
153Kellstedt and Whitten, The Fundamentals of Political Science Research, 209-13. Morton and Williams, 
Experimental Political Science and the Study of Causality, Chapter 4. 
 
154Jeniffer Milliken, "The Study of Discourse in International Relations:: A Critique of Research and Methods," 
European Journal of International Relations 5, no. 2 (1999). Positivist-styled ethnography can largely be seen 
as “extrinsic-value ethnography” as described by Schatz. Edward Schatz, What Kind(S) of Ethnography Does 
Political Science Need? , ed. Edward Schatz, Political Ethnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study 
of Power (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 303), 311-13. 
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the following sort: those that help 1. ensure that some of the evidential links in the evidential 
chain is sturdy (such as case selection techniques) or 2. find evidence for (‘lower’) 
propositions whose evidence is easier to gather (seen in descriptive-statistical, data-gathering 
and ceteris paribus methods).  
 In my reconstruction, I have firstly, substituted away the unclear, controversial, and 
possible dubious notions of “science”, “empirical facts” and “observable/unobservable.” 
Secondly, all existing names for various methods and techniques in social scientific 
methodology are now unified as being of two types. Firstly, ways of ensuring that good 
evidence is found for propositions lower down the chain. Or secondly, ways of ensuring that 
the evidential links in the chain are sturdy.  
 My language is certainly foreign to those accustomed to the conventional jargon. 
However, analogous to how the Dvorak keyboard types more efficiently than the 
conventional but clunkier Qwerty keyboard, I hope that my language of evidence, 
propositions and evidential chains is to you, obviously better than the existing jargon 































Chapter 2.1 Concepts: The Basics 
 
 As mentioned, my critique of positivism centres on how it handles social scientific 
“concepts.” Before I begin my critique however, I shall in this section, define the notions that 
we will use in examining concepts. Specifically, I unpack the following notions of a 
concepts’ “intension”, “extension” as well as “synonymy” between concepts. In doing this, I 
introduce the notion of a “possible world” as a device to (more) precisely check whether two 
concepts are synonymous.155   
The spirit of my treatment of concepts is similar to the previous sections of my thesis. 
I aim here to re-translate the existing conceptualization jargon into a language that’s clearer 
and more uncontroversial. The only notable political scientists who have engaged with issues 
of conceptualization include most prominently Giovanni Sartori,156 followed by Robert 
Adcock157, David Collier,158 Gary Goertz159, and John Gerring.160 Given the fewer number of 
                                                          
155Hannes Leitgeb, "Logic in General Philosophy of Science: Old Things and New Things," Synthese 179, no. 2 
(2011): 341-42; Graham. Priest, From If to Is: An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic(NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), p.20, 2.2.2 and pp.28-31. 
 
156Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics." "Guidelines for Concept Analysis," in Concepts 
and Method in Social Science: The Tradition of Giovanni Sartori, ed. David Collier and John Gerring(NY: 
Routledge, 2009).  
157Robert Adcock, "What Is a Concept? ," The Committee of Concepts and Methods (of the International 
Political Science Association), http://www.concepts-methods.org/Files/WorkingPaper/PC%201%20Adcock.pdf; 
Adcock and Collier, "Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research."  
158David Collier, Fernando Daniel Hidalgo, and Andra Olivia Maciuceanu, "Essentially Contested Concepts: 
Debates and Applications," Journal of Political Ideologies 11, no. 3 (2006); David Collier and James E. Mahon, 
Jr., "Conceptual "Stretching" Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis," The American Political 
Science Review 87, no. 4 (1993); David Collier and John Gerring, eds., Concepts and Method in Social Science: 
The Tradition of Giovanni Sartori(NY: Routledge, 2008).  
 
159Gary Goertz, "Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide,"(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).  
 
160John Gerring and Paul A. Barresi, "Putting Ordinary Language to Work: A Min-Max Strategy of Concept 
Formation in the Social Sciences," Journal of Theoretical Politics 15, no. 2 (2003). John Gerring, "What Makes 
a Concept Good? A Criterial Framework for Understanding Concept Formation in the Social Sciences," Polity 




works done on it, the Political-Scientific jargon on conceptualization is less developed161 (but 
in a way, less calcified) than those pertaining to research design.  
  
1. All Social Scientific Concepts are Expressed Linguistically. 
 
 What is a concept? This is a question I will not and cannot hope to answer. As 
Adcock (2005) points out, philosophers have offered many competing definitions.162 Some 
think concepts are mental entities,163 while others think this makes concepts too 
‘subjective’164, proposing that concepts are non-physical communal/cultural artefacts (the 
way that say, Jazz theory qua theory or the method for brewing espresso, qua method, is).165 
Finally, others think that concepts are no more than linguistic entities: that is, mere words 
with meanings (like “freedom” and “Fascism”).166  
 I however, know something about how concepts are expressed. I then assert that: (at 
least in social science, its) concepts, whatever they [concepts qua concepts] may be, can and 
are often expressed linguistically (that is, via writing and speaking).  
 
 
                                                          
161The above-mentioned methodologists lament this. Some examples: Gerring and Barresi, "Putting Ordinary 
Language to Work: A Min-Max Strategy of Concept Formation in the Social Sciences," 202, paras. 2-3; Goertz, 
"Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide," 1-2; Adcock and Collier, "Measurement Validity: A Shared 
Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research," 529.  
162Adcock, "What Is a Concept? " Page 0.  
163Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence, "Concepts,"  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concepts/.  
164Ibid., 1.2   
165Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity(NY Routledge, 2006), 59-77. This is 
perhaps most obvious in Lacanian Psyhoanalysis, although it certainly doesn’t use the term “concept.”  
166Margolis and Laurence, "Concepts" 1.3.  
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2. The set of all Concept-Expressions is Equivalent to the set of all Jargon 
Words/Phrases. 
 
. How then, are concepts (in social science and elsewhere) typically (and I daresay, 
always) expressed? I’d say that they are expressed via jargoned words.167 More formally, the 
set of all linguistic expressions of social scientific concepts is equivalent to (that is, contains 
the same things as)168 the set of all expressions of social scientific jargoned words. The latter 
set contains words like “institutions”, “democracy” and “power”, and so does the former 
set.169 
 More generally, and outside of social science however, all English words/phrases are 
potential candidates for being a concept-expression: what counts as jargon differs from 
person to person, and all English words are problematizable. The simplest example of this is 
a non-English speaker trying to learn English. For her, nearly every English word is a 
jargoned-word that requires translation into the language she’s comfortable with.  
 Even for those versed in English however, simple words can likewise be given the 
status of jargon. In philosophy, Heidegger made it his life work to express the meaning of 
(what is to him, a jargon) word, “is” (equivalent to the ‘concept’ “being”).170 In pure 
mathematics, the word “is” (seen as equivalent with the equals-sign) is likewise a jargon-
                                                          
167Gerring, Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework, 36, para.1.  
168This is known as the axiom of extensionality in axiomatic set theory: two sets are equivalent if and only if 
they contain the same things. Berto, There's Something About Godel: The Complete Guide to the Incompleteness 
Theorem, 19. 
169Goertz, "Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide," 3-5. More importantly as well, my formulation (of 
focusing on concept-expressions) sidesteps this debate that Goertz invented as to whether concepts are just 
conventional names for things [nominalism], or do they (actually) attempt to accurately describe the essential 
characteristics of the things they are naming [realism]. Even if we are realists about concepts (the latter view), 
concepts in such a view are still spoken and written by actual human beings, that is, they are expressed 
linguistically. In short, I know nothing about what concepts are [conventional stipulations or descriptions of real 
essences], but I know something about how they’re expressed.  
170Hubert Dreyfus, Being in the World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division 1(Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press, 1991), 10-11.  
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term, conventionally defined in terms of “equivalence classes”.171 Likewise, the word “word” 
can be a jargon-term for linguists, and the word “all” is a jargon-term for logicians – where 
such jargon is possibly accompanied by attendant debates about how best to define them.172 
 
Intensions and Extensions 
 
 Fashionable in the methodological literature on concepts is the talk of intension vs. 
extension.173 To sum up these notions quickly, a concept’s intension is synonymous with its 
meaning.174 It is intensional insofar as a concept’s meaning is something internal to the 
language (which the concept is expressed in). Extension on the other hand, pertains to the set 
of things in the ‘external’ world that that concept is about (or, the things in the world that 
satisfies the property described by the concept).175 Synonymous to these are also the notions 
of “sense” vs. “reference.”176  
 Two concept-expressions can have different intensions but the same extension.177 For 
example, Tom is a graphic designer who works from home, using a computer. He calls that 
computer his “workstation.” However, when Tom is overseas, his sister, Joey uses that same 
computer to play video games, calling it her “gaming rig.” We see that the intensions of the 
                                                          
171Stephen Lay, Analysis with an Introduction to Proof(NY: Pearson, 2014), 55-58.  
172Richard L. Cartwright, "Speaking of Everything," Noûs 28, no. 1 (1994); Sofia Ananiadou, "On the Definition 
of a Word (Book Review)," Machine Translation 4, no. 4 (1989).  
173Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," 1041. Goertz, "Social Science Concepts: A User's 
Guide," Chapter 3.  
174Kenneth Taylor, Truth and Meaning: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language(Malden, MA: 
Massachussets, 1998), 2-8. W.V.O. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," The Philosophical Review 60, no. 1 
(1951): 21-22. Readers more versed in the intricacies of formal philosophies of language will know that this 
isn’t very correct, but it should work.  
175Gy Fuhrmann, ""Prototypes" and "Fuzziness" in the Logic of Concepts," Synthese 75, no. 3 (1988): 329-30. 
Goertz, "Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide," 70-74. David J. Chalmers, "On Sense and Intension," Noûs 
36(2002): 135-36. 
176Readers of Wendt’s book might have come across these notions. Wendt, Social Theory of International 
Politics, 53-60.  
177Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," 21 last para.-22.  
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concepts “workstation” and “gaming rig” are different– one is about work and the other, 
about play. However, their extensions are the same: it is that computer in their house. That is, 
that object in the external world/hunk of plastic with circuits inside of it.   
 
3. To express a concept’s intension is to provide a definition of that concept.  
 
 To express what we think is a concept’s meaning/intension, is to give a definition of 
it.178 This is at least the hoped-for case in social science – although the same cannot really be 
said for everyday/ordinary language.179 What then, does it mean to provide a definition? I 
shall posit the following definitionB of a definitionA. To provide a definitionA of a concept is 
to translate that concept, by stating a term/phrase/proposition synonymous with it.180 The 
notion “synonymy” will be definedB later.   
 Notationally, definitionA  here denotes how social scientists define their concepts, 
while definitionB denotes (meta-linguistically), my definition of the various notions that I 
employ (including the very notion of definition). You can see that my definitionB of a 
definitionA also applies to my definitionB itself.  
 To provide a first illustration of what I’ve just said, here’s how some non-social 
scientists have defined the concept “democracy.” The most clichéd would be 
 
 Abraham Lincoln’s: “Democracy” is “government of the people, by the people, for the people.” 
                                                          
178Ibid., 24-27.  
179Adcock, "What Is a Concept? " 18-31.  See Adock's distinction between the normative (or "scientific-ideal") 
vs. more descriptive ways of talking about how people actually define concepts (badly or otherwise).    
180Lewis, "How to Define Theoretical Terms," 428-29; Nuel Belnap, "On Rigorous Definitions," Philosophical 




However, the Occupy Wall Street movement don’t like the word “government” in that 
definition (as it has connotations of elites representing the people), and chose,  
 
Occupy Wall Street’s: “Democracy” is “(an arrangement where) all citizens have the 
possibility and…right to participate in the decisions that affect our lives and our 
community.”181 
 
To provide one last example, 
 
Karl Popper’s: “Democracy” is “(a political system where) it is possible to change the 
government in a non-violent way.”182 
 
You can see that for each of them, they provided a phrase they believe is (or should be) 
synonymous with the concept “democracy.” 
 Both the definitional phrase and jargon-expression/phrase are synonymous. Which 




                                                          
181Camilla Hansen, "What Would Real Democracy Look Like? ,"  http://occupywallstreet.net/story/what-would-
real-democracy-look.  
182Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies(London: George Routledge and Sons., 1947), 110-11.  
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4. To express a concept’s extension is to state the entities in the world that 
satisfy the property the concept purports to describe.  
 
 Let’s now play a game. Imagine a set of all the things in the world – called a universal 
set183, denoted U. This set contains anything (or rather, everything) from park benches and 
mountains, to states and institutions. If I ask you to name the set of all “democracies”, you 
would then proceed to construct some subset of U by picking out the entities in U that you 
think are “democracies”, while weeding out those which you think are not.  
 In constructing your democracy-set, some obvious elements184 in U that you’ll weed 
out are for example, that plate of lobster ravioli you had last week; the 70s progressive rock 
band, Rush, and so on. But choosing which elements to include might be a little tricky. 
Assuming for simplicity’s sake that only states can be democracies, would you include the 
United States in that subset? The Polity IV measure would, but other people won’t.185 
Likewise, similar controversies surface when asking whether this or that state should be 
included.186  
   One major thing that determines what elements are to be included is the intension of 
the concept “democracy”.187 More generally, before you can tell us what should be included 
in the set of all X, we have to know what “X” means. If for example, you take Popper’s non-
violence definition of democracy, you’d exclude (from the democracy-set) any state where 
                                                          
183Fuhrmann, ""Prototypes" and "Fuzziness" in the Logic of Concepts," 330-31. This notion of a universal set is 
actually flawed if viewed from a pure-mathematical standpoint. This is because it contains paradoxical sets (the 
set of all sets that are not members of themselves) such as those seen in Russell's Paradox. If you google 
"Russell's Paradox", you should, with some tenacity, be able to understand why. 
184Elements is another name for the members of sets.   
185Ted Gurr and Monty Marshall, "Polity Iv Individual Country Regime Trends, 1946-2013,"  
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/usa2.htm. Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, "Testing Theories of 
American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens," Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 03 (2014).  
186See Frederic Charles Schaffer, Democracy in Translation: Understanding Politics in an Unfamiliar 
Culture(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000).  
187Chalmers, "On Sense and Intension," 159, para.3.  
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violence regularly occurs after every election – assuming that such perpetual violence mean 
that non-violent transfers of power are impossible. If however, you take a (permissive) 
definition of democracy as any state that has elections, then that violent state will be included 
in the democracy-set since they’ve got regular elections.     
 More abstractly, intension determines extension but not vice versa.188 For example, 
assuming that the only three “restaurants in the US that serve french fries” are McDonalds, 
Wendy’s and Burger King. If I tell you what I mean by “French fries”, and “restaurant” and 
“serves” and “United States”, you could go out, look at all the menus of US restaurants and 
construct the same three-member set. In short, know the intension, and you know the 
extension.  
 If however, I tell you that I have some concept X that has the extension-set 
{McDonalds, Wendy’s and Burger King}, you would be hard pressed to tell me what X is. 
This is because these three restaurants could also be the only restaurants in America that do 
not use fillers in their hamburger patties, or, they could be the only restaurants in America 
with a net worth of more than $10 Billion and so on – where these underlined 
phrases/concept-expressions have different intensions. They however, for serendipitous 
reasons, share the same extension. In short, if you only know the extension, it doesn’t mean 
you know the intension.  
 Put most formally and succinctly: the set of all concept-expression pairs sharing the 
same intension, is a subset of the set of all concept-expression pairs sharing the same 
extension.189  
                                                          
188Saul Kripke, "Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference: Some Exegetical Notes," Theoria 74(2008): 181-82.  
189Rudolf Carnap, Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic(Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 1947), 18-19, 4-10 to 4-13.  
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S1: Sidenote. Defining “Gibberish” using the Notion of Possible Worlds: 
Gibberish/meaningless propositions are false in all possible worlds (that 
we can imagine).  
 
 I have used the term “synonymous” without defining it, and even as far back as 
chapter 1, I have employed the notions “meaningless”, or “gibberish”. I shall give a more 
precise definition of these notions here, beginning with the notion of “meaninglessness" (a 
word synonymous with “gibberish”).  
 I shall now define the notion of “gibberish.” Imagine a world that’s very different 
from ours.190 I am sure your imagination is rich enough to posit say, a world where objects 
float up rather than drop down when we release them from our hands, a world where the 
Cuban Missile Crisis had gone nuclear, or a world where in 2015, dinosaurs still roam the 
Earth etc. Your imagination might be fanciful, but I am sure you cannot imagine anything 
whatsoever.  
 Why am I so sure? Let’s take a simple example first. Can you imagine a world where 
the proposition “sdlkgjr gsk gk” is true? Of course you can’t because that proposition is 
(syntactically) gibberish, you don’t even know what it means.191 Now, can you imagine a 
world where the proposition “green ideas sleep furiously” (this example is Chomsky’s) is 
true?192 You might now be straining your imagination in picturing what an ‘idea’ would look 
like and how it can be green, and moreover, what will it mean for it to sleep in a furious way. 
                                                          
190Priest, From If to Is: An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic, 2.2.2.  
191Berto, There's Something About Godel: The Complete Guide to the Incompleteness Theorem, 39-42. Syntax 
governs how the basic symbols of a (formal) language are to be combined. Although this applies for formal 
languages, we can somewhat extend it to English. This proposition is syntactically gibberish as its basic 
symbols/alphabets are combined improperly.  
 
192Hilary Putnam, "Dreaming and 'Depth Grammar'," in Mind, Language and Reality(NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 1975), 307.  
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In any case, your imagined picture of a world where this (semantically)193 gibberish 
proposition is true, is fuzzy to the point of you drawing a blank– compared to say, a world of 
still-existent dinosaurs.  
 What this thought-experiment shows is that language limits thought (or our 
imagination).194 Hence, all that we can imagine – that is, every possible world imaginable by 
us– is expressible in our language.195 Conversely, all those state of affairs that are not 
expressible/gibberish in our language (like green ideas sleeping furiously) are unimaginable. 
The set of all imagined worlds (or state of affairs) is called a set of possible worlds.196 As 
language limits thought, the set of all possible worlds thus share only the rules of English, 
including what we think are the meaning/intension of its words, in our actual world in 
                                                          
193Semantics deal with the relation a language has with the world/its object. This proposition is semantically 
gibberish given our acquaintance with the objects in, and facets of the world described by the words “ideas”, 
“green” etc. Syntax more generally, deals with the rules of a language seen in isolation, or in a vacuum 
independent of the world/its object. 
194T. R. Martland, "On "the Limits of My Language Mean the Limits of My World"," The Review of 
Metaphysics 29, no. 1 (1975). This paragraph is highly (early) Wittgensteinian in its philosophy of language.  
195H. R. G. Schwyzer, "Wittgenstein's Picture‐Theory of Language," Inquiry 5, no. 1-4 (1962). Aldred 
Nordmann, Wittgenstein's Tractatus: An Introduction(NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 37-38. This 
draws on Wittgenstein’s picture theory of language: every proposition pictures an (imaginatively) possible state 
of affairs.  
196Rod Girle, Possible Worlds(Chesham, UK: Acumen Publishing, 2003), 1-3. More specifically, a possible 
world can only be possible relative to something. For example, a world where balls roll uphill is not possible 




2015.197 I consider our actual world to be one element in the set of possible words as well.198 
Here, you can think of possible worlds as similar to the parallel universes seen in science 
fiction; these worlds however exist not in reality, but in our imaginations.199  
 A meaningless proposition is then one that is false in all possible worlds, as it is 
gibberish and thus unimaginable by us.200 Take the French Revolution example I’ve posited 
in chapter 1. I am sure you could imagine a world where the French Revolution got snuffed 
out in its infancy, got exported to Russia, or where its tumult continues unabated till our year 
2015 and so on. Hence the proposition “the French Revolution was exported to Russia (in 
say, 1801)” while false in our actual world is true in some other imaginary world in our 
heads. These propositions are, as you can see, still meaningful.  
 But there is no possible world where “the French Revolution is articulate” is true. Or 
more fancifully, there are no possible worlds where “in 1975, the French Revolution replaced 
Geddy Lee as Rush’s bassist.” is true. This is because all these propositions are gibberish and 
hence, unimaginable by us.  
                                                          
197This draws on the “accessibility relation” between possible worlds, seen in modal logic. And this relation 
answers the question: possible relative to what? Shooting an arrow from a bow is certainly possible relative to 
what’s allowable by the laws of physics at every point in human history, but for a primitive person living before 
the invention of archery, it is not possible relative to the state of technological advancement at his given time. I 
don’t have a particularly intuitive grasp on it, as that relation has been presented, by logicians, as being largely a 
mere technical formalism. I see it as: the accessibility relation is something we (the analyst) define at our whim. 
Our actual world accesses (or has an accessibility relation with) all possible worlds sharing some feature in 
common with ours – what these worlds share in common with ours is defined at our whim. If we are interested 
in what’s possible under the laws of physics, we then conjure up a set of possible worlds/states of affairs 
allowable under the laws of physics. Every element in that set of possible worlds are then what we define as 
accessible from our actual world. They are, for all intents and purposes, the set of possible worlds for us, the 
analyst. For me, my set of possible worlds share the rules of English in our actual world in 2015. It then follows 
(and is somewhat a tautology) to say that any proposition violating such linguistic rules, that is, any meaningless 
proposition, doesn’t describe, and hence is not true in any possible world (sharing our linguistic rules). Given 
my borrowing of Wittgenstein’s picture theory of language as described in the above footnotes, these set of all 
these possible worlds/states of affairs that are meaningfully describable given our rules of language, is therefore, 
equivalent to the set of all states of affairs/possible worlds that we can imaginatively picture. Priest, From If to 
Is: An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic, 2.23, 2.3.3 and 2.3.5 in pp.20-21, as well as section 3.6 in pp.46-29. 
Most relevant is Marie-Laure Ryan, "Possible Worlds and Accessibility Relations: A Semantic Typoloty of 
Fiction," Poetics Today 12, no. 3 (1991). 
198Priest, From If to Is: An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic, p.20, 2.2.2.  
199There are philosophical debates about what possible worlds are. But as you can see, my formulation of 
possible worlds as purely imaginative is somewhat metaphysically innocent. Ibid., 28-31.  
200See footnotes 192-195.  
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 Try positing other examples if you need further convincing that my definition of 
gibberish is correct. If you have counter-examples of a meaningless proposition that is 
imaginable (thereby jeopardizing my definition), do let me know, but I doubt you can 
construct one.       
  
S2: Two concept-expressions are synonymous if and only if they share the 
same extension in all possible worlds (including our actual world).   
  
 Given that we now have a grasp of the notion of possible worlds, we are in a good 
position to define “synonymy.” Two concepts are synonymous if and only if they share the 
same extension in all possible worlds.201 Here are some examples. Take the chips and 
restaurant example. The concept-expressions “(restaurants in the US that) have a total-net 
worth of $10 million” and “serves chips” turn out to share the same extension in our actual 
world. However, we can certainly imagine a world where McDonalds serves french fries but 
has a net worth of less than $10 million. Therefore, these two concept-expressions do not 
share the same extension in all possible worlds. As we can see, they are also not synonymous 
(given the rules of English) in our actual world.  
 Conversely, can you imagine a world (without overthinking the intensions of these 
concept-expressions) where the extension-set of all “bachelors” is not the same as the set of 
                                                          
201Carnap, Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic, 7-25, especially 2-2 in p.11, 3-5b. in 
p.14, and 4-13 in p.19. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," 23-24. 
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all “unmarried men”?202 Or equivalently,203 can you imagine a world where Charlie (an 
element in the bachelor-set) is a bachelor but not an unmarried man? Well, you’ll probably be 
straining your imagination – and drawing a blank – the same way you would in the green 
ideas sleeping furiously case.  
 For more examples: imagine a world [sharing our rules of English] where there exists 
a “bag” which is unable to “contain things in it” – you can’t. Or a world where there exists a 
“fan” which isn’t “designed to circulate air” – you can’t as well. Given this, sameness of 
extension in all possible worlds is a necessary and sufficient condition for synonymy.204 If 




                                                          
202Carnap, Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic, 3-5, in p.14-15. Carnap phrases this 
rather indirectly and this is seen in the symbolic expression (𝑥)[𝑃𝑥 ≡ 𝑄𝑥] which reads (to paraphrase): for all 
elements in U (the universal set), if some element in U, let’s call it x, [this is captured in the symbolism “(x)”] 
possesses the property described by the concept-expression P, then it also possesses the property described by 
the concept-expression Q and vice versa. The latter clause is captured in the symbolism “[𝑃𝑥 ≡ 𝑄𝑥]”  Example: 
for all elements in U, if Charlie, an element in U possesses the property described by the concept expression 
“Bachelor”, he also possesses the property described by the concept-expression “unmarried man” and vice 
versa. For Carnap, the concept-expressions P and Q are synonymous if (𝑥)[𝑃𝑥 ≡ 𝑄𝑥] is true in all possible 
worlds (or L(ogically/linguistically)-true as he calls it). This equivalently means that in all possible worlds, the 
(sub)set of all entities in U satisfying the property described by concept-expression P is equivalent to the set of 
all entities satisfying the property described by the concept-expression Q. I hope my examples sufficiently 
demonstrate why we’ve good reasons to believe that Carnap is (by and large), correct.  
 
203If two sets are equivalent, then all their members belong to both sets. This entails that there doesn’t exist any 
element of any of each set that is a member of one, but not a member of the other.  
 
204I’ve actually not argued for this point rigorously in this sub-section. The rigorous but long-winded argument 
would be this. If no one can find any counter-examples of two synonymous concept-expressions not sharing the 
same extension in all possible worlds, then all synonymous concept-expression pairs share the same extension in 
all possible worlds. This means that sharing the same extension in all possible worlds is a necessary condition 
for synonymy. Now, if no one can find any counter-examples of concept-expression pairs sharing the same 
extension in all possible worlds but are not synonymous, then all concept-expression pairs sharing the same 
extension in all possible worlds are synonymous. Which means that sharing the same extension in all possible 
worlds is a sufficient condition for synonymy. Taken together, this means that sharing the same extension in all 
possible worlds is a necessary and sufficient condition for synonymy.  
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5. Intension-expressions can be abbreviated using DEF-phrases. 
 
 I shall now introduce an abbreviating device, extending my prior discussion of 
intension-expressions. Take Lincoln’s definition of democracy as “government by the people 
(and so on).” We can abbreviate this phrase by writing it as “Phrase (government, people)”. 
The abbreviation reads: a phrase containing the words “government” and “people.” But since 
we’re looking at definitions, I shall write this phrase as “DEF (government, people).”205 
Which is read: a definitional phrase/sentence containing the terms “government” and 
“people”. Given this abbreviation, we can write Lincoln’s definition as:  
𝑨𝒃𝒓𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒎 𝑳𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒍𝒏: 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =𝑑𝑓.  𝐷𝐸𝐹 (𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝑝𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑙𝑒). 
 
This is read as: “Abraham Lincoln thinks that democracy is defined by a definitional sentence 
containing the words “government” and “people.”” Where the symbol =𝑑𝑓. is read “is 
defined by”, and the colon “:” is read “thinks that.” All of my shorthand-symbolic 
expressions are readable as grammatical English sentences, and I provide Rosetta-stone 
translations for foreign/non-English symbols.   
 There’s no hard and fast rule as to what words to include in the brackets of the 
abbreviated DEF phrase, just so long as it includes all the ‘key words’ in the long-hand 
definitional phrase. This is a very imprecise guide, no doubt. But I hope that such imprecision 
on my part is relatively harmless. 
 
 
                                                          
205Berto, There's Something About Godel: The Complete Guide to the Incompleteness Theorem, 20. This is a 
common device in predicate logic, this is seen in this page by the symbolism 𝛼(𝑥), which reads “any 
proposition containing the word signified by ‘x’.” 
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Chapter 2.2: Why Indicators Fail the Positivist Quest for 
Evidence 
 
  Having laid out the basic notions used in examining concept-expressions, I now return 
to the positivist search for evidence. In my thesis thus far, I’ve treated causal propositions as 
if they magically transform into hypotheses. Where somehow, the positivist transforms (what 
he would call) the ‘unobservable’ concepts featured in causal propositions, into the 
‘observable’ concepts featured in hypotheses. One hopes moreover, that the evidential link 
between both propositions remains sturdy under such a transformation.   
 In this section, I aim to demystify this magic, peering inside the black box of how this 
transformation takes place.206 In social scientific jargon, this transformation is known as 
operationalization.207  
                                                          
206As far as I know, no one has yet peered into the black box of operationalization. In Sartori, "Guidelines for 
Concept Analysis." Sartori's chapter comes closest to this. However, his main focus is on forming concepts, not 
operationalizing them. The psychometric literature, as far as I know, also concerns itself primarily with 
checking the validity of our operationalizations, already operationalized, and not about how it’s done. Also 
coming close are, Jeffrey Edwards and Richard P. Bagozzi, "On the Nature and Direction of Relationships 
between Constructs and Measures," Psychological Methods 5, no. 2 (2000); Richard G. Dumont and William J. 
Wilson, "Aspects of Concept Formation, Explication, and Theory Construction in Sociology," American 
Sociological Review 32, no. 6 (1967). 





 I argue that there are only two ways to engage in such transformations: intensionally 
and extensionally, and they are manifested in the social scientific use of indicators and 
indices respectively.208 This chapter looks at the former, and the next chapter looks at the 
latter.  
 If the evidential links between a causal proposition and an (operationalized) 
hypothesis is sturdy, validity is said to be the case. According to the jargon, validity is when a 
“measure measures the concept it is supposed to measure.”209 Expressing it more completely, 
validity is the case when good evidence for an operationalized hypothetical-proposition 
                                                          
208Munck and Verkuilen, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices," p.16, 
paras.2-3. Adcock and Collier, "Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative 
Research," 539, left hand side, first two full paragraphs. An index is conventionally seen as an aggregate of 
indicators, but it is best seen as an attempt to measure a concept in its ‘entirety.’ 
209Kellstedt and Whitten, The Fundamentals of Political Science Research, 101, first paragraph of 5.3.4. Adcock 
and Collier, "Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research," 529, left 
hand side, para.1. 
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(whose evidence is easier, and possible to find), constitutes good evidence for a causal 
proposition (whose evidence is hard, if not impossible to find).  
 In this chapter, I show that the use of indicators is necessarily invalid. Therefore, 
validity in indicator-dependent social science is impossible to attain, which entails that it is 




 Before I launch into my argument, let’s start with some preliminaries. Take the 
example of the vet. In her case, we see a transformation from a proposition “fleas are causing 
this cat to itch” to a (hypothetical) proposition “there is (ceteris paribus) covariation between 
fur loss and red rash spots on this cat.” These propositions however, when written and spoken 
in English, are very unwieldy.  
 To recap, these two propositions above can be abbreviated as “fleas C itch”, read: 
fleas, are causing, itch (on this cat). And, “fur loss R red rash spots”, read: fur loss, is in a 
ceteris-paribus covariational relation with, red rash spots (on this cat).” As you can see, these 
propositions are just particular instances of causal and hypothetical propositions, having the 
form aCb and xRy respectively. More generally, propositions of the form aCb and xRy have 
three (Lego-like) components to them, represented in the former case by the words 
abbreviated by a, b and C. 
  The purpose of such abbreviations, as you will see, is that it visually lays out (on 
paper) how operationalization works in the most obvious way. 
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 I shall now define my notion of propositional “transformation”: a proposition A is 
transformable into some proposition B if and only if proposition A is evidentially dependent 
on proposition B. In addition, if evidence for the transformed proposition B is easier to find 
than proposition A, that transformation counts as operationalization.  
 
Indicators as Extensional Operationalizations 
 
 I now show that indicators function as what I call, “extensional operationalizations.” 
One example of this is our vet. Note that in transforming the proposition “fleas C itch” to the 
proposition “fur loss R red rash spots”, the concepts (cats infested with/experiencing) “fleas” 
and “fur loss”, are not synonymous. Why? Put informally, one’s about fleas and the other’s 
about fur. Put formally, we can certainly imagine a (let’s say, Persian) cat retaining a luscious 
coat of fur despite being infested with fleas. Hence, both do not share the same extension in 
all possible worlds.  
 The vet however, given her experience, has good evidence for the proposition “all 
cats infested with fleas, are also cats experiencing fur loss”. Given this, she has good 
evidence that the concept-expressions, (cats infested by/experiencing) “fleas” and “fur loss” 
share the same extension: she has good evidence that if she sees a cat experiencing fur loss, 
she’s also seeing a cat infested with fleas. Thus, this similarity of extension allows her to 
‘measure’ fur loss, without having to ‘measure’210 fleas. Hence, insofar as this transformation 
allows her to use evidence for a proposition (“this cat is losing a lot of fur”) whose evidence 
                                                          
210King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, 110-11.  
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is easy to find, as evidence for a proposition (“this cat is infested by fleas”) whose evidence is 
hard to find, such a transformation constitutes operationalization. 
  Extensional transformations thus take the following general form.  
 
General form of extensional transformations: Since all as are xs (and vice versa), and all 
bs are ys (and vice versa) in our actual world, aCb is transformable to xRy.211 
 
Such a transformation is extensional insofar as the concept-expressions a and x, as well as, b 
and y are believed to share the same extension (in our actual world). They however, do not 
share the same intension.  
 But (and this is the crux of my argument) we see that extensional transformability is 
dependent on the truth/good evidence of the propositions “all as are xs” and “all bs are ys” – 
or, extensional-propositions as I will call them. This, as you will see, is evidence we cannot 
find.  
 To illustrate the gist of my argument with an example, Mousseau (2013) uses the 
number of life-insurance contracts in a particular country, to measure how much that country 
adhere to “capitalist values”.212 His justification for this is that countries having 
capitalist/economic values are “contract-intensive” (or, have a lot of contracts in them).213 In 
any case, his justification is best stylized as the extensional-proposition “all214 countries 
                                                          
211For simplicity’s sake, you can see “C” and “R” as perfectly interchangeable.   
212Michael Mousseau, "The Democratic Peace Unraveled: It’s the Economy," International Studies Quarterly 
57, no. 1 (2013): 187-88.  
213Ibid.  
 
214You could weaken this “all” by saying “most” or use more complicated set relations, but my core message is 
the same. For example, you could formulate this proposition correlationally using fuzzy logic: by saying, “Most 
elements in U that have a high degree of membership in the set A, also have a high degree of membership in the 
set B.” But you still can’t find evidence for that. Or,…“we have good reasons to be p% certain [under an 
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adhering to capitalist values have (high numbers of) life insurance contracts.”215 In social 
scientific parlance, life insurance contracts is here, an indicator (also called, a proxy) of 
capitalist values. This is because, given their purported extensional equivalence, for any 
particular economy (or more generally, member of U), the presence of life insurance 
contracts is said to indicate (or ‘point at’) the presence of capitalism.216  
 But it is impossible to find evidence for this extensional-proposition “all countries 
having capitalist values have…” Why? This is because we can certainly measure how many 
life-insurance contracts an economy has. But we have no way to measure whether a country 
adheres to capitalist values is without using the number of life-insurance contracts. 
Specifically, we have no way to look at each case and see whether it is both capitalist-valued, 
and have high numbers of life-insurance contracts, thereby serving as good evidence for the 
(correlational and) extensional-proposition.  
 This inability to find evidence for extensional-propositions manifests in, what I would 
call, an evidential gap between concept-expressions and their indicators/extensional 
operationalizations in IR scholarship. This is most apparent in the argumentative structure of 
most, if not all, indicator-dependent works in positivist IR. Let’s look at some examples.  
 Gartzke (2006) is the first, and most admirable in his refreshing candour about the 
afore-mentioned evidential limitations.217 He used similarity of states’ voting records in the 
                                                          
interpretation of probability as uncertainty] that most elements in U which have a high degree of 
membership,…” but there is no data/evidence for (the “good reasons” clause) in this epistemic proposition. For 
a work discussing the relation between fuzzy set theory (an extension of set theory) and probability theory, see 
Lotfi A. Zadeh, "Discussion: Probability Theory and Fuzzy Logic Are Complementary Rather Than 
Competitive," Technometrics 37, no. 3 (1995). 
 
215Michael Mousseau, "Contract Intensity of National Economies (Cine), Version 2.0,"  
http://politicalscience.cos.ucf.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/CINE-2.0-Codebook.pdf.  
216Goertz, "Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide," 58, point at the bottom of the page. Note the vague and 
metaphysical nature of Goertz’s language (common in the conceptualization literature and social science more 
generally) about indicators “as cues signalling the presence of a phenomenon.”  




UN general assembly as an indicator for similarity of foreign policy preferences.218 Realizing 
the evidential difficulties of (convincing us about the goodness of) his indicator of foreign 
policy preferences, he writes that “truth in advertising mandates that I point out that this 
objective (of measuring preferences) is problematic…(so) use this data219 with 
circumspection!”220 Although of course, he has a point that his attempt at extensionally 
operationalizing preferences is better than doing nothing at all.221 
  The other example is Fearon and Laitin, where they assert in just three sentences that 
GDP per capita is a good indicator of state strength.222 If you look at these sentences: you can 
see that these assertions are not backed up by data/evidence. Likewise, Kleinberg and 
Fordham (2013) treat the voting record of a district’s congressional representative on bills 
(that are for or against) trade with China, as an indicator of whether a district’s constituents’ 
interests are for free trade with China.223 Their justification for this is just one paragraph long, 
not backed up by data/evidence, and makes only an appeal to common practice and authority 
– as that that’s the indicator most studies use.224  
 The crucial problem here I think, is not whether these scholars are wrong or right – 
again, the issue all along is not truth but evidence. The crucial problem here is the lack, and 
impossibility of finding evidence for these extensional propositions, evidence which the 
extensional operationalization and more generally, the entire evidential chain rests on.  
 This problem manifests itself more obviously, when scholars disagree about the 
goodness of an indicator. Specifically, this manifests when two scholars propose two 
                                                          
218Ibid., p.3, section on "How is the Affinity of Nations index Created?".  
219Read here more precisely, as, datum-propositions which we’ve found good evidence for.  
220Gartzke, "The Affinity of Nations Index, 1946-2002" p.1, para.1.  
221Ibid., p.3, para.0 (paragraph continued from the previous page). .  
222Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War," 80, hypothesis H9, reasons a), b) and c).  
223Katja B. Kleinberg and Benjamin O. Fordham, "The Domestic Politics of Trade and Conflict," International 
Studies Quarterly 57, no. 3 (2013): 608, Right hand Side, para.1.  
224Ibid., 608, right hand side, paragraph.1.  
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divergent, but seemingly plausible extensional operationalizations/indicators of a concept-
expression. The lack of evidence means the lack of a judge to adjudicate between which one 
of the two (extensional-propositions) we should believe. This is a problem that’s further 
compounded when one extensional operationalization leads to evidence for a causal 
proposition, and the other, for evidence against it.  
 For an example of this, let’s look at two answers (or pieces of evidence for) the causal 
proposition: does ethnic tension cause civil wars?  
 
Two Divergent Measures of Ethnic Tension  
 
 In testing the proposition “ethnic tensions cause civil wars”, two scholars, namely 
Fearon and Laitin, as well as Cederman and Girandin (2007, hereafter abbreviated as C&G) 
extensionally-operationalize “ethnic tensions” differently.225  
 These two different operationalizations are conventionally called the ELF, or ethno-
linguistic fractionalization, and N* indicators;226 the ‘N’ comes from the ‘N’ in 
“ethnoNationalist”.227 For simplicity, I shall rename them the “diversity” and “governmental-
competition” indicators respectively. This is because the first purportedly measures ethnic 
diversity in a polity, while the latter purportedly measures the competition among various 
ethnic groups for control of the government.228  
                                                          
225Lars-Erik Cederman and Luc Girandin, "Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity onto Nationalist 
Insurgencies," American Political Science Review 101, no. 01 (2007). James Fearon and David Laitin, 
"Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War," ibid.97, no. 1 (2003). 
226"Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War," 78-79, write-up for H3. Lars-Erik Cederman and Luc Girandin, 
"Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity onto Nationalist Insurgencies," ibid.101, no. 01 (2007): 176-78. 
227"Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity onto Nationalist Insurgencies," 177, Left Hand Side, para.1.  
228Ibid., 177-78. James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War," ibid.97, no. 1 (2003): 
78, right hand side, last para. . 
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 At first glance, both are plausible indicators. More precisely, the two extensional-
propositions “All ethnically diverse polities have high levels of ethnic tensions, (because 
these groups find it hard to co-exist peacefully)” and “All polities with high levels of 
competition between ethnic groups over control of the government, are polities with high 
levels of ethnic tension, (because ethnic groups who don’t wield governmental power resent 
those ethnic groups which do)”, seem plausible.229 However, if you look at the way they’re 
reasoned (mathematically), and (quantitatively) calculated, the datum-propositions they give 
rise to, diverge.  
 To demonstrate their divergence, I now reconstruct their (quasi- mathematical) logic. 
I do this by taking a fictional and newly-independent polity, say, an island off the coast of 
Greece having a purely immigrant population of just six people. I shall name this newly 
independent polity, “Greco.” 
 Here’s how the diversity indicator is defined. The six people living in Greco are: 
 
People living in Greco: Adam, Ben, Clara, Dzul, Effendi, and Feng. 
 
Adam, Ben and Clara are American immigrants, possessing the ‘ethnicity’ “American”, Dzul 
and Effendi possess the ‘ethnicity’ “Indonesian”, while Feng is “Chinese.” In our polity of 6 
people, we see that there are 15 different possible pairs of people we can choose. 
Abbreviating each citizen’s name by only using its first alphabet, 
 
                                                          
229"Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War," 78-79. Lars-Erik Cederman and Luc Girandin, "Beyond 
Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity onto Nationalist Insurgencies," ibid.101, no. 01 (2007): 176-77. 
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All Possible Pairs of Greco-citizens: (A, B); (A, C); (A, D); (A, E); (A, F) 
       (B, C); (B, D); (B, E); (B, F) 
       (C, D); (C, E); (C, F) 
       (D, E); (D, F);  
       (E, F) 
 
 The diversity indicator is measured by looking at the “probability” that two people in 
a polity are of a different ethnicity.230 The term “probability” is ambiguous and 
philosophically contentious.231 We can however, interpret probability here as proportion: the 
probability that I will get tails in a coin toss is half, as it turns out that after playing the coin 
toss game many times, the proportion of tails-outcomes over all outcomes, is half.232 
 Hence, the diversity score for Greco is gotten by seeing how many citizen-pairs, out 
of all possible-citizen pairs, feature two people with a different ethnicity. Drawn in the figure 
below as those pairs outside the grey circles, it then turns out that out of all 15 pairs, that 
proportion is 11/15. Equivalently, its diversity score is 0.733, out of a maximum possible 
score of 1.233 
                                                          
230James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War," ibid.97, no. 1 (2003): 78, last para. of 
the page. Lars-Erik Cederman and Luc Girandin, "Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity onto Nationalist 
Insurgencies," ibid.101, no. 01 (2007): 174, left hand side, para.2. 
231Alan Hájek, "Interpretations of Probability,"  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/probability-interpret/.  
232Richard Hogg and Allen Craig, Introduction to Mathematical Statistics, 4th ed.(NY: Macmillan Publishing, 
1978), 2, para.1.  
233It’s 1, because the number of pairs featuring 2 people of a different ethnicity (the numerator) cannot 





You can see how the same method can be extended to almost any polity on the planet. Just 
list every citizen of say, France, classify each citizen as belonging to some ethnicity, and do 
the same thing. It’s exhausting of course: there will be a few million people, and a couple 
more million pairs. But the basic idea behind it is fairly straightforward.  
 Now that we understand how the diversity indicator is measured, I now look at the 
governmental access indicator.  
 For the governmental access indicator, it assumes a particular picture (or, ‘theory’) of 
the polity, a picture that C&G call “starlike”, and with good reason.234 They see the polity as 
necessarily, being controlled by one ethnic group (that is, the ethnic group that controls its 
government), and we can illustrate this picture with Greco. Let’s say Clara becomes the 
president of Greco, and puts the interests of all Americans before the other ethnic groups. The 
other groups will then be resentful of not just President Clara but all other Americans (who 
will rally around their president against challengers to her rule).235 Competition over access 
to the government thus develops between Americans and other ethnic groups. In addition, 
C&G assume that competition won’t occur between the marginalized Chinese and Indonesian 
                                                          
234Cederman and Girandin, "Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity onto Nationalist Insurgencies," 176.  
235Ibid., 176-77, write-up for A2.  
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groups, only between Americans (the ethnic group controlling the government) and the 
rest.236  




The starlike shape becomes more obvious if we consider polities more generally as having ‘n’ 
number of ethnic groups. The shape of competition thus looks like,  
 
                                                          





The starlike shape stems from both 1. the assumption that the ‘marginalized’ groups don’t 
compete with each other and 2. that one group necessarily controls the government (thereby 
forming the center of the star).237  
 To measure the extent of ethnic tension/competition in the polity as a whole, one just 
looks at these inter-group competitions one by one.238 In Greco’s case, we look at the two 
‘axes’ of competition: Americans vs. Indonesians, and, Americans vs. Chinese. For 
                                                          
237C&G don’t explicitly state this, and I’m doing the explaining for them.  
 
238Cederman and Girandin, "Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity onto Nationalist Insurgencies," 147, 
last para. This “one by one” character of aggregating the scores of each ethnic group-pair is seen in the last two 
sentences where they assume that the intensity of conflict between the governing group 1, and marginalized 




simplicity’s sake (because summing up the scores for the various axes is mathematically 
complicated),239 we can just examine the extent of competition in one ethnic-group pair and 
see it as being in effect, equivalent to the extent of governmental-competition for the polity as 
a whole. 
 Note that the extent of “competition over control of the government” is yet another 
concept-expression, and C&G operationalize it by asserting the extensional-proposition “all 
ethnic-group-pairs in a polity having high levels of competition over control over the 
government, are ethnic-group-pairs where the proportion of people, in the marginalized 
ethnic group, over the number of people in the ethnic group in control of the government, is 
high.240 
 To illustrate this using Greco again. We see that it has 3 American, 2 Indonesian and 
1 Chinese citizen. If Clara is the President, the Americans are in charge, and you can see that 
firstly, there are 4 people (3+1) in the ethnic-group pair Americans vs. Chinese, and secondly, 
the proportion of Chinese people (the marginalized group) over Americans in that pair is ¼.  
 But, if Feng were to be President, the number of marginalized people in the 
American-Chinese pair would be the higher number, ¾. These numbers ¼ and ¾ can be taken 
                                                          
239Ibid., 177, equation on the left hand side. To understand the main ideas underpinning the equation, ignore the 
‘r’ and ‘k’ terms as they are numerical constants, having little bearing on the relation between ethnic tension 
(N*) and the aforementioned proportion. Note that r(i) and r are not the same, r(i) is a different ‘mathematical 
entity’ and is our afore-mentioned proportion for one ethnic group-pair. The crucial mathematical mechanism 
for ‘summing up’ the scores is the large sign “Π” which indicates that you multiply the proportions for each 
ethnic-group pairs. Why then is it multiplication and not addition, and why is it that the terms to be multiplied 
are in the form of a fraction? This stems from how C&G wants to calibrate (‘a priori’/mathematically) the 
indicator such that it does not exceed 1 (to facilitate comparison with the diversity indicator as that also doesn’t 
exceed 1). You see that since r(i) is necessarily, lesser than one, so multiplying a large number of r(i) terms will 
never yield a result that’s more than 1, hence multiplication is chosen. Addition will be a bad choice as it is 
possible that sum of many r(i) terms might exceed one. Also, given that r(i) is between 0 and 1 (ignoring the 
constants), a fraction of the form 
𝑟(𝑖)
1+𝑟(𝑖)
is necessarily between 0 and 1 as the denominator will always be 
larger.  
 
240Ibid., 176, right hand side, para.3.  
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to be, in effect, the governmental competition indicator-score for the Chinese-American 
pair.241 This is because C&G thinks that in the former case, the marginalized Chinese would 
be outnumbered, and hence cannot vigorously compete against the Americans for control 
over the Greco government. Competition in this case, is mild/not intense. In the latter case, 
President Feng, being outnumbered by a lot of Americans, will have a lot of competition 
against his rule.242 Competition in this case, is very intense.  
 Note that unlike the diversity indicator, this score changes radically depending on 
which ethnic group is in power,243 and this is the crux of the divergence. 
 To illustrate this divergence, let’s take Greco’s neighbour, Troy. Troy has 20 people, 
each having first names beginning with the alphabets a to t. Persons a to p are Dutch, q to s 
are Malaysian while t is the only Japanese citizen.  
 
       People living in Troy:  a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p | q r s | t 
 
You can see that their diversity score is lower than Greco’s (you can work it out if you don’t 
believe me). This, according to the diversity indicator, means that Troy is more ethnically 
peaceful than Greco. But if President Clara is the ruler of Greco, while Prime Minister 
Tomoyuki is the ruler of Troy, the governmental-competition indicator will register Troy as 
being far less ethnically peaceful than Greco as he will have to fend off challenges from a 
                                                          
241We can reason this (mathematically) by saying that at the very least, the total government-competition 
indicator-score for Greco is proportional to the indicator-score of the Chinese-American pair. This should work 
if we’re not too fussy about the mathematical minutiae.  





sizeable Dutch majority (again, you can work it out if you don’t believe me). Under one 
indicator then, Greco’s more peaceful, while under the other, Greco’s less so.  
 While this divergence is the case for our fictional polities of Greco and Troy, is it also 
the case for real polities such as The Philippines, Germany and Canada? According to 
Cederman and Girandin, yes it is.244 Or as they put it: their coding of the N* scores for 
various cases “generated (data) that is radically different from the ELF. [emphasis added.]245 
This is seen most clearly in the diagram that C&G drew, a diagram I’ve copied and pasted 
below.246 The red circles indicate cases where the N* and ELF measures diverge.   
 
Fig.2.2e 
                                                          
244Ibid., 178, right hand side, first full paragraph.  
245Ibid., 178, right hand side, first full paragraph. 
246Ibid., 179, figure.2.  
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 In addition, these two indicators have been used to operationalize the “ethnic tension” 
in “ethnic tensions cause civil wars” differently, leading to two competing bodies of evidence 
for and against this causal proposition. One leads to evidence that says: yes, it does; another 
leads to evidence that says: no, it doesn’t.247  
 
The Pseudo-Science of Extensional Indicators 
 
 This example illustrates why Adcock and Collier – and the psychometric literature – 
emphasize the need to measure concepts in their ‘entirety.’248 An operationalized indicator 
which doesn’t do so, is invalid.249  
 The justification behind this can be further illustrated with a simple analogy. Let’s say 
I want to measure, for restaurants in my neighbourhood, how good their pasta sales are. I 
cannot just measure how many spaghetti-dishes they sell. Why? This is because Moe’s 
restaurant down the road is famous for his delicious and best-selling lobster ravioli (and has 
low sales volume for his spaghetti-dishes). If I use spaghetti as an extensional-indicator of 
pasta, I’ll think that Moe’s doesn’t sell a lot of pasta, when ‘in fact’, he does. Likewise, my 
colleague might use ravioli as an extensional indicator and have the opposite set of data from 
mine.     
                                                          
247This is most explicitly given evidence for in Jeffrey Dixon, "What Causes Civil Wars? Integrating 
Quantitative Research Findings," International Studies Review 11, no. 4 (2009). 707, last para. spilling over to 
the next page, also p.720 table 8, third to fifth independent variables under the “demographics” c.   
248Adcock and Collier, "Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research," 
538-40.  
249 Stephen N. Haynes, David C.S. Richard, and Edward S. Kubany, "Content Validity in Psychological 
Assessment: A Functional Approach to Concepts and Methods," Psychological Assessment 7, no. 3 (1995). 
Kellstedt and Whitten, The Fundamentals of Political Science Research, 106, latter half of para.1. 
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 But maybe you find it troublesome to measure/gather evidence for datum-propositions 
about how many lasagne, penne, spaghetti,…,macaroni dishes each restaurant sells. So you’ll 
make up an extensional proposition that: “all pasta dishes are spaghetti-dishes, and all 
spaghetti-dishes are pasta-dishes.” This leads to the question: how are you going to 
test/gather evidence for this extensional proposition if your only measure of what counts as a 
pasta-dish is spaghetti? You can’t. And this is the analogous quandary (extensional 
indicators) in the social sciences are in.  
 So how does this make the positivist use of indicators pseudo-scientific? The crux of 
this is how for (positivist-oriented) studies using just one indicator – coal consumption per 
capita as an indicator of economic development250, GDP per capita as an indicator of the 
extent of capitalism in an economy,251 etc.252 – their evidential chains are dangling 
precariously at the top. This is because the sturdiness of the evidential link between the causal 
proposition and extensionally-operationalized hypothesis [the first link in the chain], are 
dependent on extensional-propositions we can never find evidence for. Hence, the first rung 
of the evidential chain is not sturdy. This then entails that we cannot find evidence for the 
causal proposition in question. See fig.2.2f 
 
                                                          
250Håvard Hegre et al., "Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-
1992," The American Political Science Review 95, no. 1 (2001): 37, left hand side, 2nd full paragraph. .  
251Erik Gartzke, "The Capitalist Peace," American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 1 (2007): 174-75.  





 How then, is a body of social scientific scholarship dependent on extensional-
indicators, pseudo-scientific? What does this jargon term “pseudo-scientific” mean? I can 
argue for it in the following way.  
 Let’s define a body of positivist social scientific scholarship (or, a topic, subfield, 
discipline etc.) as a body of (what its practitioners deem to be), ceteris paribus-covariational 
evidence for or against a set of general, causal propositions. It is a tautology to assert that a 
body of social scientific scholarship is scientific, if it is scientific. But I (and everybody, 
really)253 don’t (legitimately) know what “science” and “scientific evidence” is.  
                                                          
253Larry Laudan, "The Demise of the Demarcation Problem," in Physics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis, ed. R. 
S. Cohen and L. Laudan, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Springer Netherlands, 1983); Jackson, 
The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of 
World Politics, 10-16. The demarcation problem is the problem about what demarcates science from non-
science. If we can’t figure this problem out, then we cannot define what counts as science (and non-science). If 
we can’t figure out this demarcation, then we can’t figure out the extension of the concept-expression “science”. 
And if we can’t figure out the extension of “science”, and assuming that we are able to know and describe the 
methodological facets of every discipline, it then means that we do not have a good definition/intension-
expression of “science.”   
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 I shall however, assert and think it is assertible, that a necessary but insufficient254 
condition for a discipline/body of scholarship to count as scientific, is that it is grounded in 
evidence. Given this, we can modify my formerly-tautological assertion to: a body of social 
scientific scholarship is not scientific, if it is not grounded in evidence. Or more precisely, “is 
not grounded in evidence” here can be substituted with the synonymous concept-expression 
“does not have evidence for its set of (general, causal) propositions.” And given their 
dangling evidential chain, as argued, a body of positivist social scientific scholarship 
extensionally-operationalizing their (jargoned) concept-expressions do not have evidence for 
their causal propositions.  
 In this respect then, (as it violates the necessary condition), that body of indicator-
dependent positivist scholarship is not scientific. Or equivalently, it is unscientific. In 
addition, KKV/positivists as you’ve seen, use the word “science” in describing their method 
of finding causal evidence via ceteris-paribus covariation. Hence, should practitioners of 
indicator-dependent scholarship think or proclaim that closely following KKV’s method 
makes them scientific,255 they are deceptively calling an unscientific discipline/subfield 
scientific. Where deceiving people into thinking that an unscientific body of work is 
scientific, is simply (synonymous with), pseudo-science.  
 In conclusion then, indicator-dependent, positivist social science is unscientific. And 
if it calls itself a ‘science’, it is pseudo-scientific. 
                                                          
254It is insufficient because this would make our vet, the troubleshooting done by a car mechanic and the 
‘deductions’ of Sherlock Holmes, ‘scientific’ as they constantly make ‘propositions’ that are evidentially 
grounded. 
255For an example, Fred Chernoff, "The Study of Democratic Peace and Progress in International " International 
Studies Review 6, no. 1 (2004). Kellstedt and Whitten, The Fundamentals of Political Science Research, Chapter 
1; King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, Chapter 1. 
Keohane, "Beyond Dichotomy: Conversations between International Theory and Feminist Theory." "Political 
Science as a Vocation," PS: Political Science and Politics 42, no. 2 (2009): 360-62.For others, see also, Jackson, 
The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of 
World Politics, 3-10.   
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Chapter 2.3: Why Indices Fail 
  
 In response to the invalidity indicators suffer from, the positivist might attempt to 
solve this by (qualitatively) coding each case. That is, for example, rather than using some 
indicator (say, number of parties competing in elections) as an indicator for “democracy”, we 
engage experts in the affairs of particular countries to evaluate/code how democratic these 
countries are. The premise behind this is that these experts are able to holistically evaluate 
how well these countries satisfy every facet of the concept-expression “democracy.” In this 
chapter, I argue that this approach fails because our concept-expressions in IR are too 
ambiguous.  
 
Indices as Intensional Operationalizations 
 
 How do indices work?  Let’s say all of us – whether layperson or social scientist – 
have some definition of the concept-expression “democracy”, a concept-expression I denote 
“democracyA”.  However, “democracyA”, as Schaffer (2000),256 I think convincingly shows, 
is ambiguous (a term to be defined later), even controversial257 in its varying intension-
expression/s. In other words, “democracyA” means (possibly radically) different things to 
different people. In the conceptualization literature, democracyA is known as the background 
concept.258 
                                                          
256Schaffer, Democracy in Translation: Understanding Politics in an Unfamiliar Culture, 10-20 especially.  
257Collier, Hidalgo, and Maciuceanu, "Essentially Contested Concepts: Debates and Applications."  
258Adcock and Collier, "Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research," 
531-34. Gerring, Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework, 52-54. 
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 What indices do then, is invent what is strictly speaking, a new concept-expression I 
denote “democracyB”, such that its intension-expression is (hopefully), 1. expressed 
unambiguously, and 2. synonymous with democracyA  In the conceptualization literature, this 
concept-expression “democracyB” is known as the systematized concept.259   
 Unlike indicators, indices function as operationalizations of a different sort. Let’s look 
at one example: the polity index for democracy. The polity index expresses (what it takes to 
be) the intension of democracyB in the following way.  
 
Polity IV: A state is democratic if 1. there are constraints on what the executive can do, 2. 
political participation is not regulated, 3. the process of deciding (or recruiting) who will run 
the executive branch of government is competitive.260 
 
This intension-expression is polity IV’s criteria of (quantitatively) deciding whether this or 
that polity261 is democratic (and to what extent).262  
 I denote this intension-expression “DemocracyB/P”, named as such because it is polity 
IV’s systematized definition of the concept-expression “democracy”. DemocracyB/P, is what I 
call, an intensional operationalization of democracyA. Why do I say this? Firstly, it is 
intensional as unlike the intensional dissimilarities characteristic of indicators, the intension-
                                                          
259Adcock and Collier, "Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research," 
533-34.  
260Goertz, "Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide," 97. I got this from Goertz’s more compact re-
characterization of the Polity attributes.  
261The term “polity” is interchangeable in my thesis with “country”, “state” and “nation.” The polity is state and 
society considered jointly.  
262Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr, "Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity Iii Data," Journal of 
Peace Research 32, no. 4 (1995): 472-73.  
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expression of democracyB/P and some ordinary person’s expression of democracyA is thought 
to be (more or less) synonymous.  
 Secondly, Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr (the people behind the polity index), think that 
propositions of the form “state X has constraints on executive action,…,competitive 
recruitment of the executive.” is a (datum-)proposition whose evidence is easier to find, as 
compared to a proposition “state X is democratic”.263 I shall assert an axiom that synonymous 
propositions are evidentially dependent on each other.264 Given this axiom, the former 
proposition constitutes a (purported) transformation of the latter. Moreover, insofar as 
evidence for or against the transformed latter proposition is (thought to be) easier to find than 
the latter one, this transformation (is thought to) count as operationalization.  
 From this illustrative example, I shall then assert what I consider to be the general 
form265 of intensional transformations.  
 
General Form of Intensional Transformations: Since, a and x, and b and y are synonyms, 
a proposition of the form aCb is transformable to a proposition xRy. 266 
                                                          
263Ibid. Shawn Treier and Simon Jackman, "Democracy as a Latent Variable," American Journal of Political 
Science 52, no. 1 (2008): 201.  
264Carnap, Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic, p.15, proposition 3-12. Carnap 
expresses it in terms of truth, not evidence.   
265I have only strictly speaking, argued that the Polity index fits this form. Whether indices in general fit this 
form remains to be seen, but I will argue in the end of this section that it does.   
266As a sidenote, there might arise cases when substituting synonymous concept-expressions into propositions 
yields a non-synonymous proposition. For example, “Strasbourg lies on the left bank of the Rhine” is not 
synonymous with “Strasbourg lies on the left financial institution of the Rhine.” How then should we deal with 
this? Note that concept-expressions are words and phrases, and hence, linguistic sub-components of (lengthier) 
propositions. And note moreover, that I have only defined synonymy for concept-expressions, not propositions. 
To then check for propositional synonymy after substitutions of synonymous concept-expressions, check 
whether those two propositions share the same truth values in all possible worlds. Two propositions are 
synonymous if and only if there exists no possible world where one is true and the other is false.Quine, "Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism," 27-28. Carnap, Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic, 56. 
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 I shall now argue why intensional operationalizations, like their extensional 
counterpart, do not yield causal evidence. I do so by examining one example closely, namely, 
the Polity index of democracy. More specifically, I examine how the Polity index expresses 
its intension of “democracy.” 
 To repeat the Polity definition (on pain of redundancy),  
 
Polity IV: A state is democratic if 1. there are constraints on what the executive can do, 2. 
political participation is not regulated, 3. the process of deciding (or recruiting) who will run 
the executive branch of government is competitive.267 
 
 Expressing it as a DEF-sentence, the Polity definition can now be expressed as:  
 
Polity IV: A democratic polity =df. DEF (1. There are constraints on what the executive can 
do; 2. political participation is not regulated; 3. the process of deciding who will run the 
executive branch of government is competitive). 
  
If you like, you can substitute “a democratic polity” with “democracy.” Also, the use of 
semicolons and bolded numbers are entirely stylistic. If you look at the long-form definition, 
you realize that you can remove the bolded numbers without any loss of meaning. Note also 
that the phrase “DEF-sentence” can be substituted with the phrase: “a definitional sentence 
                                                          
267Goertz, "Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide," 97.  
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containing the word/s.” My DEF-sentence device is grounded in everyday English, not in 
Logic (at least not substantively)268, or mathematics.  
 This DEF-sentence can be equivalently and more elegantly expressed as a diagram I 
call a DEF(initional)-chain.269 The term to be defined is on top (that is, the words found to the 
left of “=df.”), and we know it is the polity definition because of the superscripts “B/P”. The 
words/phrases in the DEF-sentence are those one rung down the chain. Hence, 
DemocracyB/P’s DEF-sentence can be graphically represented as:  
. 
Fig.2.3a 
                                                          
268My DEF-sentence is based on the Ramsey sentence in philosophy of science sans the existential quantifiers, 
more specifically, Lewis’ rendering of the Ramsey sentence in Lewis, "How to Define Theoretical Terms," 426-
31.  
269The graphical form is also one based on “concept structures” seen in the conceptualization literature. For 
examples, Munck and Verkuilen, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices," 
13. Goertz, "Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide," 52. 
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Expressed more cumbersomely in an abbreviated prose form: 
 
 Polity IV: A democratic polity =df. DEF (1. DEF (Constraints, Executive Action); 2. DEF 
(Regulation, Political Participation); 3. DEF (Competition, Executive Recruitment)). 
Expressed even more cumbersomely in unabbreviated prose:  
The Polity IV index thinks that “democracy” is defined by a definitional sentence containing 
three words/phrases that are themselves defined by three definitional sentences containing the 
words “constraints” and “executive action” for the first definitional sentence, “regulation” and 
“political participation” for the second definitional sentence, and “competition” and executive 
recruitment” for the third definitional sentence.  
In addition, the concept-expressions “competition” and “political participation” can be further 
decomposed into their own DEF-sentences (thereby creating one further level in the DEF-
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chain). This seemingly infinite levels of decomposability,270 I will show, is at the heart of 
why intensional operationalizations fail.  
Put informally, intensional operationalizations fail because concept-expressions in 
social science are ultimately parasitic on ambiguous and perennially contested concept-
expressions such as “power” and “politics.”271  
 I shall now present the aforementioned argument more formally, beginning with an 
illustrative example. Namely, the Polity index’s dependence on expert opinion in measuring 
levels of democracy, and why two experts disagree.   
 
Why Experts Disagree: Lisa Weedeen vs. Polity IV on Yemen 
 
 The polity IV index measures propositions of the form “polity/country X is 
democraticB/P” by relying on “expert” opinion272, and I would assume that these experts are 
versed in the goings-on of a particular country. This should, in my opinion, set alarm bells 
ringing: experts on particular countries are a common sight in political science. More 
importantly, we can intuit that experts rarely agree, especially regarding the extent of 
“democracy” or “political participation” a country has.  
  Evidence for this intuitive hunch has been found by Bollen and Paxton (2000) as well 
as Jackman and Treier (2008).273 The former compared the measurements of three experts on 
                                                          
270Sartori somewhat recognizes this with his notion of a semantic field. Sartori, "Guidelines for Concept 
Analysis," 124-25.  
 
271Janice Bially Mattern, "The Concept of Power and the (Un)Discipline of International Relations " in The 
Oxford Handbook of International Relations, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal(NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 696. Janice Bially Mattern recognizes this when she says “But concepts, no matter how 
broad, entail metatheoretical premises.” Also, Despite brushing the problem aside with considerable 
handwaving, John Gerring recognizes this. Gerring, "What Makes a Concept Good? A Criterial Framework for 
Understanding Concept Formation in the Social Sciences," 44. 
  
272Gurr and Marshall, "Polity Iv Individual Country Regime Trends, 1946-2013" 5-6. This is also known in 
social scientific parlance, as coding. 
273Kenneth Bollen and Pamela Paxton, "Subjective Measures of Liberal Democracy," Comparative Political 
Studies 33, no. 1 (2000); Treier and Jackman, "Democracy as a Latent Variable."  
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how democratic various countries are.274 Bollen and Paxton found that the two experts 
(responsible for the Freedom House index) tended to measure Communist (pardon the 
imprecision), and predominantly Christian countries as being more democratic, while the 
lone Polity II expert did the opposite.275 Summarizing their findings of such divergence 
among experts, Bollen and Paxton remarked: “what we found is not comforting.”276 Jackman 
and Treier also seem to concur.277 
 I am currently not educated enough to understand the statistical methods used in these 
works, so I might have misinterpreted them.278 I also cannot evaluate the quality of evidence 
that they’ve furnished. However, assuming that experts do disagree in their evaluations on 
how democratic each country is, the question I hope to answer now is: why?  
 The key to answering this lies in DEF-sentences, specifically, my idea that the 
‘attributes’ of democracyB/P (and I believe, indices of democracyB in general) are themselves 
concept-expressions as ambiguous as “democracy” itself. I shall illustrate this point by 
zooming in on democracyB/P’s second attribute (how unregulated political participation is) in 
the case of Yemen.279 Here, two experts disagree: the Polity IV expert pessimistically thinks 
that political participation in Yemen is highly regulated280, while Lisa Weedeen is more 
optimistic.281  
The crux of their divergence lies in two different definitions of the “political”, and 
consequently, “political participation.” Weedeen’s definition of “politics” and “political 
                                                          
274Bollen and Paxton, "Subjective Measures of Liberal Democracy," 61.  
275Ibid., 75-77.  
276Ibid., 78, para.1.  
277Treier and Jackman, "Democracy as a Latent Variable," 213, first para. of conclusion. .  
278Nonetheless, for a relevant and accessible introduction, see Jason Seawright and David Collier, "Rival 
Strategies of Validation: Tools for Evaluating Measures of Democracy," Comparative Political Studies 47, no. 1 
(2014).  
279The ambiguity of the concept-expression “political participation” can be seen in these works attempting to 
define it. Patrick J. Conge, "The Concept of Political Participation: Toward a Definition," Comparative Politics 
20, no. 2 (1988); Jan W van Deth, "A Conceptual Map of Political Participation," Acta Politica 49, no. 3 (2014).  
280"Polity Iv Country Report 2010: Yemen,"  http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Yemen2010.pdf.  
281Lisa Weedeen, Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power and Performance in Yemen(Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 2008), 118, para.1; 23, 40-41.  
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participation” is rooted closer to (what I think is) an Aristotelian, power-free construal of the 
term: to participate in politics is to concern oneself with issues pertaining to the polis.282 The 
Polity IV expert, on the other hand, defines the “political” in (what I think is) a more 
Machiavellian, power-laden sense of the term: to participate in politics is to exercise 
power.283  
Weedeen sees the citizens of Yemen as politically participative as they concern 
themselves with issues of the ‘polis’ (that is, Yemen) despite not wielding power (assuming 
that the way citizens wield power is through elections).284 Specifically, she focused on the 
institution of the qat chew – a gathering where people talk politics while chewing qat, a 
chewable narcotic similar to amphetamine.285 Anyone can join in the qat chew, and anyone 
can speak about ‘national’ issues (pardon the imprecision).286 In addition, Weedeen hints that 
the narcotic properties of qat makes political discussions livelier.287 In sum, for Weedeen, 
Yemen should be seen as more democratic288 in light of this relatively unregulated,289 
hierarchically flat,290 and lively space of ‘political’ discussion.  
 In evaluating political participation in Yemen however, the polity IV expert focused 
on incidents of voter fraud and intimidation,291 as well as how (Yemeni) President Salih used 
force to crush popular protests against his rule.292 According to the polity IV expert, political 
                                                          
282Richard Mulgan, "Aristotle and the Value of Political Participation," Political Theory 18, no. 2 (1990): 196, 
para.1.  
283Isaiah Berlin, "The Originality of Machiavelli," in Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas, ed. 
Henry Hardy(London: Pimlico Books, 1979), 50-52.  
284Weedeen, Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power and Performance in Yemen, 125-26.  
285National Institute on Drug Abuse, "Drugfacts: Khat,"  http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/khat; 
Weedeen, Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power and Performance in Yemen, Chapter 3.  
286Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power and Performance in Yemen, 122 last para.-23.  
287Ibid., 123 last para.-24 para.0.  
288Ibid., 139 last para.-40 para.1.  
289Ibid., 134, para.1.  
290Ibid., 126 paras.1-2.  
291"Polity Iv Country Report 2010: Yemen",  3, paras.1-2.  
292Ibid., 3, paras. 3-4.  
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participation in Yemen is highly regulated.293 This is because for the Polity IV expert, to 
participate in politics is to exercise power, and the power exercised by the ‘people’ (through 
voting or protest) is ‘regulated’ insofar as its exercise has been subdued by the government. 
 Any debate over which definition of politics is ‘better’ is either irresolvable, or an 
entirely inappropriate one to have294 This is because these two conceptions of politics are 
rooted in two different political-theoretical traditions.  
Weedeen’s more Aristotelean conception is rooted in Aristotle’s peculiar moral 
philosophy and theory of the human being.295 For Aristotle, to be moral is to strive towards 
the right moral end,296 and indispensable towards such a striving is participation in ‘political’ 
life,297 where a particular kind of political participation is political discussion.298 Aristotelean 
political participation/discussion is thus, not a means of keeping tyranny in check or 
exercising power: it is simply an indispensable part of a human being’s moral cultivation.299 
 In contrast, Machiavelli’s conception of politics is laden with power through and 
through. This is at least the case in The Prince, a book written in a time of Italian disunity and 
tumult; Machiavelli saw Italian unity as a way to end the tumult in Italy.300 To that end, The 
                                                          
293Ibid., 2. Gurr and Marshall, "Polity Iv Individual Country Regime Trends, 1946-2013" 16. The Polity IV 
expert coded Yemen as having “restricted” political participation. This adds 2 to its autocracy (or -2 to its 
democracy) score.  
294For an example, see Ian Shapiro, "Enough of Deliberation: Politics Is About Interests and Power," in 
Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement, ed. Stephen Macedo(NY: Oxford University 
Press, 1999).  
295For an illustration, see Judith M. Green, "Aristotle on Necessary Verticality, Body Heat, and Gendered Proper 
Places in the Polis: A Feminist Critique," Hypatia 7, no. 1 (1992).  
296Darrell Dobbs, "Natural Right and the Problem of Aristotle's Defense of Slavery," The Journal of Politics 56, 
no. 1 (1994): 81 para.1-83 para.1.  
297Ibid., 81, preface to the Aristotle quote-82.  
298Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos, "Politics, Speech, and the Art of Persuasion: Toward an Aristotelian Conception 
of the Public Sphere," ibid.61, no. 3 (1999): 745-47.  
299Darrell Dobbs, "Natural Right and the Problem of Aristotle's Defense of Slavery," ibid.56, no. 1 (1994): 75, 
para.2, especially the sentence "It (the polis) exists not merely for the sake of self-preservation,...it exists above 
all to enable its citizens to become capable performers of noble deeds.". Also, Sartori, "What Is Politics?," 45.  
300Berlin, "The Originality of Machiavelli," 30-31. Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, ed. James B. 
Atkinson(Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 2008), Chapter 24 and 26. 
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Prince was intended as a practical treatise on how a virtuous301 individual could unite the 
disparate Italian states.302  
Plus, even if we take the Aristotelean definition of politics as being involved in affairs 
of a polity (be it ‘Italy’, Florence or Athens), engaging in politics in the midst of such tumult 
requires one to keep internal and external enemies in check.303 In sum, given the tumult of 
Machiavelli’s day, to engage in (Machiavellian) politics is to exercise power.  
 More importantly, these two definitions of politics exist side-by-side in everyday 
discourse, that is, the background concept-(expression) that is “politicsA.” To use an 
American example, if we say that we should participate in town hall meetings because it is 
the duty of a good citizen to participate in politics, then we are invoking Aristotle. But if we 
say that we should participate in order to make a difference (that is, exert what power we 
have as citizens), then we are invoking Machiavelli.304  
 Note that we are now back to where we were in the beginning of this section when we 




                                                          
301Machiavelli calls this “virtù”, which is best read as strategic skill. Neal Wood, "Machiavelli's Concept of 
Virtu Reconsidered," Political Studies 15, no. 2 (1967).   
302Machiavelli, The Prince, Chapter 26. Reading chapter 26, it’s evident that Machiavelli is addressing it to the 
house of Medici, who he thinks can unify Italy and expel the foreign powers (primarily France and Austria) 
dividing the Italian states and meddling in Italian affairs.  
303Sartori, "What Is Politics?," 48 last para.-49. Machiavelli, The Prince, Chapters 14 and 22, last 2 paragraphs. . 
304This is actually one of Machiavelli’s messages in his more republican Discourses on Livy. Discourses on 
Livy(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2009), Book 1, Chapter 6. John Pocock, The Machiavellian 
Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (NY: Princeton University Press, 
1975), 198-99. This “making a difference” takes on a more martial tone for Machiavelli. For him, Rome’s 
imperial greatness was gained via the Marian reforms, which allowed the plebs to join the army as professional 
soldiers. This created the Roman analogue to a people’s army. For him, the arming the plebs served a two-fold 
function: a more obviously imperial-military one as well as a way for the plebs to channel their ambition against 
foreign enemies rather than against the aristocracy. Without the latter, plebeian-aristocratic strife would 
destabilize Rome’s domestic politics. In short, the Marian reforms channelled the power of the ‘people’ to more 




Ambiguity as why Intensional Operationalizations Fail: A (Quasi-) Formal Argument 
 
 What are the implications of these two differing definitions of “politics” for the polity 
index in particular, and the positivist quest for evidence more generally? Let us now return to 
the big picture, starting with an illustration. I tell my friend “Drew’s cat is sick.” This 
proposition has 4 words, and 3 concept-expressions discounting “is”: they are, “Drew”, “cat”, 
and “sick.” It however, turns out that I have two friends Drew A and Drew B; Drew A keeps 
a Maine Coon while Drew B – a professional zoologist – keeps a tiger (note that tigers are 
also cats). Lastly, “sick” could be one of two things: first, a slang term referring to something 
‘cool’, or conventionally, a word referring to someone very ill.   
  “Drew’s cat is sick” is known as an ambiguous proposition, and it’s a proposition 
constituted by ambiguous concept-expressions.305 What do I mean by “ambiguous”? I’ll 
define ambiguity for concept-expressions first, starting with the example “Drew”. Drew has 
two possible non-synonymous definitions306 for it: “Drew” could either mean “Drew A” or 
“Drew B”, and likewise for the other concept-expressions. Should my friend ask me “which 
Drew?” and I respond “oh, Drew A”, then I am disambiguating the concept-expression 
“Drew” insofar as I specify which definition (out of many other possible ones) I am using.307  
An ambiguous concept-expression is thus one where different people express two (or 
more) non-synonymous definitions for it.308 To disambiguate a concept-expression is to 
                                                          
305Arne Naess, "Toward a Theory of Interpretation and Preciseness," Theoria 15, no. 1-3 (1949): 251-52, 54-55. 
Brendan Gillon, "Ambiguity, Generality, and Indeterminacy: Tests and Definitions," Synthese 85, no. 3 (1990). 
Sartori, "Guidelines for Concept Analysis," 111-15.  
306Naess, "Toward a Theory of Interpretation and Preciseness," 254. The sentence “…the negation of a 
synonymity relation.” 
They are non-synonymous because Joey A and Joey B do not share the same extension in all possible worlds. 
The extension-set of the concept-expression “Joey A” is populated by one person: Joey A himself, and likewise 
for “Joey B”. Insofar as Joey A and Joey B cannot be imagined as being the same person (assuming they are 
necessarily distinct individuals, or more formally, different elements of U) in all possible worlds, “Joey A” and 
“Joey B” never share the same extension-set in any possible world. You see that this is the case for the others.   
307Ibid., 229-32.  
308Gillon, "Ambiguity, Generality, and Indeterminacy: Tests and Definitions," 394.  
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specify which definition (or definitions, if it’s appropriate) we mean. Tautologically, an 
ambiguous concept-expression that is not disambiguated, remains ambiguous. DemocracyA – 
recall Lincoln’s and Popper’s non-synonymous definitions – is an example of an ambiguous 
concept-expression.   
I graphically incorporate this notion of ambiguity by adding another component to my 
DEF-diagram, a component I call disambiguation lines. They are diagonal orange lines 
linking two (or more) possible disambiguations (at the bottom) with the ambiguous concept-
expression at the top. The most straightforward one would be fig.2.3c for “Drew.”  
 
 
Fig.2.3c: When an ambiguous concept-expression is disambiguated 
 
The disambiguation that is chosen is represented by an arrowed disambiguation line.  
 Should however, an ambiguous concept-expression not be disambiguated – and thus 





Fig.2.3d: When an ambiguous concept-expression is not disambiguated 
 
 DemocracyB/P (and “democracy” more generally) is however, a concept-expression 
that I term multiply ambiguous. This is because its definitional phrase/sentence also contains 
ambiguous concept-expressions.  
To see what this means more concretely, take the example of democracyB/P and 
assume (tentatively, for simplicity’s sake) that democracyB/P is defined as unregulated 
political participation. I’ve argued that there are two possible disambiguations of “political 
participation” – defined as “exercising power” and “publicly discussing national issues.” 
DemocracyB/P thus have at least 2 disambiguations of it: it could mean “unregulated exercise 
of power (by the ‘people’)” or “unregulated public discussions of national issues.”  
 But assuming that there are two more disambiguations of the ambiguous term 
“power”309 (denoted power1 and power2), this increases the number of disambiguations to 3. 
Because, democracyB/P could mean “unregulated public discussions of national issues”, the 
“unregulated exercise of power1 by the ‘people’” and “…of power2 by the people”. 
Furthermore, you can see that the number of disambiguations continue to expand because 
“unregulated” is itself ambiguous, and this number increases further if we take the full polity 
definition which includes constraints on the executive, etc. 
                                                          
309“Power” is a term that’s notoriously hard to define. See Bially Mattern, "The Concept of Power and the 
(Un)Discipline of International Relations ".  
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See the diagrams below for a graphical representation. 
 
 




Fig.2.3f: Possible Disambiguations 
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Thus, democracyB/P constitutes the Polity index’s attempt to disambiguate the 
concept-expression “democracy”. However, democracyB/P still remains multiply ambiguous 
because the terms used to define it are not disambiguated310, therefore, democracyB/P remain 
ambiguous.  
Having discussed ambiguous concept-expressions, I now move on to ambiguous 
propositions. I define ambiguous propositions as propositions constituted by at least one 
ambiguous concept-expression.311 I shall now prove that this entails that it can be both true 
and false in some possible world. Firstly, defining propositional disambiguation: to 
disambiguate a proposition is to substitute all its ambiguous concept-expressions with a 
disambiguated definition. Take my example of “Drew’s cat is sick”, I disambiguate this 
proposition by saying “Drew A’s (not Drew B’s) Maine Coon (not tiger) is ill (not cool).” 
Without disambiguating the proposition, there are 8 possible disambiguations for it: 
“Drew A’s tiger is ill.”, “Drew A’s tiger is cool”, “Drew A’s Maine Coon is ill.” etc. You can 
see that one possible disambiguated proposition can be true, while some other is false: “Drew 
B’s tiger is cool” could be true (because it can do a lot of tricks for example) while “Drew 
A’s Maine Coon is ill” could be false. More generally, and therefore, there exists a possible 
world – as we can imagine a state of affairs – where one disambiguation of an ambiguous 
proposition is true while another disambiguation is false.312  
How does propositional ambiguity implicate, or as you will see, impede, the search 
for evidence? Let’s revisit some definitions. Evidence are good reasons that help us (better) 
                                                          
310Although, the Polity IV dataset recognizes this and tries to disambiguate some but not all its concept-
expressions. Gurr and Marshall, "Polity Iv Individual Country Regime Trends, 1946-2013" 6 last para.-7. 
311Gillon, "Ambiguity, Generality, and Indeterminacy: Tests and Definitions," 402, para.1.  
312This draws on the contradiction test for ambiguous propositions. Ibid., 407. More formally, let’s assume that 
two propositions cannot be synonymous iff between the both of them, their constituent concept-expressions are 
not synonymous. This then means that the disambiguations of an ambiguous propositions (are, like their 
concept-expression counterpart), non-synonymous. As two propositions are synonyomous iff they share the 
same truth value in all possible worlds, this therefore means that for two non-synonymous propositions (which 
the disambiguations of an ambiguous proposition are), there exists a possible world where one disambiguation is 
true, and another disambiguation is false.   
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guess (or decide) how true (or false) a proposition is. An ambiguous proposition however, 
can, in some possible world (denoted W), be true and false in varying degrees over various 
disambiguations. In W, that ambiguous proposition is what I call, evidentially undecidable, as 
it is both true and false (and possibly, everywhere in between). Consequently, no amount of 
evidence can help us decide whether it is true or false (or at some point in between truth or 
falsity).  
Should W not be our actual world, I term that ambiguous proposition, potentially 
evidentially undecidable, and should W be our actual world, I term that ambiguous 
proposition, actually evidentially undecidable.313 
Thus, “political participation in Yemen is unregulated” is as you have seen, actually 
undecidable. Assuming that Weedeen is right about the qat chews, and the Polity IV expert is 
right about voter intimidation, W is our actual world where the aforementioned proposition is 
true under its Aristotelean disambiguation of “political participation”, and false under its 
Machiavellian disambiguation.   
However, that proposition about Yemen is only one of many possible propositions 
featuring “democracyB/P”. For the set of all propositions featuring “democracyB/P”, you can 
see that there exists a subset D containing propositions of the form “Country X is 
democraticB/P.” This subset is simply the polity dataset (recall that I’ve defined a “dataset” a 
set of datum-propositions). As democracyB/P is multiply ambiguous and not disambiguated, 
all propositions in D are either potentially or actually evidentially undecidable.  
                                                          
313My use of the word “undecidability” is inspired by, and very loosely based on its more technical use of it in 
mathematical logic. Berto, There's Something About Godel: The Complete Guide to the Incompleteness 
Theorem, 26, 108. A decidable set is one where we can specify a procedure (also known as an “algorithm”) that 
tells us whether for all elements of U, this or that element of U belongs or does not belong to that set. Here, we 
have a set “the set of all polities having high levels of unregulated political participation” and we have no 
procedure capable of deciding (or, evidence helping us to decide) whether Yemen belongs or does not belong in 
this set.  
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You can vaguely feel that potential evidential undecidability is somehow inimical to 
the positivist quest for evidence. But unpacking exactly how, is I think, quite complex and it 
will require more philosophical legwork (before eventually applying it to social science).314 
The implications of actual evidential undecidability is however, quite clear. 
Actual evidential undecidability means we cannot find evidence for or against an 
ambiguous proposition: (good) evidence for such a proposition is scattered and accrues all 
along the true-false continuum in our actual world. Thus, an ambiguous and actually 
undecidable proposition is not just one where evidence for (or against) it is hard to find, 
evidence of any sort is impossible to find. Recall that operationalization attempts to transform 
a proposition such that evidence is (at least) possible to find.  
Assuming then that many propositions in D are like those about Yemen, actually 
evidentially undecidable, this in social scientific parlance, means that the polity dataset D, is 
unreliable.315 Specifically, a dataset is unreliable if and only if there exists pieces of evidence 
for and against a ‘majority’316 of its datum-propositions; ambiguity is just one of many 
possible ways datasets can be unreliable. For positivists, reliable datasets are a necessary 
condition for good causal evidence.317  
                                                          
314This might involve playing around with possible worlds (a fairly active subfield of philosophy). Primarily, the 
question of how W (or the set of Ws) where a potentially undecidable proposition is true and false, relates to our 
actual world. One hunch I have is some members of this set of Ws are future, actual states of affairs (e.g. the 
end of the Cold War for someone living before 1989; or possibly, two “democracies” going to war sometime in 
the future). Seen this way, potential evidential undecidability then has implications on how new goings-on in 
our world are interpreted as being evidence for or against a particular theory. More specifically, about how 
ambiguity can render propositions about an event as being both evidential support and challenge to a theory 
under various possible disambiguations. For a work tackling such a question, see Andrew Lawrence, "Imperial 
Peace or Imperial Method? Skeptical Inquiries into Ambiguous Evidence for the "Democratic Peace" " in 
Theory and Evidence in Comparative Politics and International Relations ed. Richard Ned Lebow and Mark 
Irving Lichbach(NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
315Simon Jackman, "Measurement," in The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology, ed. Janet M. Box-
Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady, and David Collier(NY Oxfor University Press, 2008), 123, last para. Munck and 
Verkuilen, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices," 19.  
316Pardon the vagueness; it will turn out to be quite harmless in the end, I think. This is because whatever one’s 
definition of “majority”, if that definition of “majority” is satisfied, then that dataset is unreliable (under that 
definition of majority).  
317King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, 25 last 




To reconstruct why they think so, I shall assert an axiom that a proposition is actually 
undecidable if, (a majority of) the propositions that it is evidentially dependent on, is actually 
undecidable. With this, we can now figuratively move up the evidential chain. If a majority of 
datum-propositions in D is actually undecidable, then the variational proposition asserting 
that there is variation in levels of democracyB/P is actually undecidable. Informally, this 
means we cannot find evidence that there is variation in levels of democracy across cases if 
the dataset is unreliable.318 This then means that the covariational, and hypothetical ceteris 
paribus covariational propositions are themselves actually undecidable. 
 Thus, even if we grant that a general, causal proposition containing the concept-
expression “democracy” is synonymous with, and thus transformed into another proposition 
containing “democracyB/P”, we still cannot find evidence for the latter. In other words, even if 
the Polity index succeeds in such a transformation (in my specific, technical meaning of 
“transformation”), it fails to operationalize the proposition containing “democracy.” This 
means more broadly, that propositions featuring even a systematized “democracyB/P” fail the 
positivist quest for causal evidence: it is actually evidentially undecidable. 
Therefore – recall my prior argument on pseudo-science – a body of social scientific 
scholarship utilizing at least the polity index is ungrounded in evidence, and is thus, 
unscientific. And if that body of work couches itself as scientific, it is pseudo-scientific.  
To generalize, all indices’ definition of their systematized concept-expressions are as 
multiply ambiguous as the Polity one. Here are some examples; the ambiguous concept-
expressions are underlined.  
 
 
                                                          
318The Fundamentals of Political Science Research, 101, para.1.  
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The Minorities at Risk Index: A minority is at risk if it is “an ethnopolitical 
group that collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory 
treatment vis-à-vis other groups in society; and/or collectively mobilizes in 
defense or promotion of its self-defined interests.”319 
  
Doyle and Sambanis’ Civil War Dataset: A conflict counts as a civil war if 
it “1. caused more than 1000 battle320 deaths; 2. challenges the sovereignty of 
an internationally recognized state;…;5. the rebels were able to mount an 
organized military opposition to the state.”321 
 
 Having now shown that the use of indices and indicators fails positivism’s goal of 
finding causal evidence, have I shown that positivist social science as a whole fails? I believe 
so, because as far as I know, all positivist works depend on either indices or indicators (or a 
combination of them). If you know of any positivist work that doesn’t (thereby jeopardizing 
my argument), do let me know, but I doubt you can find any.  
Before I continue, I would like to shut down one possible counter-argument because I 
think it’s ultimately unproductive and fallacious. This counter-argument can be summed up 
via the related responses: “but we have been getting better at getting more reliable and more 
valid data”322 and “this is the best that we can do.”323  
                                                          
319"Minorities at Risk (Mar) Codebook Version 2/2009,"  
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data/mar_codebook_Feb09.pdf.  
320During any war, deaths could still occur outside of a pitched engagement.    
321Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "Data Set Notes for Michael M. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis 
"International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis" "  
www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/cohen/codebook.pdf. For a work examining the difficulty of defining 
“civil war”, see Sambanis, "What Is Civil War? ." 
322King, "Restructuring the Social Sciences: Reflections from Harvard's Institute for Quantitative Social 
Science," 165-66.  
323King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, 109-12.  
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These two responses commit what I call a “good-better-best” fallacy. The crux of this 
is how “X is the best”, “X is good”, X is getting better” do not entail each other. Just because 
something is the best, or getting better doesn’t mean it’s good (or good enough): they are 
separate claims that have to be evaluated separately.  
This fallacy stems from how we’ve naively and wrongly viewed good, better and best 
as equivalent to something like good, very good and very very good. Hence, we think that if 
X is getting better, or the best of its kind, it must be good. However, to cite some 
counterexamples, the best taco joint in this small town might not even be passable, and the 
fact that I’m getting better at the ukulele doesn’t mean that I’m good at it. Likewise, the 
cheapest electric car on the market is still very expensive, and nuclear power plants are (as 
their critics allege) not safe enough despite being safer than before.  
 Hence, it might be true that the current state of positivist IR has been getting better, or 
is the best we can currently do. But it doesn’t entail that positivist IR is good enough – or 
more clearly, that it is, in its present state, up to its task of accruing causal evidence.  
  
Why Positivist IR Fails: A Bird’s Eye View of my Argument 
   
More generally, I’ve argued that as operationalization fails, ‘good’ quality data – that 
is, data that is at least reliable and valid – is impossible to attain. Positivists too recognize that 
1. good data is necessary for good causal evidence, and 2. even the most sophisticated 
techniques of data analysis cannot rescue the positivist from invalid and unreliable data.324 
Analogously, good data are like the fresh ingredients that chefs routinely demand: no amount 
of good technique and seasoning can save a dish cooked without fresh ingredients.   
                                                          
324Jackman, "Measurement," 126-28. While I don't understand the technical bits, Jackman's assessment at the 
last 2 paragraphs of 27 seems to reflect this. More accessibly, Kellstedt and Whitten, The Fundamentals of 
Political Science Research, 103, para.1. 
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There are however, two equivocations to my argument. Firstly, my argument does not 
strictly speaking, indict positivism qua positivism. It indicts only positivist IR from its 
inception till 2015. Specifically, positivists think that good causal evidence is equivalent to 
evidence for ceteris paribus covariation across a dataset that’s reliably and validly gathered, 
and I’ve not found fault with that.  
The fault lies with our multiply ambiguous vocabulary in political science/IR (from its 
inception till 2015) that makes valid and reliable data impossible to have. Seen this way, 
positivist IR is ‘born in the wrong time and place’ so to speak – it is applied to a discipline 
which hasn’t yet disambiguated many of its concept-expressions. 
Secondly, I have only argued that indicator and index-dependent works in positivist 
IR are pseudo-scientific. I haven’t yet covered a type of operationalization that straddles the 
line between indicator and index. I call such an operationalization, a multiple indicator. It 
combines multiple indicators to form a composite indicator that is supposed to be 
extensionally equivalent to the concept-expression to be measured. An example of this is the 
“Composite Index of National Capability” (or CINC) that aims to measure how much 
“power” a state has.325 It combines indicators such as a country’s population, GDP, steel 
production, military expenditure etc. where the higher a country’s population, GDP etc., the 
higher its CINC score (which is purportedly extensionally equivalent326 to its ‘power’).  
The conventional/positivist way to find evidence for the extensional proposition for 
such multiple indicators, is to see whether for example, a state’s GDP, population, steel 
production etc. covary in the ‘same direction.’ That is, whether high levels of GDP are also 
accompanied by high levels of military expenditure etc. The reasoning behind this is that the 
more ‘power’ a state has, the higher it should score on these individual indicators. Therefore, 
                                                          
325See, J. David Singer, "Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816–
1985," International Interactions 14, no. 2 (1988).  
326This is most explicitly seen in ibid., 116, last para.   
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if these individual indicators covary in the same direction, this is evidence that the multiple 
indicator is (extensionally) equivalent to the concept-expression it is trying to measure. Such 
a technique for checking the validity of a multiple indicator is known in the jargon, as 
“Construct” or “Convergent” validity.327  
Trying to unpack and critique this would however require another chapter no less 
detailed than the one I have written on indicators and indices. Besides, indicators and indices 
cover (to pardon my vagueness) a ‘large majority’ of works in (positivist) IR. Thus, I had to 
sacrifice pedantic completeness in exchange for a shorter, more readable thesis.  
Put most precisely then, I’ve argued that positivist IR works dependent on indices and 
indicators has, from its inception till 2015 at least, fail to achieve its aim of accruing causal 
evidence.   
This leads to the question: will positivist IR continue to fail? Or equivalently, can it be 
saved? To this I can only say one thing, before positivism can be salvaged as a viable 
methodological –ism in IR, we need to excise ambiguity from our language. That is, we have 
to ask ourselves questions like: what is, or should we mean by, “power”328, “institutions”329, 
or “the economy”?330 Moreover, in the midst of proffering a definition, we must check 
whether the definition itself contains ambiguous concept-expressions, and define those with 
comparable rigour. These are questions political theorists often ask, and I’ll wager that 
                                                          
327To see this at work in the CINC index, see Jae-On Kim et al., "Index of National Power: How to Assess the 
Basic Capacity of a Nation."Here, they assume that the proposition “a powerful country will (likely) have both a 
high CINC score, and many wins in soccer tournaments” is true. To then find evidence that a countries with 
high CINC scores are powerful countries, they show that there’s a correlation between a country’s wins in 
soccer tournaments, and their CINC score. They repeat this procedure with 1. the number of Nobel prizes 
citizens of a country has won, 2. number of Olympic medals won, and 3. Number of Fortune 500 companies 
originating for that country. Some readers might have an intuition that such a procedure is suspect. For a critic, 
see Harold P. Bechtoldt, "Construct Validity: A Critique," American Psychologist 14, no. 10 (1959). 
328Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).  
329John Searle, The Construction of Social Reality(NY: Simon and Schuster, 1995).  
330Uskali Maki, ed. The Economic World View: Studies in the Ontology of Economics(NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001).  
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grappling with them is a huge enterprise that present-day positivists in IR are unwilling to 
undertake.  
Of course, that positivism will work after this first step discounts the concessions that 
I have extended to it. I’ve assumed that positivists have good means of achieving a ceteris 
paribus situation, and that ceteris paribus covariation is equivalent to good causal evidence. 
Should these concessions be unwarranted, this first step of linguistic disambiguation will still 
lead to a positivist failure to find causal evidence.  
Calls for linguistic disambiguation are not new. As far as I know, Giovanni Sartori 
and Janice Bially Mattern are the only scholars who have made the same plea331, a plea that 
IR has by and large ignored.332 Beyond these two scholars, my argument echoes anti-
positivist arguments by IR scholars drawing on the philosophy of social science. Scientific 
(and Critical) Realists have attacked the positivist ignoring of causal mechanisms, and 
questioned whether evidence for ceteris paribus covariation is equivalent to causal 
evidence.333 In a similar spirit, Patrick Jackson has in my opinion, successfully dislodged the 
definitional monopoly positivists have over the word “science.”334 
In relation to Scientific Realists then, my argument ‘opens a new front’ so to speak, in 
their anti-positivist argument. Beyond having to grapple with questions of causal mechanisms 
and alternative means of causal evidence, positivists now have to grapple with questions of 
our multiply ambiguous concept-expressions. In relation to Patrick Jackson, I have made a 
stronger version of his argument: positivist IR today is not even one of many possible ways to 
                                                          
331Bially Mattern, "The Concept of Power and the (Un)Discipline of International Relations " 695 last para.- 97. 
This is reflected in her call for “pragmatic metatheoretic singularism.” Sartori, "The Tower of Babel," 75-80. 
Also, as the very prescient Kenneth Waltz puts it “Unless the confused, vague and fluctuating definitions of 
variables are remedied, no tests of anything can be properly conducted” in Kenneth Waltz, Theory of 
International Politics(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1979), 15, middle of para.1. 
332Gerring, "What Makes a Concept Good? A Criterial Framework for Understanding Concept Formation in the 
Social Sciences," 36.  
333See footnotes 112-116 in Chapter 1.3.   
334Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for 
the Study of World Politics, 193-201 especially.  
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study world politics scientifically,335 it is not a way of studying world politics scientifically in 





















                                                          























Chapter 3.1: Implications of my Anti-Positivist Argument 
 
 Having now argued that positivist IR is pseudo-scientific, what are the implications of 
my argument? The implications, I believe, are two-fold.  
 
More broadly, 
1.  As positivism has been seen as the paradigmatically ‘scientific’ method in IR/social 
science, but it is unscientific, how then should IR establish itself as a science?  
More narrowly,  
2. How can we re-structure and define our set of social scientific concepts in an 
unambiguous way?  
 
In this third part of my thesis, I aim to tackle these two questions simultaneously.   
 Unfortunately, I cannot look to the Philosophy of Science for help. This is because, at 
least for implication number 1., philosophers of science have given up stating the conditions 
under which a discipline can establish itself as a science. This is also known as the 
“demarcation problem”.336 Thus, I cannot draw on a set of general criteria, or a ‘scientific 
method’ that philosophers of science have set, a method which we can apply to our particular 
task of studying world politics. More strongly then, there doesn’t exist any work in the 
Philosophy of Science that tackles both implications 1. And 2. simultaneously.  
                                                          
336See Laudan, "The Demise of the Demarcation Problem." And note 252 in chapter 2.2. 
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Thus, I shall take a more inductive, example-driven tack. If we can assume that the 
disciplines of Mathematics and Physics count as sciences, and their theories count as 
scientific theories, I shall then attempt to draw lessons from particular mathematical and 
physical theories in an attempt to tackle these two implication-questions.  
In the next chapter, I look at two examples of scientific theories, Primitive Recursive 
Arithmetic and Newtonian Kinematics. I tackle implication-question 1. by asking what kind 
of methodological lessons we, as IR scholars, can draw from them, and I tackle implication-
















Chapter 3.2: A Methodological Lesson from Two 
Examples 
 
 In this chapter, I look at primitive recursive arithmetic (abbreviated as PRA) and 
Newtonian kinematics. I lay out each theory on their own terms, and draw a methodological 
lesson from them in the end. 
 More generally, I show how painstakingly mathematicians and physicists construct 
their concepts. More specifically, I show how they define their concepts from the ‘ground-
up’, that is, they start with a handful of simple/primitive and unambiguous concepts, and 
define more difficult/jargoned concepts using only these primitive concepts. The payoff of 
their ground-up approach is conceptual non-ambiguity. In contrast, we social scientists 
conventionally define concepts ‘top-down’, that is, we take an ambiguous concept like 
“democracy” and try to ‘break it down’, or dis-ambiguate it. As I have shown, this ‘top-
down’ approach to disambiguation is cumbersome at best, or impossible to accomplish at 
worst.    
 Finally, I examine how physicists and mathematicians choose their primitive concepts 








Preliminaries: Rigour and Primitive Concepts in Mathematics 
 
The proper way to do mathematics is to start tabula rasa.337 That is, we have to 
unlearn everything we know, and start from scratch. For dramatic effect, I call this step, step 
zero. Starting from step zero means that we have no concept of “number”, “addition” or 
“multiplication.” As you will realize, the closer to tabula rasa we start from, the more 
challenging mathematics becomes.  
This tabula rasa requirement is closely related to the notion of mathematical rigour: 
one crucial feature of mathematical rigour is an ardent refusal to appeal to non-primitive 
concepts that we haven’t explicitly posited.338 This demand for rigour draws on the anti-
authoritarian and anti-conventional spirit of mathematics.339 Everything in mathematics is to 
be defined, then proven. Any mathematical argument for some proposition X that appeals to 
                                                          
337David Hilbert, "The Foundations of Mathematics," in From Frege to Godel: A Sourcebook in Mathematical 
Logic, ed. Jean van Heijenoort(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 465 para.0, and 75-76.  
 
This tabula rasa requirement is stated most strongly by Hilbert. For him, what mathematics is, is simply a set of 
symbols, with rules governing how these symbols can be formed into sentences (i.e. strings of symbols), as well 
as rules of inference that govern what new string of symbols we can write given a pre-existing string of 
symbols. Note that this word “write” is to be construed literally. This pre-existing string of symbols are known 
as axioms, and those newly written strings of symbols are known as theorems. These symbols have no meaning 
whatsoever. This approach to mathematics is known as “Formalism”, and draws on the notion of the syntax 
(rather than semantics) of a formal language. See Berto, There's Something About Godel: The Complete Guide 
to the Incompleteness Theorem, 40-41. 
 
This Formalist construal of mathematics as a ‘meaningless and artificially constructed game’ is influential but 
controversial. Nonetheless, more weakly, the demand for mathematics to be placed on ‘rigorous foundations’ is 
an offshoot of the work of late 19th Century mathematicians (most of whom were based in the University of 
Gottingen). See Leo Corry, David Hilbert and the Axiomatization of Physics: From Grundlagen Der Geometrie 
to Grundlagen Der Physik(Dodrecht, Netherlands: Springer Science and Business Media B.V., 2004), Chapter 
1. It is this focus on foundational questions that have heavily impacted how Mathematics (as a discipline) is 
practiced today. Specifically, rather than calculation under conventionally stipulated rules, the emphasis in 
mathematics today is on defining concepts from scratch and proving propositions featuring those concepts. As 
you realize, this is very close to what philosophers do, hence Frege’s insightful remark “every good 
mathematician is at least half a philosopher.”  
 
338This is exemplified in the opening pages of Hilbert’s magnum opus, David Hilbert, The Foundations of 
Geometry(LaSalle, Illinois: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1950), 1-7.  
339For an excellent, non-technical and ethnographic discussion of this, see Munir Fasheh, "Mathematics, 
Culture, and Authority," For the Learning of Mathematics 3, no. 2 (1982).  
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the fact that all mathematicians believe in X, or that an esteemed mathematician said “X” has 
no (mathematical) force whatsoever.340   
The task of PRA is to define arithmetical concepts such as “addition” and 
“multiplication” using even simpler, or more primitive concepts. Hence the terms “primitive” 
and “arithmetic” in PRA. The way to achieve this is to define these arithmetical concepts 
“recursively”, and you will find out later what it means.  
 In order now to proceed from step zero to more advanced steps, we have to posit 
some primitive concepts.  
The first primitive concept I shall posit is that of a set. A set is a collection of 
things,341 and the things belonging to a set are called its elements. Some examples of sets are 
a fridge filled with food, a basket of fruits, a group of friends, and a nest of ants.  
 The second primitive concept is that of a relation. A relation can be understood in 
two senses of the term. A particular relation is a relation that holds between two things342, a 
and b. A general relation is a relation that holds between two elements (themselves also 
things) that belong to two sets, such that a belongs to some set A, and b belongs to some set 
B.343 Should I not specify which of the two senses I mean, I mean relation in the general 
sense of the term.  
                                                          
340Alexander Soifer, The Mathematical Coloring Book: Mathematics of Coloring and the Colorful Life of Its 
Creators(NY: Springer, 2009), 197-98. This “proving for oneself” however, gets complicated in the case of a 
computer generated proof.  
341Lay, Analysis with an Introduction to Proof, 38. F. A. Muller, "The Implicit Definition of the Set-Concept," 
Synthese 138, no. 3 (2004): 422-23. Note however, that this isn’t a perfect definition of “set.” The definition of a 
“set” is complex, contested and explored in the mathematical subfield of axiomatic set theory. The problem with 
my definition (as the cited pages in Muller’s article describes) is that mathematicians want to consider the “null 
set” (the set with nothing in it) as a set. But if a set is defined as a collection of things, then the null set isn’t a 
set, which creates a problem.   
 
342Lay, Analysis with an Introduction to Proof, 54, section 2.2.6. Note also how contrived Lay’s intuitive 
definition is “…a relation between two objects a and b is a condition involving a and b that is either true or 
false.” 
 
343Ibid., 55, section 2.2.7.  
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A particular relation between two things is denoted aRb, read: a is in such and such a 
relation R, with B. A general relation between elements of sets is denoted as R: A→B. Read: 
the general relation R relates elements from the set A with elements from the set B.344  
 Here’s an example of a relation. Let H be the set of all human beings. The child-
parent relation, R, relates elements of set H to elements of the identical set H. The set H has 
the elements {Sasha Obama, Barack Obama, Steven Tyler, Liv Tyler, (and so on)…} Those 
things in the curly brackets denote the elements of that set. As a general relation, the child-
parent relation relates members from the set H, with members of the identical set H.345 An 
example of the child-parent relation as a particular relation is encapsulated in expressions like 
“Sasha Obama R Barack Obama” (read: Sasha Obama is the child of Barack Obama). 
 I shall now posit the third, less primitive concept of a pair-set. A pair-set is a 
particular kind of set in that the kinds of things it contains, are pairs of things.346 What is a 
pair? A pair is a collection of two things a and b such that a belongs to some set A, and b 
belongs to some set B.347 A pair-set can thus be labelled AB,348 and should the two sets A and 
B be identical (that is, contain the exact same elements),349 they can be written as AA or, A2. 
                                                          
344Ibid., 63, Definition 2.3.1.  I’m actually conflating a “function” with a “relation.” A “function” is a particular 
kind of general relation. It is a general relation relating elements of the set A with elements of set B, such that 
firstly, the relation is defined for all elements of A, and secondly, for all those elements of A, they are related to 
only one element of set B. Relations that don’t fulfill these two criteria are relations but not functions. When I 
talk about “relations” from now, I mean “functions.” For an example of a “function”, see my next example of 
“is the child of.” For an example of a general relation that is not a function. Take the relation “is the mother of” 
that relates elements of the set (of all human beings) H with elements of the set H. You can see that this relation 
is defined for “Michelle Obama”, but never for “Barack Obama”, hence “is the mother of” violates the first 
criterion of function-hood. Likewise, “is the friend of” defined on H violates the second criterion because 
Amanda could be the friend of Bernard, Clara and so on. Expressed very un-rigorously, the second criterion 
states that for all elements in the ‘input’ set, it should only yield ‘one answer’, that is, just one element in the 
‘output’ set. 
  
345Ibid., 54, last sentence.  
346Ibid., 53.  
347Ibid., 52.  
348Ibid., 53-54.  
349This reflects the axiom of extensionality in axiomatic set theory. It simply states that two sets are equivalent if 
and only if they contain the same elements. Jean-Louis Krivine, Introduction to Axiomatic Set Theory(Springer 
Netherlands, 1971), 2.  
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Here‘s an example of a pair-set. Let the set H be the set of all humans who are 
heteronormatively married. H then contains {Barack Obama, my friend Joey,…(and so on)}. 
The pair-set H2 is the set of all heteronormatively married couples. H2 thus contains the 
members {(Barack Obama, Michelle Obama); (Joey, Amanda); (and so on).} The round 
brackets denote pairs.  
I now posit our last primitive concept, the concept of an ordered set. Intuitively, an 
ordered set is a set whose elements are ‘arranged’ according to some criteria. For example, if 
S is the set of all American states {Alabama, (to),Wyoming}, S is an ordered set if its 
elements are arranged alphabetically (or by population size, and so on).350 Likewise, a set of 
stations on a subway line can be an ordered set if its elements are arranged from say, east to 
west.  
While it is tempting and ultimately correct to intuit outlines of the concept of 
“number” from the concept of an ordered set, this is very dangerous. Remember: 
mathematical rigour eschews analytical leaps such as these. This definition of “number” (as 
roughly corresponding to the first, second, third members of an ordered sets), has been 
proposed by John Von Neumann, but he defines it painstakingly, using only the primitive 
concepts of sets and relations.351 As you will see, we do not need the concept of “number”, 
just the concept of an ordered set. 
                                                          
350The culmination of this is the “well ordering theorem” which proves that every set can be (well) ordered. 
Ibid., 20-21. Ron Freiwald, "Introduction to Set Theory and Topology,"  
www.math.wustl.edu/~freiwald/ch8.pdf. My definition of an ordered set is very unrigorous as it appeals to a 
concept of “arrangement.” In contrast, the well-ordering theorem uses only the primitive concepts of set, 
relation as well as the Axiom of Choice (seen later in this chapter).  
 
351John von Neumann, "On the Introduction of Transfinite Numbers," in From Frege to Godel: A Sourcebook in 
Mathematical Logic, ed. Jean van Heijenoort(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967). You can 
actually get a sense of this in just the first 2 pages, pp.346-348; This is also the only part of the proof that I 









 With these concepts of set, pair-set, relation and ordered set, we can start with a 
central task of PRA, the definition of “addition.” What it means to “define addition” will be 
unpacked later. More importantly, (for the sake of rigour) our definition cannot feature 
concepts other than the four primitive ones that we have introduced. As you will see, this will 
be achieved in a “recursive” way. 
Before we begin, I shall define concepts idiosyncratic to our task of defining addition. 
Firstly, I shall define the concept of a picking relation.353 Informally, the picking relation tells 
us to pick the first (or second) member of a pair. The picking relation telling us to pick the 
first member of the pair is called the “first-picking relation”, and the same reasoning applies 
to the “second-picking relation.” More formally, the picking relation relates elements of a 
pair set with elements of a (non-pair) set. For example, the pair (Joey, Amanda) in H2 is 
related to Amanda in H under the second-picking relation.   
The next relation I shall introduce is a successor relation,354 and this is a relation that 
can only be defined for ordered sets. For example, 4 is the successor of 3, and Arizona is the 
                                                          
352I am not too versed in the Phillosophy of Mathematics, but this is a view expressed by some philosophers of 
mathematics. Stewart Shapiro, Thinking About Mathematics: The Philosophy of Mathematics(NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), Chapters 8-9. I have also lifted this expression “mathematics without numbers” from a 
book Geoffrey T. Hellman, Mathematics without Numbers: Towards a Modal-Structural Interpretation (NY 
Oxford University Press, 1989). It is a book I do not currently understand.  
 
353Shawn Hedman, A First Course in Mathematical Logic: An Introduction to Model Theory, Proof Theory, 
Computability and Complexity(NY: Oxford University Press, 2004), 302, Example 7.2. This is conventionally 





successor of Alabama in S. Informally, the successor relation relates an element of an ordered 
set to the next element in that ordered set. More formally, the successor relation relates 
elements in an ordered set O with elements of the identical ordered set O. 
Next, I shall introduce the concept of a generalized ordered set. We can represent 
ordered sets more generally as a generalized ordered set O such that its first member is 
denoted o1, second member denoted o2, and so on. Thus, O consists of the members {o1, 
o2,…}. O is a close counterpart to a set mathematicians conventionally denote as “ℕ”, 
representing the ordered set of natural numbers {0,1,2,…}.355 However, we don’t need and 
haven’t yet defined the concept of “number”. Besides, ℕ is nothing but a particular case of O. 
It, like O is ordered, but while O can contain any number of elements, ℕ contains an infinite 
number of elements.356 Note also, that in talking about (this one set) O, we are also talking 
about every particular instance of ordered sets.  
I shall now state the first axiom of addition.  
 
First Axiom of Addition: Addition is a relation that relates elements from the set O2, 
to elements of the set O.357 
 
To describe this most unrigorously, in “2+3=5”, we see that the pair (2,3), (conventionally 
known as the sum), is related to the number 5, (conventionally known as the summand). 
                                                          
355Krivine, Introduction to Axiomatic Set Theory, 28. As you can see from the von Neumann article in note 346, 
as well as in the pages up till Krivine, p.28, there is a lot more apparati besides ordered sets that we need, if we 
want to define the natural numbers primitively. I currently don’t fully understand them. For a more accessible 
definition, see R.L. Goodstein, Recursive Number Theory(Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 
1957), 1-4. 
356This is more accessibly seen in Lay, Analysis with an Introduction to Proof, 87-88.  
357Hedman, A First Course in Mathematical Logic: An Introduction to Model Theory, Proof Theory, 




More rigorously, (2,3)R5 is true if R is the addition relation. More rigorously, if we denote 
the relation of addition as ⊕, then ⨁ : ℕ2 → ℕ. Most rigorously (since we don’t have a 
definition of ℕ, and as you will see, addition can be defined for any ordered set), ⨁ : 𝑶2 →
𝑶. This concludes our first axiom. 
 This first axiom allows us to clarify what our task of defining addition involves. If 
you’ve noticed, any definition of addition as “⨁ : 𝑶2 → 𝑶” is an incomplete one. This is 
because the picking relation also has the form 𝑃1: 𝑶
2 → 𝑶, where P1 denotes the first-picking 
relation. To differentiate the addition relation from relations of the type 𝑅: 𝑶2 → 𝑶, I comb 
through every element of 𝑶2 and find a way to see which element of O it is related to, via the 
addition relation.358 This, put unrigorously, involves answering the question: a+b equals to 
what?  
 Secondly, I must state that unfortunately, my task of defining addition involves only 
finding a way to talk about (or specifically, translate) the rules of addition. I, for simplicity’s 
sake, shall not concern myself with whether these rules are ‘true’, or how they’re 




 Let’s begin. I have been told two things about addition. Firstly, 0+b=b.360 That is, 0 
plus some arbitrary number b equals that number b. Secondly ((a+1)+b)=((a+b)+1).361 For 
                                                          
358Ibid., 303.  
359A fruitful way to explore topic this would I think, be to do it by examining the history of mathematics. See 
David Burton, The History of Mathematics: An Introduction(Columbus, OH: McGraw-Hill, 2006), 1-54.  
360Goodstein, Recursive Number Theory, 14, A1.  
361Ibid., 14, A2.  
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example, if a=4 and b=2, then ((4+1)+2)=((4+2)+1). I shall now slowly work backwards and 
try to talk about addition using more and more primitive concepts.  
Starting with “0+b=b”, we realize that firstly, 0 and b are “numbers”, and are 
elements of ℕ. As mentioned however, ℕ is just a particular instance of the generalized 
ordered set O, and if I can define the rules of addition for O, this means that these rules also 
apply to the particular case of ℕ.  
In “0+b=b”, we also encounter the foreign concept, “equals.” To define it primitively, 
we see firstly, that equality is a relation between two things a and b, conventionally written as 
a=b. Equality is however only meaningful if a and b are members of the same set.362 Thus, 
4=4 is meaningful because both 4 and 4 belong to the same set ℕ. Red=4 is not meaningful 
because red belongs to the set of all colours, while 4 belongs to the set of all natural numbers. 
More subtly, (a,b)=b is meaningless because (a,b) belongs to a pair-set while b (a single 
thing) cannot belong to a pair-set. Thus, two things a and b are equal if and only if they are 
the same element of the same set.  
Analyzing “0+b=b” we see that it is about the addition relation ⨁ : 𝑶2 → 𝑶. “0+b=b” 
is telling us that the summand of the pair (0,b) in 𝑶2, equals b, an element of O. Moreover, 
we notice that the picking relation is of the same form, that is, 𝑃2: 𝑶
2 → 𝑶. Thus, “0+b=b” is 
simply telling us, “For any addition relation involving the pair (0,b), pick the second member 
of the pair.”  
Also, “0” is the first element of ℕ, and we shall generalize “0” to be o1, the first 
member of O. We can now fully translate “0+b=b” as,  
                                                          
362Lay, Analysis with an Introduction to Proof, 28, Definition 2.9. This draws on the definition of equality, a 
definition that uses the concept of “equivalence classes” defined on elements of the same set (that Lay denotes 
as “S”).  
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The Second Axiom of Addition (Prose) “The element in O that the pair 
(o1,b) is related to under the addition relation, is the same element in the same 
set, O, that the (same) pair (o1,b) is related to under the second-picking 
relation.” 
 
To abbreviate the second axiom, I use the expression “⨁(𝑜1, 𝑏)” as shorthand for the 
expression written in green; “=” to be shorthand for the expression written in blue”; and, 
“𝑃2(𝑜1, 𝑏)" as shorthand for the expression written in orange. We can now abbreviate the 
second axiom of addition, 
 
The Second Axiom of Addition (Abbreviated): ⨁(𝑜1, 𝑏) = 𝑃2(𝑜1, 𝑏). 363 
  
With this second axiom, we have defined addition for pairs in O2, provided that one 
member of that pair is o1. For such pairs containing o1 (a particular case of o1 is the number 
zero), we can translate all talk about the addition relation into talk about the more primitive 
picking relation. But what about pairs that don’t feature o1? Informally, while we have 
defined 0+1, 0+4 and so on, what about 2+5 or 5+8?  Once we have defined addition for these 
‘non-zero’ pairs, we have defined addition for all pairs in O2, and therefore, we would have 
defined addition.  
 Let’s now examine the second thing we were told about addition 
“((a+1)+b)=((a+b)+1).” I call this sentence, “sentence beta.” I’ve also been told that we 
                                                          
363Hedman, A First Course in Mathematical Logic: An Introduction to Model Theory, Proof Theory, 
Computability and Complexity, p.304 Proposition 7.8.This is the function h. 
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should calculate the sum in the inner brackets first. Let’s translate this statement. We see 
immediately that the “summand of (a+1)” can be talked about as the “successor of a.” We 
can then translate sentence beta to, “the summand of the pair (the successor of a, b) is equals 
to the successor of the summand of (a,b).” To abbreviate this sentence, I use the expression 
“S(a)” is shorthand for “the successor of a.” 
 Thus, sentence beta can be (partially) translated in abbreviated form as: 
“(S(a)+b)=S(a+b).” This expresses, informally, the idea that the summand of say, the 
successor of 4+1 (that is, 5+1=6), is equals to the successor of the summand of 4+1 (that is, 
the successor of 4+1=5, which is 6).   
 The expression on the left hand side of the equals sign can be further translated as 
“the summand of S(a) and b”, and this summand is an element in O which the pair (S(a), b) is 
related to under the addition relation. Note firstly, that the pair (S(a),b) is meaningfully 
expressed.364 Why? This is because the successor relation relates elements in O with elements 
in the identical set O, and notice that the pair (S(a), b) belongs to the set O2 (or, OO). This 
means that both members of the pair belong to O. It is thus meaningful to write the first 
member of the pair as S(a), because S(a) is also member of O.   
 Likewise, the expression on the right hand side of the equation can be further 
translated as saying “the successor of the summand of the pair (a,b).” Notice that this is also 
meaningful as the summand of (a,b), is the element in O that the pair is related to under the 
addition relation. As the successor relation relates elements in O with elements in O, it is thus 
meaningful to talk about the successor of the summand of a pair in O2. 
 We can now fully translate sentence beta as  
                                                          
364In dealing with the addition relation on this pair containing a member expressed in terms of the successor 
relation, we are now dealing with composite relations (or rather, composite functions). Ibid., 302-03, definition 
7.4. Lay, Analysis with an Introduction to Proof, 71-72. 
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The Third Axiom of Addition (Prose): “the element in O which the pair 
(S(a), b) is related to the under the addition relation, is the same element in the 
same set, O, as the successor of the element in O that the pair (a,b) is related 
to under the addition relation.”  
 
To abbreviate the third axiom, I introduce the expression “⨁(𝑺(𝑎), 𝑏)” as shorthand 
for the expression written in green; the expression “=” as shorthand for the expression written 
in blue; and the expression “𝑺(⨁(𝑎, 𝑏))” as shorthand for the expression written in orange.” 
From here,  
 
The Third Axiom of Addition (Abbreviated): ⨁(𝑺(𝑎), 𝑏) = 𝑺(⨁(𝑎, 𝑏)) . 365 
 
 We can now define addition and I shall do this in a way that’s more familiar to us. To 
do this, I use a particular pair found in a particular example of O2. This is the pair (2,5) in the 
set ℕ2. To define the addition relation for (2,5), I ask: what element in ℕ is the pair (2,5) 
related to under the addition relation?  
This element in ℕ is one that we can write as ⨁(2,5).366 We see firstly that ⨁(2,5) 
can be re-written as ⨁(𝑺(1),5) 367. Invoking the third axiom then, ⨁(2,5), or ⨁(𝑺(1),5), 
can be rewritten as 𝑺(⨁(1,5)) 368. How then can we rewrite S(⨁(1,5))? We can rewrite 
                                                          
365Hedman, A First Course in Mathematical Logic: An Introduction to Model Theory, Proof Theory, 
Computability and Complexity, 304, proposition 7.8. This is Hedman’s function g. Note that Hedman’s function 
g involves a triplet-set. This draws on the general recursion formula in 303, where a way to define a relation we 
don’t know, is to pick and use 2 relations of adjacent “arities” that we know.  
366Read: the element in ℕ that the pair (2,5) is related to under the addition relation.  
367The element in ℕ that the pair (the successor of 1, 5) is related to under the addition relation.   
368The successor of the element in ℕ that the pair  (1,5) is related to under the addition relation 
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⨁(1,5) as ⨁(𝑺(0),5) 369. From here, we see that S(⨁(2,5)), or S(⨁(1,5)), can be rewritten 
as 𝑺(⨁(𝑺(0), 5))370.  
Invoking the third axiom yet again, ⨁(𝑺(0), 5) can be rewritten as (𝑺(⨁(0,5))371. 
Thus, S(⨁(2,5)) can be rewritten S(S(⨁(0,5))372. You realize that this ℕ2 pair now features 
the number 0, the first element in the ordered set ℕ. This allows us to invoke the second 
axiom. From here, S(S(⨁(0,5))can be translated as S(S(P2(0,5)).373  
We have now translated the addition relation for this particular case of (2,5). To 
express this definition fully: the element in ℕ that the pair (2,5) is related to under the 
addition relation, is the same element in the same set, as the successor of the successor of the 
element in ℕ, that the pair (0,5) is related to under the second-picking relation.374 Note that 
the only foreign concepts featured in the underlined definition are the trivial “the”, “of”, “in”, 
“that”, “is”, “to” and “under”. The rest of the concepts are primitive ones that we have 
already defined. Given this, we have completely translated all talk of addition involving the 
pair (2,5) into talk involving only the more primitive successor and picking relations.  
This can be generalized to all elements of O2.375 For some arbitrary pair (y,z) in O2, 
All we need to do is repeatedly invoke the third axiom. That is, we can rewrite (y,z) as (S(x), 
z) where x is the “predecessor” (antonym of “successor”) of y. This allows us to invoke the 
third axiom, which in turn allows us to rewrite ⨁(𝑦, 𝑧) as 𝑺(⨁(𝑥, 𝑧)). However, we have not 
gotten rid of the ‘plus’ sign/concept yet. To do so, we repeat what we did, and rewrite (x,z) as 
(S(w), z), where w is the predecessor of x, and invoke the third axiom again. ⨁(𝑦, 𝑧) is now 
                                                          
369The element in ℕ that the pair (the successor of 0, 5) is related to under the addition relation. 
370The successor of the element in ℕ that the pair (the successor of 0, 5) is related to under the addition relation.  
371The successor of the element in ℕ that the pair (0,5) is related to under the addition relation  
372The successor of the successor of the element in ℕ that the pair (0,5) is related to under the addition relation.   
373Goodstein, Recursive Number Theory, 20, last 2 lines.   
374Ibid.  
375Hedman, A First Course in Mathematical Logic: An Introduction to Model Theory, Proof Theory, 
Computability and Complexity, 304, proposition 7.8.  
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expressed as 𝑺(𝑺(⨁(𝑤, 𝑧)). We do this (and ‘keep going back’) until one member of the pair 
features o1, the first element in O, which allows us to invoke the second axiom and finally 
translate the concept of addition into the concept of the picking relation. Given this repetitive, 
or recurring process of invoking the third axiom, this definition of addition for all pairs of O2 
is called a recursive definition.376 Hence the name, primitive recursive arithmetic. 
 
The Mathematical Foundations of Newtonian Kinematics 
 
 I now examine Newtonian physics. If E=mc2 is Einstein’s most famous equation, then 
F=ma is Newton’s. Let’s analyze this equation. On the right hand side of “=”,we see the 
terms m (mass) multiplied by a (acceleration). But what is acceleration? In Newtonian 
physics, it is expressed as the “second derivative” of position over time – or, the rate of 
change of the rate of change of an object’s position over time.377 
 F=ma as you can see, contains two as-yet undefined concepts “multiplication” and 
“derivatives”. However, multiplication and derivatives are relational concepts. The former 
relates “mass” with “acceleration”, and the latter states some relation between “position” and 
“time.” 
 More generally, the entirety of Newton’s laws are expressed as a relational 
combination of three primitive concepts: mass, position and time.378 To define it, the mass of 
an object is how heavy it is; the position of an object is where it is; while time refers to when 
                                                          
376Berto, There's Something About Godel: The Complete Guide to the Incompleteness Theorem, 72-77.  
377Peter J. Nolan, Fundamentals of College Physics, 5 ed.(Boston, MA: Pearson, 2005), 4-4 to 4-7.  
378This is, as far as I know, most clearly stated in Heinrich Hertz, The Principles of Mechanics Presented in a 
New Form(NY: Macmillan and Co., 1899), Chapter 1.  
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an object is (in time). Expressed most unpretentiously, the three primitive concepts grounding 
Newtonian physics are, “heavy/light”, “when” and “where”. 
 My task now is to examine these primitive concepts, but I shall restrict my focus to 
(the relation between) position and time. They are relations conventionally termed “velocity” 
or “acceleration.” As you will see however, these concepts are, in this thesis, too advanced 
for us.  
The study of the relation between position and time is known as kinematics, a study 
foundational to the entire apparatus of Newtonian physics.379 Kinematics is rooted in the 
Greek word “kinesis” which means “movement”, thus kinematics is simply, the study of 
movement.380 Some examples of kinematical propositions are: “Zoe is going to Times 
Square”; “There’s no way we can reach downtown in time.”; and, “Sir, I’m afraid I’ll have to 
book you for speeding.”  
Specifically, I shall examine the kinematical axioms via which position and time are 
(implicitly) defined, axioms that render the (mathematical) use of calculus in Newtonian 
kinematics (and Newtonian physics) meaningful in the first place.  
As you will see, these axioms are:  
 
1. For all two positions in space (and time), there exists a position in space (and time) 
that lies in between them. 
2. Nothing can be at more than one place at one time.  
3. Nothing can disappear and then reappear again. 
                                                          
379Ibid., 4.  




4. Nothing can teleport from one place to another.  
 
These axioms guarantee that all relations between position and time are “continuous 
functions”, and calculus is only meaningful when applied to continuous functions. 
 
Defining the Position-Time Diagram 
 
I shall now primitively define a central feature of Newtonian kinematics: the position 
time diagram. I shall use the example of a road trip. Stacey is on a road trip in the US. He 
begins his journey on Christmas, from New York and drives westwards, stopping at various 
US states along the way. We can thus posit a set of positions P, where Stacey is at on his road 
trip, a set whose elements we can order from east to west.381 P thus contains {New York, 
Philadelphia,…(finally terminating in) Oregon}. We can also posit a set of times, T, when 
Stacey is at, ordered from earlier to later. T thus contains: {25 December, 26 
December,…(finally terminating in the day he ends his road trip at), 4 January}.382  
 However, the date “4 January” and the place “Oregon” are, on their own, categorially 
distinct, and thus fundamentally unrelated. What ties them together is none other than Stacey 
himself. This is because, on January 4, Stacey was in Oregon. Thus, I shall define a location 
                                                          
381Physicists usually posit this more abstractly as a point in three-dimensional space. Or more primitively, as a 
triplet in a triplet-set where each member of the triplet is a point on some spatial “dimension.” However, we can 
see each triplet as being nothing but a name for a unique position in that three-dimensional space. Thus, P 
operates at a higher level of generality in that its elements can contain single things, pairs, triplets, quadruplets 
and so on. The set of US states on Stacey’s road trip is as much an instance of P as the abstract three-




relation, denoted L. As a general relation, 𝑳: 𝑻 → 𝑷. As a particular relation, a particular 
instance of L is: January 4 L Oregon (read: “On January 4, Stacey’s location is: Oregon.”)  
 We can represent these sets and relations diagrammatically.  
We can draw an ordered set by laying its elements out from left to right; elements on 
the left are earlier in the order than those on the right. Alternatively, we can also draw it 
vertically from bottom to top. Elements at the bottom are earlier in the order than those on 
top.383 To draw the two possible diagrams for P, 
 
                                                          




Fig.3.2a: Diagrammatical Representations of P 
To diagrammatically represent the relation L, we lay the elements of P horizontally, and 
those of T vertically. Points on the flat surface – the plane – contained within the P and T 
‘lines’ represent instances of L construed as a particular relation.384 Point x represents for 
example, the relation 29 December L Indiana.  
 
Fig.3.2b: A Diagrammatical Representation of relation L 
  
                                                          
384Lay, Analysis with an Introduction to Proof, 56-58.  
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A diagram of L relations (for objects in general) is known as the position-time 
diagram.385 We can thus use a position-time diagram to describe Stacey’s movement across 
the US. If Stacey covers one state a day, his position-time diagram can be drawn as,  
 
 
Fig.3.2c: Stacey’s Position-Time Diagram 
We have now completed our definition of the position-time diagram.  




                                                          
385Nolan, Fundamentals of College Physics, p.3-1.  
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Real Numbers and Uncountable Infinities  
  
 Let’s examine P. We can define it at a more fine-grained level by having it contain 
cities rather than states. Hence, P could contain the elements: {Long Island, New York City, 
Philadelphia, Pittsburgh…, Portland}. To differentiate this ‘city-level’ set P from the 
previous ‘state-level’ set P, I call the former P1 and the latter P0. Assuming that Stacey stops 
over at two cities at each state, you see that P1 contains twice the number of elements as P0.  
 With twice the number of elements, we now have twice the number of unique names 
we can attach to the unique positions that Stacey was at. We can however, construct even 
finer-grained sets containing districts, streets, and so on. This increases the unique names we 
can attach to the unique locations Stacey is at. More generally, this increases the number of 
elements in P.  
In fact, physicists believe that P can be infinitely decomposed into finer and finer 
grained sets.386 This is such that even when Stacey moves a sliver of an inch, they have a 
name for this new location. But what do we mean by “infinitely decompose”? To understand 
this, we have to explore the mind-boggling concept of not just “infinity” but “uncountable 
infinity.”387  
                                                          
386This assumption however, gets scrutinized only very recently in theories of quantum gravity. According to 
Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity, gravitational force acts when a massive object – by virtue of its mass –
bends the spacetime around it. In General Relativity however, spacetime is still seen as a continuum (i.e. as 
infinitely decomposable). Parallel with this is how General Relativity (a theory of the very heavy) is 
mathematically incompatible with Quantum Mechanics (a theory of the very small), and Quantum Gravity is an 
attempt to unify these two theories. This unification becomes pertinent when describing events such as moments 
after the Big Bang when the entire heavy mass of the universe is concentrated in a small space. Central to its 
attempt at unification is making spacetime (and hence, the theory of gravity) discrete/quantized rather than 
continuous. See Roger Penrose, "On the Nature of Quantum Geometry," in Magic without Magic: John 
Archibald Wheeler, a Collection of Essays in Honor of His Sixtieth Birthday, ed. John R. Klauder(San 
Francisco, CA: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1972), 333-35. 
 




In mathematics, an example of an infinite set is ℕ, a set that goes from 0 to 1 to 2, and 
so on, ad infinitum. However, there is a second, mind-boggling counterpart to ℕ, the set of 
real numbers, conventionally denoted ℝ, that contains numbers such as 0.457457347 and 
1.343.  
If I ask: what is the next element in ℕ after 1? You can unequivocally say, 2. 
However, if I ask you what is the next element in ℝ after 1, things get more complicated. If 
you tell me that it’s 1.01, I could say that no, 1.001 lies in between 1 and 1.01; and if you tell 
me that it’s 1.001, I could say 1.0001 lies in between them. In fact, at any tiny interval in ℝ, 
there are an infinite number of elements/points crammed in between them.388  
In mathematical parlance, ℝ, is known as an uncountably infinite set because we 
would have difficult counting how many elements are contained even within a small interval; 
ℕ is however, a countably infinite set because we can count the number of elements 
contained within an interval (between say, 1 to 5, or 100 to 23,000,000).389  
 Luckily, we can get rid of the mind-boggling concept of uncountable infinity by 
defining it primitively. An ordered set then, is uncountably infinite if and only if for any two 
elements in that set, there exists at least one element that lies in between them.390 
                                                          
388This draws on two proofs. Firstly, Cantor’s diagonal argument which argues that it is fundamentally 
impossible to state every element within even some tiny segment of ℝ. This proof is not difficult to follow, and 
requires only the concept of a (real and natural) “number”. The second proof is how for every two arbitrary 
elements in ℝ, there necessarily lies an element (in this case, number) in between them. For the former proof, 
see Berto, There's Something About Godel: The Complete Guide to the Incompleteness Theorem, 33-36. For the 
latter proof, see Lay, Analysis with an Introduction to Proof, 137, theorem 3.13. 
 
389This is a slight modification to Lay’s definition. I modify it in order to make the countable-uncountable 
distinction closer to our intuitive understanding of it. Analysis with an Introduction to Proof, 88, para.1.   
 
390This isn’t a ‘proper’ mathematical definition of an uncountably infinite set. I’ve drawn this definition from 
Hilbert’s geometrical axiom that at any two points on a line, there necessarily lies a point in between them. See 
Hilbert, The Foundations of Geometry, 4, Axioms II,2-4. The proper definition of an uncountably infinite set is 
a set that is larger than ℕ. Lay, Analysis with an Introduction to Proof, 86, Definition 4.1; 92, Theorem 4.12. 
This definition of an uncountably infinity sets using the concept of a “bijective function” (or informally, a ‘one-




 Most importantly, can physicists meaningfully apply this mind-boggling concept of 
uncountable infinities when talking about something as mundane as Stacey’s road trip? Yes. 
If we take Stacey’s doorway as the first position he was at on his road trip, we can define the 
first cobblestone of his front yard’s walkway as the next position he was at. However, we can 
zoom in to that interval, down to a microscopic level, and define a set of unique positions 
lying between the doorway and first cobblestone. Thus, no matter how far we zoom in 
spatially, we will always find at least one point lying in between any spatial interval.391 
 Diagramatically, we can represent P (and any ordered, uncountably infinite set) as a 
continuous line – continuous because it is an uncountably-infinitely dense cluster of points.392 
You can see this applies for T as well. See the figure below. 
 
 
Fig.3.2d: The Diagrammatic Representations of ℝ vs. ℕ.  
  
 Thus, it is only after primitively defining the mind-boggling concept of an 
uncountably-infinite set and ensuring that it is meaningfully applied in the case of S and T 
that we can finally draw the position-time diagram in a way most of us are familiar with. 
Stacey’s position-time diagram can now be drawn as,  
                                                          
391See note 381. 
392Lay, Analysis with an Introduction to Proof, Chapter 3. As Lay chapter 3 attests, there is still a lot more 
apparatus to be built before we can link the set-theoretical concept of an uncountably infinite set with the 
geometric concept of a line. This linkage – together with ensuring that the arithmetical relations of addition and 
multiplication have a meaningful physical/real life interpretation – is the basis upon which we can define vector 
addition, a key mathematical component in any Newtonian talk of “forces.” I neither fully understand this 





Fig.3.2e: Stacey’s Position-Time Diagram assuming an Uncountably Infinite number of 
Positions and Times 
 
From here, I assert the first axiom of kinematics, an axiom that assumes the infinite 
decomposability of space (and time).  
 
First Axiom of Newtonian Kinematics: For any two points in space (and 









Functionhood and Continuity 
 
 The second to fourth axioms are more straightforward.  
 
Second axiom of Newtonian Kinematics: Nothing can be at more than one 
place at one time.393  
 
The significance of this axiom is best appreciated diagrammatically. The second axiom 




                                                          
393This is as far as I know not explicitly expressed at all by physicists. The only one who I know who have 
expressed this axiom explicitly is Hertz, The Principles of Mechanics Presented in a New Form, 45-46. He 
expresses it as “The points in space which are denoted at two different times by the same material particle, 
coincide when the times coincide.”  
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Fig.3.2f: A Position-Time Diagram for Stacey disallowed by the Second Axiom 
 
Informally, the second axiom disallows more than one line on the position-time diagram. 
More formally, L doesn’t relate any element of T to more than one element of P.394  
 The third axiom is, 
 
Third axiom of Newtonian Kinematics:Nothing can disappear and then 
reappear again.395  
 
Again, the significance of this axiom is best appreciated diagramatically. This axiom 
disallows position-time diagrams of the type: 
 
 
                                                          
394Lay, Analysis with an Introduction to Proof, 66, Definition 3.1. This has the L relation fulfilling the uniqueness 
criterion in the definition of a function. 
395This is somewhat expressed in Bunge, Foundations of Physics, 132, PM 2.2.  
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Fig.3.2g: A Position-Time Diagram for Stacey Disallowed by the Third Axiom. 
Informally, the second axiom disallows horizontally disjointed lines on the position-time 
diagram. More formally, this means that L relates every element in T with some element in 
P.396 
 More formally, the second and third axioms collectively ensure firstly, that L is 
defined for every element of T, and secondly, that for all elements of T, there is only one 
element in P it is L(ocationally) related to. Relations of these type are known, in 
mathematical parlance, as functions. See footnote 9 for an exposition. 
 Lastly, the fourth axiom of Newtonian kinematics is 
 
Fourth Axiom of Newtonian Kinematics: Nothing can teleport from one 
place to another.397 
 
Diagrammatically, this axiom disallows vertically disjointed lines.  
 
                                                          
396This has the L relation fulfilling the existence criterion for a function. Lay, Analysis with an Introduction to 
Proof, 66, Definition 3.1.  




Fig.3.2h: A Position-Time Diagram for Stacey disallowed by the Fourth Axiom 
 
In mathematical parlance, functions of this sort are termed as discontinuous. Thus, the fourth 
axiom guarantees that the location function L is continuous.398  
 Taken collectively, the four axioms guarantee that the location relation L is a 
continuous function relating elements of two uncountably infinite sets: the set P of all 
positions an object was at, and the set T of all times an object was in. More importantly, 
calculus is only meaningful when applied to continuous functions relating elements of two 
uncountably infinite sets.399 These four axioms then allow us to meaningfully define a 
                                                          
398I’m pretty much drawing on the intuitive notion of “continuity” here. I do not currently have a good 
understanding of the more rigorous “epsilon-delta” definition of a limit and of continuity. Lay, Analysis with an 
Introduction to Proof, 208, 16-17.  
399Ibid., 254, Practice 1.5. Note however, that I’m making an un-(or even anti-) mathematical move here. I am 
appealing to convention and authority regarding how most mathematicians believe that calculus is only 
meaningfully applied to continuous functions. I am unfortunately, limited in my mathematical education at this 
point, such that I cannot give you a good argument/proof from scratch. Specifically, I am not able to lay out 
from scratch, the steps and reasons why this argument is correct. This is unmathematical because, in opposition 
to a properly rigorous mathematical argument, I am not opening this up argument for you (or more rigorously, 
for every human being) to check.    
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“derivative” of the location function, a derivative conventionally termed “velocity.” 
However, this is too advanced for us, and we can stop here.  
 
Drawing Lessons: Lego-Languages and Sensory Experience in the Construction of 
Newtonian and Arithmetical Concepts  
 
The Construction of Lego-Languages 
 
 Now that we are acquainted with PRA and (the mathematical foundations of) 
Newtonian kinematics, we are in a good position to draw lessons from them.  
Good mathematicians start tabula rasa. As such, they begin their mathematical career 
as mutes: they cannot speak because they have no language.400 Defining a ”language” to be a 
collection of concepts,401 mathematicians then have to take a first step and posit some 
basic/primitive concepts. As we have seen, they posit just two: the concepts of a set and 
relation, plus other ‘connecting’ words like “and”, “or”402, “under”, “to” etc. What is striking 
is how from such austere beginnings, mathematicians are able to construct a language rich 
enough to talk about complex things like infinity, arithmetic, and beyond.   
                                                          
400This is most evident in Formalist forms of mathematics, seen in Johann von Neumann, "The Formalist 
Foundations of Mathematics," in Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings, ed. Paul Benacerraf and Hilary 
Putnam(NY: Cambridge University Press, 1964), 64. 
401This is indeed the definition of a “formal” language Berto, There's Something About Godel: The Complete 
Guide to the Incompleteness Theorem, 40.  
 
402These are conventionally known as the “logical connectives.” I see them as no more than simple English 
words. We could of course, interpret these words more stringently and employ connectives like “and”, “or”, and 
so on according to rules stipulated by some logical system. While propositional logic is the most famous, there 
are other competing systems like paraconsistent logic, relevant logic, intuitonist logic and so on, each of them 
disagree with propositional logic in some ways. Thus, the ‘right’ way to use these logical connectives in my 
opinion, is to form propositions featuring them and ask the reader whether they agree with those particular 
propositions. For example, rather than appeal to modus ponens as some ‘given’/unproblematically true inference 
rule, we ask the reader: since we agree that “if I clap my hands, then I get sound”, and “I clap my hands.” Do 
you think I am justified in inferring that “there is sound?” If the reader agrees, we can proceed, if not, we can 




From here, we immediately see a contrast with social scientific practice. In social 
science, we construct concepts ‘top-down’. We start with jargoned concepts and then try to 
dis-ambiguate them.403 In contrast, PRA starts ‘bottom-up’, beginning with simple concepts 
and then concatenating them to form more jargoned concepts.  
This has implications for issues of ambiguity. As I have argued, social scientific 
concepts run into problems of ambiguity, and ambiguity is inimical to our quest for evidence, 
let alone ‘science.’ In contrast, the mathematical definition of addition is unambiguous. This 
is because for all elements in O2, I can define which one element in O it is related to under 
the addition relation. This is unambiguous as I doubt you can disambiguate the picking and 
successor relations any other way such that some pair in O2 is related via addition, to a 
different element in O.  
The uninitiated might attribute this to how mathematics is (vaguely) ‘objective’. But 
we, as now-adept mathematicians, understand that the reason runs deeper. The reason I think, 
is this. Assuming that the primitive concepts of “sets”, and “relations” are unambiguous, you 
see that the definition of the “picking” and “successor” relations are unambiguous because 
they use only these unambiguous primitive concepts in their definitional sentences. 
Consequently, the definition of addition is likewise unambiguous because it uses only the 
concepts of the successor and picking relation in its definitional sentence.  
 In contrast, a top-down, social scientific approach starts with an ambiguous, jargoned 
concept like “democracy”, and defines it using a definitional sentence containing the (less?) 
ambiguous concepts of “power” and “politics”, which then require further disambiguation, 
and so on.  
                                                          
403This is evident in the approaches to conceptualization expressed in Goertz, "Social Science Concepts: A 




 The mathematician is thus analogous to a minesweeping soldier; she advances inch by 
inch, slowly but certainly.  This is because before the mathematician dares to say anything 
about “numbers”, “derivatives” and “continuous functions”, she painstakingly defines these 
concepts primitively. In contrast, the social scientist is analogous to a cavalryman, he dashes 
forward, eager to talk about phenomena like civil wars or democratic transitions. It is only 
after running into problems of ambiguity that he backtracks and tries to disambiguate these 
ambiguous concepts.404  
 How then does this ground-up, mathematical approach to definition work more 
generally? I call such a ground-up approach to definition, the construction of a Lego-
language.405 The primitive concepts are analogous to the handful of Lego-bricks more 
complex structures (analogous to jargoned-concepts, and the language as a whole) is built 
from. A Lego-language is thus nothing more than a concatenation of a handful of basic Lego-
bricks/primitive concepts.  
More importantly, can Lego-languages be used to talk about some issue of social 
scientific interest? The answer is yes. The first two parts (or, first portion) of my thesis is a 
demonstration of this. Learning from PRA, I have tried to construct (and translate social-
scientific jargon into) a Lego-language. I posited the three primitive notions406 of “truth”, 
“belief” and “proposition”. From there, I combine them to define the derivative notion of 
“evidence” 
                                                          
404This metaphor is Poincaré’s in Henri Poincaré, "Intuition and Logic in Mathematics,"  http://www-
history.mcs.st-and.ac.uk/Extras/Poincare_Intuition.html.  
 
405Those versed in philosophy will see parallels in the architectonic methods of Kant and Heidegger. Gerd 
Buchdahl, "The Relation between 'Understanding' and 'Reason' in the Architectonic of Kant's Philosophy," 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67(1966). Dreyfus, Being in the World: A Commentary on Heidegger's 
Being and Time, Division 1, Chapter 14. I have elaborated on this a little bit more in my undergraduate thesis, 
calling it “structural description.” 
  
406Recall that notions are concepts as well, they are meta-concepts, that is, concepts that we use to talk about 
concepts. Notions, like all concepts, are to be subject to the same scrutiny as concepts, such as, for example, 
checking whether they are ambiguous. For purposes of visually and aurally distinguishing these two things, I 




Evidence=df good reasons for why we should believe in the truth of a 
proposition. 
 
With this notion of evidence, I define the notion of evidential dependence, where,  
 
Evidential Dependence =df a proposition A is evidentially dependent on some 
proposition B if and only if evidence for proposition B counts as evidence for 
proposition A. 
 
Note however, that my definition of evidential dependence is fully decomposable into a 
definition featuring only the primitive notions of “truth”, “belief” and “proposition.” If we 
substitute my definition of “evidence”, the definition of evidential dependence becomes  
 
Evidential Dependence =df a proposition A is evidentially dependent on some 
proposition B if and only if (the) good reasons for why we should believe in 
the truth of proposition B counts as good reasons for why we should believe in 
the truth of proposition A.  
 
Furthermore, my derivative concept of propositional “transformation” (defined in terms of 
evidential dependence) can be similarly broken down and talked about solely in terms of my 
primitive notions. This also applies to my definition of “intension” and “extension”, which I 
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have defined more primitively using “possible worlds”, itself defined as “imagined states of 
affairs.”  
 Thus, all the jargoned concepts that I have introduced are nothing but a complex 
concatenation of the four primitive notions of “truth”, “belief”, “evidence” and “imagined 
states of affairs”. The use of a constructed Lego-language for the sake of excising ambiguity 
is thus, the lesson that I have gleaned from PRA, a lesson that I have tried to apply in the first 
portion of my thesis. 
 
What Next after Tabula Rasa? Sensory-Propositions and the Implicit Definition of Primitive 
Concepts 
 
 Unlike the language of addition, the language of Newtonian physics is more complex. 
This is because it contains the concepts of not just addition, but multiplication, derivatives, 
and so on. Thus, all I could do was state the assumptions that Newtonian kinematics holds 
regarding its two primitive concepts of position and time, assumptions that render any talk of 
their relation using differential calculus, meaningful in the first place. 
 What this affords us is an opportunity to zoom into the status and definition of 
primitive concepts in a Lego-language. It allows us to see how mathematicians and physicists 
jump from step 0, to the first step of positing primitive concepts. As you will see, the process 
of positing and defining primitive concepts is not easy.  
At first glance, the primitive concepts of “sets”, “relations”, “positions” etc. seem to 
be unproblematically ‘given.’ However, this is not the case. In mathematics for example, the 
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challenging subfield of Axiomatic Set Theory grapples with the problem of defining the 
concept of a “set.”407  
The strategy for defining primitive concepts is one that mathematicians and logicians 
call, implicit definition.408 This is in contrast to explicit definition, where we attempt to define 
a concept using a definitional sentence. Note that I have in my thesis thus far, used 
“definition” in the explicit sense of the term.  
Here’s how implicit definition works. To implicitly define some concept X is to state 
the set of true propositions which X appears in.409 To illustrate this, let’s take the example of 
“pasta”. Most of us cannot give a good explicit definition of pasta that differentiates it from 
(Chinese) noodles. Hence, we understand the ‘definition’ of pasta implicitly insofar as we can 
state the set of true propositions which “pasta” (or X) appears in.  
For example, “Moe’s restaurant has really good X dishes”; or “X tastes better if you 
salt the water that X is boiled in” and so on. This definition is implicit insofar as “pasta” is 
not defined qua pasta, but is defined in terms of the true relations it has with other concepts 
(such as “salt”, “Moe’s restaurant”, and the “water” used to boil it).410 We see the same thing 
at work in the kinematical axioms. Axioms 1-4 define how position and time relate with each 
other.  
But implicit definition gets caught in a catch-22.411 If we have’t yet defined what 
“position”, “time” or “pasta” is, how can we ascertain whether those implicit-definitional 
                                                          
407Lay, Analysis with an Introduction to Proof, 98-99.  
408Moritz Pasch, "Implicit Definition and the Proper Grounding of Mathematics," in Essays on the Foundations 
of Mathematics by Moritz Pasch, ed. Stephen Pollard(Dodrecht, Netherlands: Springer Science and Business 
B.V., 2010). See Pasch for an example of how it is done in the foundations of geometry; there’s no difficult 
background required to follow his discussion, although it does require some tenacity.   
409Paul Horwich, "Implicit Definition, Analytic Truth, and Aprior Knowledge," Noûs 31, no. 4 (1997): 423-26. 
Muller, "The Implicit Definition of the Set-Concept," 433-34, 39.   
410David Hilbert, "Mathematical Problems,"  www.ams.org/bull/2000-37-04/S0273.../S0273-0979-00-00881-
8.pdf. p.414, first sentence. This notion of implicit definition was invented by David Hilbert, who mentioned it 
without rigorous explication. His initial unrigorous characterization of it was that implicit definitions (roughly) 
spelt out the interconnections between concepts. See also, Shapiro, Thinking About Mathematics: The 
Philosophy of Mathematics, 283-89.  
411Horwich, "Implicit Definition, Analytic Truth, and Aprior Knowledge," 424-25.  
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propositions are true? And if we can’t ascertain their truth, how can we define these concepts 
implicitly?   
 There is however, a way out. Analayzing those implicit-definitional propositions, we 
notice that they pertain to our sensory experience. This is because these proposition would 
still be meaningful and true if we add the prefix “I have experienced…”  
Take for example, “I have experienced Moe’s restaurant (as) having really good pasta 
dishes” is meaningful and true because I have tasted those dishes for myself, and they’re 
delicious. Likewise, “I have experienced (or seen) nothing that can teleport from one place to 
another” is meaningful and true, and so is “I have experienced nothing that can disappear and 
then reappear again.”   
Take for example also, the “axiom of choice”, one of 9 axioms in Axiomatic Set 
Theory.412 Here’s a sensory example of it. I am working at a chocolate store, and I decide to 
snack on some chocolate. The store has a big shelf, which contains jars, and each jar contains 
one flavour of chocolate – some white, some dark, some orange flavoured and so on. For 
variety, I pick one piece of chocolate from each jar and place it in my snack bowl.  
More generally, the axiom of choice states: (I have experienced that) given any set 
(the shelf) whose elements are sets (the jars), you can pick out one element (the chocolate 
pieces) in each set-element (the jars) and form a new set (the snack bowl) containing those 
chosen elements.413 This axiom as you can see, describes my experience of choosing my own 
snacks at work. 
Thus, PRA and Newtonian kinematics escapes the implicit-definitional catch-22 
because the truth and meaning of these implicit-definitional propositions are drawn from a 
                                                          
412 Krivine, Introduction to Axiomatic Set Theory, 19-20. 




pre-linguistic source: sensory experience.414 Their meaning is dependent not on the meaning 
of the primitive concepts, but on our visceral senses of sight (of not seeing teleporting 
objects), touch (of picking and placing chocolate pieces in my snack bowl), taste (of eating 
Moe’s delicious meatball spaghetti), and so on.  
More formally, as these implicit-definitional propositions are those pertaining to our 
sensory experience, the extension-expression of these primitive concepts is a set containing 
only entities that we can sense. That is, they are entities (such as a fridge filled with food, or a 
jar of orange-flavoured chocolate) that are perceptible within our visual or auditory range.415  
From here, I argue that the language of at least Newtonian physics and PRA is 
definitionally “grounded” in sensory experience. What do I mean by “grounded?”As we have 
seen, the concept of addition is definitionally grounded (that is, defined in terms of) the 
concept of the picking and successor relations, which are in turn definitionally grounded in 
the concept of a set (and relation). The concept of a set is in turn definitionally grounded via 
implicit definition in the axioms/true propositions about it. And these true propositions are 
definitionally grounded in our sensory experience insofar as they describe it. Sensory 
experience is thus, that rock bottom ‘thing’ which the primitive concepts (and thus, the Lego-
language) of Newtonian kinematics and PRA rests on.  
  
  
                                                          
414This insight is fundamentally Heideggerian. For Heidegger, scientific activity is fundamentally grounded in 
our concrete everyday experience, or Dasein. Dasein does not, I repeat, does not refer to the human being. 
Construing of Dasein in this way would be to construe of it in third-person, as a thing. It would be to construe of 
Dasein, in Heideggerian parlance as present-at-hand. Most precisely, Dasein refers to our experience of being 
human. It is thus these mundane everyday experiences (picking snacks at work etc.) that I argue are that basis 
upon which the axioms of abstract theories like Newtonian kinematics and PRA definitionally rests on, via 
implicit definition. He expresses this most explicitly in Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John 
Macquarrie & Edward Robinson(NY: Harper & Row, 1962), 403-15.   
    
415This insight is Kantian, who argues that the speculative metaphysics of his day gets into contradictory, and 
irresolvable debates among themselves as they try to talk about things beyond their sensory experience. This is 
discussed in the “transcendental dialectic” portion of the First Critique. Jay Rosenberg, Accessing Kant: A 
Relaxed Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), Chapter 13, 292-94. 
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Distilling the Methodological Lesson 
 
 I shall now distill this lesson into a series of method416-steps. I don’t wish to be 
hyperbolic and call these steps the, or even, a ‘scientific’ method. This is simply the 
methodological417 lesson that I have drawn from a study of just two theories in mathematics 
and physics. You can certainly dispute this lesson on the basis of an in-depth study of PRA, 
Newtonian physics, or other mathematical and physical subfields.   
 Here’s how this method works. 
  
0. Start tabula rasa 
 
1. Examine and describe your sensory experience of world politics.  
 
2. From these sensory-propositions, draw out those (simple) concepts you want to use as 
primitive concepts for a Lego-language.  
 
3. Construct a Lego-language by concatenating these primitive concepts to form more 
difficult jargoned concepts.  
 
4. Use this Lego-language to ‘describe facts’, ‘explain phenomena’, state ‘laws’ etc. 
                                                          
416See footnote 150 in Chapter 1.3 for my definition of the distinction between method and methodology. These 
are method-steps as these steps alone don’t provide a justification for why they should be followed, hence they 
are not methodological. 
  
417My lesson is methodological as the justification for why mathematicians and physicists do, and us social 
scientists should follow this Lego-language approach is that it helps us to build unambiguous concepts. As I 
have argued, ambiguous concepts is detrimental to the positivist quest for evidence.  
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Note that I have not spent any time discussing step 4., so we are currently not sure what it 
entails. As you have witnessed however, mathematicians and physicists dwell painstakingly 
on steps 1-3, and these steps should keep our hands full in the meantime. In social-scientific 
parlance, steps 1-4 describe the process of defining and positing concepts, that is, it involves 
conceptualization.   
 Like how mathematicians and physicists have excised ambiguity with such an 
approach, I believe that we can, following these steps, excise ambiguity from our social 
scientific language the way they did for theirs.  
 Most crucially, the transition from step 0 to step 1. entails that we begin not by 
consulting the erudition of scholars. That is, we do not (primarily) consult what philosophers 
have said about concepts like “democracy” or “development”. We should instead, first 
consult and describe our sensory experience of ‘democracy’ or ‘development’. Of course, we 
do not know whether it is ultimately legitimate to use these jargoned concepts of ‘democracy’ 
and ‘development’. But we can certainly talk about our experience of attending a qat chew in 
Yemen,418 or our experience as an aid worker in a North Indian village.419 Ethnography, 
bordering on auto-ethnography,420 (as we are to describe our sensory experience), is then the 









                                                          
418Weedeen, Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power and Performance in Yemen, Chapter 3.  
419David Mosse, Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice(Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto 
Press, 2005), Chapter 3.  
420Tami Spry, "Performing Autoethnography: An Embodied Methodological Praxis," Qualitative Inquiry 7, no. 
6 (2001); Morgan Brigg and Roland Bleiker, "Autoethnographic International Relations: Exploring the Self as a 
Source of Knowledge," Review of International Studies 36, no. 03 (2010).  
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Chapter 3.3: Applying the Methodological Lesson: 
Autobiography and Sensory Experience in IR  
 
In this last chapter, I specify what the first method-step entails; this first step should 
take the form of an autoethnography with a focus on our immediate, sensory experience. 
Having surveyed many works in IR, I find that the only one piece of work that (somewhat) 
demonstrates this is Iver Neumann’s At Home with the Diplomats, a book analysing his 
experience in the Norwegian foreign ministry.421  
In this chapter, I highlight this first step by contrasting how Neumann’s work differs 
from other works that come close to taking this sensory step. Specifically, in taking this first 
step, we, the scholar, have to 1. prioritize our sensory experience over theory/the scholarly 
literature; 2. describe our, rather than an interviewee’s experiences; and 3. these experiences 
should be those that are sensorially-immediate (for example “I heard a loud explosion; a 
mortar shell has hit my neighbour’s house.” as opposed to, “I grew up in the midst of the 
Syrian Civil War”).  
 Following this, I paint a glimpse of how we can go from this first step to other 
advanced steps. Gleaning from Neumann’s experiences, I extract three candidates that we 




                                                          
421Neumann, At Home with the Diplomats: Inside a European Foreign Ministry.  
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From Step 0 to Step 1: The Unambiguity of Sensory-Descriptions  
 
 Christine Sylvester – in her work on Experiencing War – is, as far as I know, the first 
and only IR scholar to call for a focus on individual experience.422 Put negatively, she states 
that Feminist IR prioritizes the experiences of women, over the abstraction of theory and the 
scholarly literature.423 This negativity towards abstraction parallels with step zero. As 
mentioned, the rigorous mathematician begins tabula rasa, ignorant of what existing theories 
and the existing scholarship has to say about anything.424 Likewise, and more positively, 
Sylvester’s call to focus on experience425 parallels with step one.  
However, what does it mean to describe not just experience, but sensory experience? 
What is the payoff of doing this for us as IR scholars? And more hyperbolically, why is this 
step ‘scientifically’ important?  
 I aim to answer these questions in this chapter by looking at an example of a work in 
IR demonstrating this step 1. at work. That work is Neumann’s At Home with the 
Diplomats.426 To illustrate what it means to describe sensory experience, I contrast 
Neumann’s passage with the descriptions of non-sensory experiences exemplified by Allison 
(2009).427  
 Specifically, I examine Neumann’s passage, and show that it, by virtue of him 
describing only his sensory experience, is free of ambiguous concept-expressions. The payoff 
                                                          
422Christine Sylvester, War as Experience: Contributions from International Relations and Feminist 
Analysis(NY: Routledge, 2013).  
423Ibid., See Chapter 1 and pp.54-57 on Sylvester's review of Megan MacKenzie's book. .  
424Of course, the mathematician has to eventually consult and engage with existing scholarship, but he does not 
do this as a first step.   
425Sylvester, War as Experience: Contributions from International Relations and Feminist Analysis, 49-52.  
426Neumann, At Home with the Diplomats: Inside a European Foreign Ministry.  
427Miranda Allison, Women and Political Violence: Female Combatants in Ethno-National Conflict(NY: 
Routledge, 2009).  
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then to describing our sensory experience is unambiguous propositions, and it is these 
unambiguous propositions that we can use to implicitly define/draw out primitive concepts. 
 This is the passage from Neumann that I shall examine:  
 
When I entered the Department for European Affairs,…I walked down the corridor to find a 
group assembled around the department’s TV. The boss himself was on the phone to the 
foreign minister,…(and) two of my senior colleagues were discussing which of their European 
counterparts to call. A second plane emerged on the screen, flying straight into the South 
Tower. (It was then that) the boss broke the long silence and asked us to go back to our offices 




Here, Neumann is describing a scene in the Norwegian foreign ministry during the 
September-11 attacks that unfolded right in front of his eyes.  
Let’s examine this passage, starting from “When I entered the Department of 
European Affairs.” Note that the “Department of European Affairs” refers to a particular 
room – and not the institution – that Neumann literally walked into. Thus, we can rephrase 
this sentence to “when I entered the room.” Note firstly that the concept-expression 
“Department of European Affairs” (as a room) has an extension-set composed of only one 
element. Note secondly, that should we find that concept-expression ambiguous, Neumann 
could simply bring us to the Norwegian foreign ministry building, usher us to that room, and 
tell us: here, this is the room I walked into.   
 This applies to the rest of the concept-expressions in the passage. Much like “the 
Department of Foreign Affairs”, “the corridor”, and “the department’s TV” are also concept-
                                                          
428Neumann, At Home with the Diplomats: Inside a European Foreign Ministry, 11-13. 
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expressions that Neumann can, if he so wishes to, (sensorially, rather than linguistically) 
disambiguate by pointing them out to us. Likewise, Neumann also describes his “boss”, and 
his “two senior colleagues.” These concepts (extensionally) also refer to particular, unique 
individuals that we can meet in the flesh. 
 I now cite a second example of the same type as Neumann’s (that is, it is 
unambiguous and describes one’s sensory experiences). This is a passage from Tracy 
Kidder’s story of Deo’s (a survivor of the Rwandan genocide’s) sensory experiences. 
  
The soldiers busted open the doors to the dormitory, and their commander…ordered the 
students to divide themselves. “Hutu brothers over here, Tutsi cockroaches over there.” The 
Hutus would not abandon their schoolmates. The soldiers tried to kill them all. It was said that 
some of the dying boys quoted Jesus on the cross, crying out to God to forgive their killers.429 
 
Note that this passage very much mirrors Neumann’s in its concept-expressions such as “the 
soldiers” and the “dying boys.” These concept-expressions feature only one element in their 
expressed extension-sets: they are those people present right in front of Deo’s eyes.  
 I hope that other concept-expressions in these passages like Neumann “walking 
down” the corridor, or of Hutus “quoting” Jesus, to be unambiguous. But rather than arguing 
for their unambiguity directly, I think that this unambiguity best appreciated comparatively. 
That is, it is best appreciated in contrast to the ambiguous concept-expressions peppering the 
non-sensorial descriptions common in IR scholarship.  
 I contrast Neumann’s passage with a passage from Miranda Allison’s book Women 
and Political Violence. In this book, Allison comes close but not quite in making the sensory-
                                                          
429Tracy Kidder, Strength in What Remains(NY: Random House 2010), 210.  
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descriptive moves Neumann and Kidder made. She focused not on her own sensory 
experience, but on the non-sensory experiences of her interviewees.  
I now cite a passage from Allison’s book. In this passage, she is quoting Maria, an 
Irish Republican Army fighter, who was recounting her military experience.  
 
In the early days (of my service in the IRA), I would say it didn’t matter what you did, it was 
just ‘thanks love’, you know? ‘Good for you’, and like patronizing. But certainly the second 
time around, I felt greatly respected.430 
 
Here, we encounter the ambiguous concept-expression, “respect.”431 Why is this so? 
Analyzing the quote, we realize it is because Maria doesn’t provide us reports on particular, 
sensorially-accessible instances which this concept of “respect” was concretely experienced. 
It is via descriptions of these (extensional) instances that “respect” can be sensorially 
disambiguated.  
More concretely, note how the events described in Neumann and Kidder’s passage 
firstly, do not extend beyond the visual and auditory range of any human being, and secondly, 
tick in the time-scale of minutes (or at most, hours). In contrast, the events described in 
Maria’s account are extra-sensorial and tick in the time-scale of years.  
 Allison also runs into issues of ambiguity when she reports not on her own 
experiences, but the experiences of her interviewees,  
 
                                                          
430Allison, Women and Political Violence: Female Combatants in Ethno-National Conflict, 190. 
431For the complex ambiguities surrounding this concept, see Robin Dillon, "Respect (Entry in the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy),"  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/respect/.  
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In light of Mary’s experiences and Eileen’s comments, Mairead and Caral both indicated that 
there is perhaps more gender equality in the military side of the Republican movement than in 
the political side.432   
 
Here, the ambiguous concept-expression “gender equality” is invoked.433 We realize 
moreover, that in this passage, it is not only not describing anything immediately sensorial, it 
cannot do so because it is not autobiographical. This is because one cannot obviously 
(literally) see through the eyes, or hear through the ears of another. 
 I now augment this contrast by looking at the far more numerous ambiguities 
peppering an ‘empirical’ (that is, non-sensory, non-experiential and non-autobiographical), 
description conventional to Political Science. This is Skocpol’s description of the French 
Revolution; ambiguous concept-expressions are underlined.  
 
When the Brissotins (a political faction in Revolutionary France) engineered France into 
declaring war against Austria in 1792, they supposed the effort would unify a patriotic and 
revolutionary nation, and propel it to easy victories.434  
 
Note how in this passage of comparable word-length, the number of ambiguous concept-
expressions increase dramatically in contrast to Allison, Neumann and Kidder.  
                                                          
432Allison, Women and Political Violence: Female Combatants in Ethno-National Conflict, 191. 
433Helen E. Longino, "Feminism and Philosophy: Perspectives on Difference and Equality by Moira Gatens 
(Book Review)," The Philosophical Review 102, no. 3 (1993). The ambiguities surrounding “gender equality” is 
explored in debates surrounding Difference Feminism.   
434Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis Off France, Russia and China(NY: 
Cambridge, 1979), 187.  
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 From these examples, we see a pattern emerging. That is, the more 
autobiographical,435 experiential and sensorial the passage, the more unambiguous it is. I 




From Step 1 to 2: Drawing out the Primitive Concepts  
 
 What then is the use of these unambiguous sensorial-descriptive passages? In this 
section, I analyze Neumann’s passage and draw out three possible candidates that we might 
use as unambiguous primitive concepts. These are primitive concepts we can use to ground a 
Lego-language that can describe practice of diplomacy at least, or world-political phenomena 
at most.  
                                                          
435There are other works in IR scholarship calling for a focus on the self as well. See, Naeem Inayatullah, ed. 
Autobiographical International Relations: I, Ir(NY: Routledge, 2011); Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Autoethnography 
– Making Human Connections," Review of International Studies 36, no. 04 (2010); Oded Löwenheim, "The ‘I’ 
in Ir: An Autoethnographic Account," ibid.; Morgan Brigg and Roland Bleiker, "Autoethnographic International 
Relations: Exploring the Self as a Source of Knowledge," ibid., no. 03. See also, Jenny Edkins, "Novel Writing 




The first primitive concept is “persons” That is, concrete, flesh and blood individuals 
like Xi Jinping, or a Lieutenant Ramirez serving on board the USS Ronald Reagan. The 
second primitive concept is “information-expressions”, that is, information as it is 
expressed.436 This includes for example, a memo Xi Jinping wrote to Chinese premier Li 
Keqiang, or a verbal order Lt. Ramirez gave to the ship’s radar controller. The third primitive 
concept is “position”, that is, a point in “space”, equivalent to the primitive concept “where” 
in Newtonian kinematics.437  
 I must mention that my positing of these primitive concepts is highly tentative. This is 
because firstly, and recalling how painstakingly mathematicians and physicists proceed, I 
think more sensorial-descriptive and autobiographical work has to be done before we can 
posit primitive concepts. Secondly, I posit them for the sole purpose of providing a 
methodological demonstration. That is, I aim more generally, to provide a concrete 
demonstration of how my methodological lesson can be put into practice, and more 
specifically, to give you a glimpse of how we can transition from step 1. to more advanced 
steps.   
 Let’s look at Neumann’s passage again.  
 
When I entered the Department for European Affairs,…I walked down the corridor to find a 
group assembled around the department’s TV. The boss himself was on the phone to the 
foreign minister,…(and) two of my senior colleagues were discussing which of their European 
counterparts to call. A second plane emerged on the screen, flying straight into the South 
                                                          
436As far as I know, this concept of “information” in social science has been considered only by Harold 
Garfinkel. See James Aho, "Towards a Sociological Theory of Information by Harold Garfinkel (Book 
Review)," Human Studies 33, no. 1 (2010). 
437There is a rich and well-established body of work in Geography examining the concept of “space and place.” 
For a pioneering work on these concepts that also takes an experiential look at these concepts, see Yi-Fu Tuan, 
Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience(Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota University Press, 1977).  
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Tower. (It was then that) the boss broke the long silence and asked us to go back to our offices 
and finish whatever we were doing.
438
 
We see here that those phrases in orange describe (concrete, sensorial) instantiations of the 
spatial “positions” where Neumann was at; those phrases in blue describe (concrete, 
sensorial) instantiations of “persons” that Neumann saw, and those in green describe 
(concrete, sensorial) instantiations of “information” that Neumann experienced. These 
instantiations of “information” either involve the processual act of conveying information (via 
a phone call, or a verbal order from ‘the boss’), or the content of information conveyed (such 
as the scene of the plane crashing into the North tower that Neumann witnessed).  
 Substituting these coloured phrases with the primitive concept-expressions they are an 
instantiation of, Neumann’s passage now reads 
When I entered position1,…I walked down position2 to find persons1 at position3. Person2 
himself was conveying information1 to person3,…(and) persons4 were conveying information2 
to each other (regarding) which of persons5 to convey information3 to. (I witnessed) 
information-expression1. (It was then that) person2 broke the long silence and conveyed 
information4.. 
Here, what we’re seeing is a series of sensorial-descriptive propositions, featuring our 
three candidates for primitive-concepts. These are then propositions that we can use to 
implicitly define them. To parse out these propositions, they are: 
1. When I entered position1,…I walked down position2 to find persons1 at position3. 
2. Person2 himself was conveying information1 to person3 
3. Persons4 were conveying information2 to each other (regarding) which of 
persons5 to convey information3 to. 
4. (I witnessed) information-expression1. 
                                                          
438Neumann, At Home with the Diplomats: Inside a European Foreign Ministry, 11-13. 
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5. (It was then that) person2 broke the long silence and conveyed information4. 
 
Note firstly, that these primitive concepts extensionally refer only to their sensorial 
instantiations and nothing more. It is for this reason that they can be sensorially defined (and 
if need be, disambiguated) by describing these sensorial instantiations. Note also secondly, 
the similarities these propositions have with the definition of addition. These propositions 
feature only our three primitive concepts, alongside only other fairly trivial concept-
expressions.  
 With these primitive concepts now implicitly and unambiguously defined – by 
describing their sensorial-experiential instantiations – we can then proceeed to construct a 
Lego-language and form unambiguous jargoned concepts. Recalling our three primitive 
concepts, this is a language that most fundamentally describes persons expressing and 
receiving information (from each other) across space (and possibly, time). Some examples of 
this are JFK’s fateful final telegram to Krushchev during the Cuban Missile Crisis, or a Major 
Petrov’s order for his regiment to retreat during the Battle of Kursk.  
Note that incidentally, this Lego-language is now shaping up to look a little like that 
of Newtonian physics, which (merely) describes things of varying masses being at different 
points in space at different times. However, such a construction of a Lego-language is a little 
too far down the road for us, and we shall stop here.  
 
Implications of Part 3: Film and Autoethnography as IR’s First (Scientific) Steps 
 
Let us now return to the big picture. Recall the two implications of my anti-positivist 
argument that I have mentioned in chapter 3.1. Taken in conjunction, they pertain to the kind 
of lessons we can draw from mathematics and physics in defining unambiguous social 
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scientific concepts. We have seen that the way mathematicians and physicists do it is to start 
with unambiguous primitive concepts and define more compound, jargoned concepts using 
only those. In this respect, mathematical and physical concepts are unambiguous ‘all the way 
down’.  
But how are primitive concepts defined unambiguously? In this chapter, I have 
elaborated on their technique of implicit definition. These primitive concepts are defined by 
describing their sensorial instantiations, and these primitive concepts generally construed, are 
nothing more than the sum of these sensorial instantiations. Put simply, these primitive 
concepts are sensorially rather than linguistically defined. Thus, for example, to define a 
“set”, we describe our experiences with the chocolate jar, the shelf, the fridge of food and so 
on. To define “information-expressions”, we describe our experience with watching the news, 
or of seeing President Assad fidget nervously around the negotiating table and so on. 
This step of implicit, sensorial definition corresponds to the jump from step 0 to step 
1. After all, before we can build Lego-languages, we have to first define the primitive Lego-
bricks it is to be built from. In IR then, as I have shown, the subfield most suited to take this 
very first (scientific) step is autobiography (or rather, autoethnography), as we should be 
describing our sensory experience of world politics.  
But even beyond autoethnography, filmmaking can also be a valuable means to take 
this first step as well. After all, the camera is capable of storing scenes – such as the carnage 
of a battlefield – which we could have in principle, witnessed in the flesh.439  
                                                          
439For very recent works in IR advocating for and discussing such an approach, see William A. Callahan, "The 
Visual Turn in Ir: Documentary Filmmaking as a Critical Method," Millennium - Journal of International 
Studies 43, no. 3 (2015); Elena Barabantseva and Andy Lawrence, "Encountering Vulnerabilities through 




It is thus paradoxically, these stereotypically ‘unscientific’ subfields/approaches of 
filmmaking and autoethnography – not Big Data – that can help IR take the first step in 













































 As you are now acquainted with the Lego-linguistic method, I shall review and show 
how the first two parts of my thesis is an application of this method at work. In chapter 1.1, I 
demonstrate the ideal of mathematical rigour at work. Rather than appealing to convention 
and authority by simply stating the beliefs that most positivists hold, I reconstruct from 
scratch, the good reasons behind why positivists believe what they believe. After all, for the 
rigorous mathematician, an idea’s strength derives only from the good reasons supporting it, 
not the proportion, or prestige of scholars believing in it. In chapter 1.1 then, I aimed to give a 
robust, charitable reconstruction of positivism.   
 In chapter 1.2, I aimed to show that my reconstruction of positivism firstly, does 
describe actual works in IR, and secondly, that it dominates in at least the top-three IR 
journals.  
 In chapter 1.3, I translate the existing jargon of positivist research design into my 
language of evidential chains. In doing so, I mirror the recursive definition of addition. Like 
how PRA translates the ambiguous but more conventional “0+b=b” to the unambiguous 
“⨁(𝑜1, 𝑏) = 𝑃2(𝑜1, 𝑏)”, I translate a more conventional but ambiguous language to my 
constructed Lego-language of “evidential chains.” Finally, like how the recursive definition 
of addition features only the concepts of the picking and successor relation, I have defined all 
of positivist research design as featuring either 1. ways to ensure that the links in the 
evidential chain are sturdy, and 2. ways of finding evidence for the various propositions in the 
chain.  
 In chapter 2.1, I continued my reconstructive and definitional enterprise. More 
importantly, in restricting myself to how “concepts”, and their “intensions” and “extensions” 
are linguistically expressed, I have brought my discussion of concepts as close to our sensory 
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experience as possible. Intension-expressions for example, do not describe the ‘essence’ of a 
concept, they are simply a definition that actual people have given (via speaking or writing) 
about what they think a concept means. In addition, in defining intensions and extensions in 
terms of possible worlds – that is, imagined states of affairs – I have defined them in terms of 
something we can experience (albeit in a non-sensorial way, via our imaginations).  
 It is only after extensively laying down this notional, Lego-linguistic groundwork that 
I finally felt ready to use it to advance my anti-positivist argument.  
 In chapter 2.2 and 2.3, I examine the process of operationalization in social science. In 
chapter 2.2, I highlight the evidential gap characteristic of works using indicators in social 
science. This gap exists because one cannot find data/evidence showing that one’s indicator is 
good. I then reconstruct an example of the ELF and N* indicators where this evidential gap 
manifests itself more obviously in the form of conflicting datasets – and by implication, 
conflicting causal evidence. It is here that I argue that indicator-dependent social science is 
pseudo-scientific.  
As a sidenote, my critique of indicators extends more generally to the use of 
indicators in non-academic social practices. For example, standardized tests like the SAT are 
themselves indicators of something abstract like “knowledge” and “mastery”. Also, “key 
performance indicators” indicate how “well” a company or government bureaucracy is 
“performing.”. 
I then examine indices in chapter 2.3, arguing that they too fail because our concepts 
are too ambiguous. More generally, this problem of ambiguity is the umbrella problem 
implicating all social scientific propositions. More specifically, ambiguous propositions are 
evidentially undecidable, and this lets down positivism’s quest for evidence.   
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 In chapter 3.1, I then draw out the implications of my anti-positivist argument. In 
chapter 3.2, rather than arguing in the abstract about “science”, I looked at the minutiae of 
two particular mathematical and physical theories. 
More polemically, I believe that if IR is serious about emulating the natural sciences, 
it must take this inductive approach. After all, as mentioned, philosophers of science have 
given up stating any abstract, general criteria – that is, a “Scientific Method” – that we can 
follow. Thus, in opposition to what KKV did in the first chapter of their book,440 the most 
that we in IR can do is to draw (mere) lessons from actual (natural-)scientific theories. In 
addition, the only way we can know whether this or that lesson ‘works’ is through 
demonstration, not a priori argument. That is, a methodological lesson ‘works’ when it 
spawns ‘good’, substantive research in IR (under some definition of “good”).  
 This is indeed hard work, as it requires us as a discipline to be collectively conversant 
in both the politics and the (actual, natural) sciences.441 However, the road to being a 
scientific discipline is neither easy nor quick. More importantly, if you look at the history of 
physics – from the Ancient Greeks to Einstein – it took it about a millennium or so to find its 
bearings. Thus, we shouldn’t expect the young field of Political Science – just about a 
century old – to figure out how to study politics ‘scientifically’ in just a generation or two.  
 In this spirit of slow, painstaking progress, I then argued that before we can even 
theorize, describe or explain, we have to construct the very language (that is, collection of 
concepts) via which we will use to express these theories, descriptions and explanations. 
Showing how painstakingly mathematicians and physicists construct unambiguous concepts, 
I illustrated their method of Lego-languages via which we as IR scholars can do likewise.  
                                                          
440King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, Chapter 1.  
441For an example of an IR scholar demonstrating such facility, see Alexander Wendt, Quantum Mind and 
Social Science: Unifying Physical and Social Ontology(NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015).   
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But even before we can construct a Lego-language we have to posit the primitive 
concepts/basic Lego-bricks that it is to be built from. As Chapter 3.3 shows, the way to do 
this is for IR scholars to describe their sensory experience through autoethnography and 
possibly, filmmmaking. It is thus paradoxically, these sterotypically unscientific approaches 
that constitute our first steps to (possibly) establishing ourselves as a science.  
 While I have in the latter half of chapter 3.3, showed how we can transition from this 
sensory step to constructing a Lego-language proper, I do so only as a methodological 
demonstration. In practice, I think we shouldn’t be too hasty. Autoethnograpahy and 
filmmaking are still highly underdeveloped approaches in IR, and a lot more work has to be 
done in both practicing them, and grappling with the various methodological issues 
surrounding them. This I think, cannot be done in a quick and cursory fahion. If the millenia-
long road that Physics took is any indication, it is entirely possible that we should be devoting 
this generation of IR scholarship to describing our sensory experience of world politics.  
Some of you might balk at the hard work that this entails. But I think that whether we 
as a discipline are willing to embark on this ascetically slow, painstaking and risky road will 
determine whether we have the requisite tenacity to not so much be scientists, but to lay some 
groundwork for future generations of scholars to hopefully establish IR/political science as a 
science. More concretely, I believe that the day we (or future IR scholars) succeed in 
establishing IR as a science, is the day IR (like Physics) finds/invents a law. Until then, we 
have to be disposed towards trial and error. That is, we have to be light on our feet, always 
ready to rethink or even unlearn accepted methodologies and philosophies, while tinkering 
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